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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation ej(amines the moral status of animals and the idea of 
"animal rights" as a moral theory and efficient action-guide with regard to 
the treatment of animals. Appeal to moral rights is usually made in order to 
safeguard the interests of morally considerable individuals and to protect 
the weak and powerless from being exploited. Animals have interests, ~s do 
human beings: they are conscious creatures with a r.onative and cognitive 
life. They are subjects of a life which can be better or worse for them, and 
how they are treated raises iinpc.1 i nt. inor<'? questions. 
Animals matter, and the morality of deciding cont 1 1:ts bPtweP.;1 ... ,,'l'lan and 
animal interests (and thes~ conflicts include the pract1ce~ ot • l. and 
slaughtering animals for food, scientific research involving animals, some 
practices governing the clothing and pet industries, as well as hunting 3nd 
using animals in sport and for entertairvnent purposes) invariably in favour 
of human beings 1s dubious and labelled 11 species1st 11 , the analogy being with 
seJtism and racism. Humans and animals, like men and women, and white and 
black, have equal standing. 
A study of various views and theories which deal with animals reveals th~t 
ind1rect-duty views, duty- and goal-based theories, appeals to kindness, an 
ethic of sympathy, reve rence for life, etc., fail either els comprehensive 
moral theories or as eff1cient action-guides, or both. A view of rights, 
however, provided that the implications of appeals to Justice and equality 
are taken seriously, offers both. The con111on objectives of morality are more 
readily attained if moral rights are ascribed to animals. 
A distinction between ba.. anJ nonbasic moral rights demonstrates that all 
morally cJnsiderable individuals have equal moral rights at the basic level 
but do not necessar1ly share the same rights at a nonbasic level. Although 
moral rights involve reference to right and wrong action, this does not mean 
that rights can never be overridden on moral grounds. Justifiable violation 
of rights may include self-defen( , protection of the weak and defenceless, 
acting in the interest of the very individual whose right is overridden, etc. 
Nonetheless rights do not constitute the whole of morality: they only have 
their place in morality as a neces~ary tramework and system of efficient 
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guidance. The extension of rights to animals may not suffice to "emancipate" 
animals, to liberate them in our awareness: this is arguably attained only 
when talk of rights is coupled with genuine fellow-feeling, with active and 
conative sympathy. Yet ascribing to an1mals rights whtch they cannot claim 
for themselves and respecting thP~e rights 1s not only essential for protec-
tin~ them from further explnit~cion am.1 treatment a!:t mere resources but also 
of vital importance in the matter of at a1nin~ COOll\On moral raisons d'etre. 
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PREFACE 
My project is to disc , . the philosophical, moral foundation of vegetaria-
nism, of the cessation of using animals in re.earch, ~nd of treating them 4~ 
mere means to human ends, generally speaking (and such an investigation would 
also concern circuses, zoos, the clothing a~d pet industr1es, and even 
certdtn areas of wildlife management). Th1s illustrates the wider mf'anfng of 
the .1ogan "Animal Rights 11 and the (largely practhal) concerns r,r the animal 
rights movement, vu. those ot treeing an1nials from mere tnc:trumental st"tuc 
~n~ nf establishing t~e1r standing in their own right, without explorin~ or 
de~end1ug the notion of "rights" as such. 
My concurrent intention is to defend a view or theoretical framework which 
accords with this foundation and which serves as a consistent and efficient 
act1on-gu1de. Th1s 1s where the notion of an ;mal "rights" is v1ndicated and 
shown to serve to explain the basis of our respons1b111ties for, and non-
rfghts against, nonhuN11 animals. (In what follows I will, for the sake of 
brevity of verbal d1scrimfnat1on, speak of "human beings" and "animals" and 
only occas1onally d1st1ngu1sh between "human" and nonhun~n animals".) 
My own reservations with respect to animal "rights" are not about. t'ie legitf-
1n1cy or adequ1cy of the notion but abnut the circumstances and mot1vating 
factors for the arising of the notion of rights as such. "Rights" f s expres-
she and exetnplary of human (and, more particularly, Western) suspfc1on, 
distrust, and dfchotomic ("subject versus object", rather than "subject and, 
or with objec t ") thinking. 
The concept of rights 1s, like the conct.ots of mind and of God, perh1ps 
unfortunately, here to ~tay: one thought or conceived they can no longer be 
"unthought" or rendered inconceivable. The. have their respect1ve functions, 
are inore or less useful, and it would lJe pointless, ff not impossible, to 
divorce the bearer of function from the neec1 of the function. A possfb11 ity 
might be to say that there no longer exists iuch a need - but then we would 
have to 1nvestfgate what particular developme,,• 
the evolution of human understanding and t~ 
prompted the evanescence of such a neea. 
whether such evidence is available at all, an~ 
assess 1t. 
'•·man evolution, and fn 
articular, could have 
1s extremely doubtful 
it i~ - whether we could 
A final technical point: throughout the course of my argument I am concerned 
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with "moral" rights when I speak of 11 righh 11 1 unless I exp11r.itly refer to 
"legal" or similarly institutional rights. I d~ not think that any purpose 
1s ~erv'!d by shifting the emphasis from "moral" to "prudential" w1th respect 
to rights, owing to allegedly "inherent difftculties" in the notton of moral 
rights. The concept of moral r1ghts 1s basic 1n rigt,ts-language, and my 
reason for d1st1ngu1shing between morcll and leg1tl rights (a ~ if this neP.ded 
elucidation) 1s that moral .· ights often have a kind of precursory fu11ction. 
If all moral rights were legal (or le11ally recognized) rights, and vice 
versa, then the sole bearers of rights tuday would be wealthy and more or 
less intelligent Caucasian men (if, 1ndeed, there would be any possessors or 
ascribees of rights at all). The concept of, oral rights 1s basic in the 
langua~e of rights 1 n that 1 t reflect the sense in wh1 ch appea 1 tc rights 
was originally made. All other kinds c. r1ghts (1.e., other than moral and 
legal, e.g., 11 aesthet c", "economic", or "ecological") are rights by analogy 
and modelled on 11mor11 rights". 
I wish to express my qrati tude to my SUPf·rv1sor, Professor Jonatt'an Suzman, 
for his guidance and criticism. His reservations concerning anim11s "rights 11 
proved provocat1ve and made me scrutin1ze th1s notion with that much greater 
care. My s1ncere thank also to Jame , Griev~. who acted as my informal 
consultant and whose suspi\;1ons of "rights" a !iUCh proved similarly incen-
tive, as did his reconmendat1ons regard1r , relevant literature. I am grate-
ful further to Mark L'on for his va~uabl ·•ggest1ons and comnents in the 
matter of Ph11oraophy of M1nd and animal .,l .vchology. My dissertation was 
written during my tenure as a recipient of l Huma ·1 Sciences Research Council 
Bursary and two University Sen1or Bursarie~ ( Category B award in 1984, and 
a Category A award 1n 1985) from the Un1vt:1r\1cy of the Witwatersrand. My 
gratitude to the Council and to thf ~niversity i ~ ve~v great. 
Last, but certainly not lea · t, my wannest thanks to my mother Susanne, who 
took (arid withstood) great pains in typing the draft ot the present work. and 
to Johanne Lafl~ur for her efficiency and accuracy in typing the final 
version of this dissertation. 
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Ch. 1 
The Place of Rights in Morality 
Concern with rights Hems to be a fairly recent philo!iophical phenomenon. 
There is no equivalent of the concept of a rlght in Classical Greek thought, 
nor in 'he Chinese and Indian trad1t1ons, for that matter. The ancient 
Greeks and Chinese were concerned not with rig~ts and duties but with balance 
and hannony that transcended the ind1vidual, that made society p~rt of a 
great cosmic scheme, and that rested on a network of obligations, not just to 
individuals, but to forces and institutions, both human and divine, that 
shaped and transcended such 1ndiv1duals. (Indeed, it 1s not only po~sible 
but plausible to postulate a link between the orig1n of rights and the growth 
of individualism.) Even in Classical Roman usage, the term 11 ius 11 covers the 
notion of "law" and the idea of "priv11P 1 ther than that of Nr1ght". The 
Romans, too, did not concern thensel• th t~e analysis of rights and 
duties. Their classification of rig' .as · r"de 1n comparison with their 
expert treatment of 1ndividual rules an~ institutions (i.e., of privileges, 
powers, and 1nnunities). These were v.ewed a~ 11assets 11 and equated with 
physical objects - "interest" and "right", on the other hand, were thought 
"too abstract" and - owing to their intangibility - did not play a pra11inent 
role in the concerns oft~ pract1cal Romans. 1 
The 1dea of "naturol r, s" first appeared 1n the ~e1enteenth century, and 
thereafter was reiterated 1n the American Deel drat on of Independence, the 
French Declaratinn of the R1ght of Man, the Un1vPrs1l Declaration of Human 
Rtghts, etc., the tentral tenet he•~g that a man 1c I) could have a right 
which, as natural, inalienable, and indefeasible, 
and valid1ty transcending that of ord1nary positi 
Cl 1 led the idea Of natura 1 rights "nonsense ur 
mischievous r1cnsen5e, and even equatPd it wit· 
attack which seems to be ju r ttfied if he ts h•: 
,jd some kind of sanctity 
JW. Jeremy Bentham has 
ti 1 ts", rhetorica 1 and 
t"ro1 1st 1 anguege", an 
logical point, 1.e., 
denying that "rights" are - as "natunl" might 1 to imply - "things", 
refer to anything as sub,tantive as atom or ma( lhts are merely propo· 
sals, verbal announcements, but 1t should no ...:oncluded - as Eugene 
Kamenka does - that their existenc~ cannot be emi ir. ally or 11scientific11ly11 
established. We can inquir~ ir.to their ex1stenct @mp1rica11y, ~1z. by asking 
whether there exists in a given society the concept of rights, and we can 
investigate the function of rights and the extent to which they are respe~­
ted. 2 
...••••••• /4 
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1.1 What Kinds of Things art Right~ J 
Of course, to ask: wt-iat kinds 01 things are . 1ghts ? 1s to ask a 
potentially misleading question, for this way of posing 1t seems to 
imply that r1ghts are quasi-physical entitie~ in the world. 11 Th1r1gs" 
stands in need of qualification, perhaps by way ~f appeal to the concep-
tual and functional aspect involvet. The n1tur~ of rights is probably 
best eluc1dated by reflecting on the inadequacies of synonyms usually 
yhen. Alth(\ugh none of these 11 lustrate fully the r.o"cept of r1ghts, 
they serve to expla1n the variou f cet of rights-talk, and they share 
reference to certa1n attributes and ra1t of the 1ndiv1dual which are 
protected and defend•d against at ck by other~. 
A right i somct1mes held to be a .. powe1 11 - 1.e., the power of act1ng 
for one's good, secured to an individual by the moral cOn111Un1ty. Yet a 
person inay have rt,,ht she 1 powerless to enforcei and to speak of 
•hypothet1cal powers" (vu. that what she would be able to ach1eve 1f 
she wer able) 1 the same a to say that her r1ghts are the powers she 
would enJoy 1f sht had her right • P1ghts may explain why indiv1dua1 s 
have the powers they do, but they not 1denttcal with these powers. 
Neither i •might" rtght: hav1r q h power to enf~rce compliance does 
not necessarily imply that one has the r1ght to do so. Powers may be 
said to oblige, but no to confer , rtght: power m1y make people feel 
(prudent1ally) obliged to ob•y, but it does not confer a right to 
obedience, and therefore, does not confer authority. It h neither 
necessary nor sufficient for substant1at1ng the cla11i1 to authority. 3 
Rights have also been defined as "1nterests". Now, there are several 
senses in which "interest 11 1 used~ in the conattve, or "objective" 
sense (e.g., "be1ng 1n r ted 1n", "tak1ng an interest" - here, int•· 
rests appear to bt lin«ed wtth desires, pre erences, will), and in the 
welfare, and subjectlVe senses (e.g., .. having an interest .. - where 
intere~ts are linked with needs, and a point of view). It i obvious, 
however, that I may have a rtght to what I do not desire, prefer, or 
will. and similarly, that I may have right that art not to my advantage 
or that do not bear on my experience at the time. But although rights 
are not to be identified with 1nterests, the notion of interests does 
have an important role in the analysis of "rights" (see below, esp. chs. 
2 and 3). 
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When rights are refe.:rred to a 
the same as tha ... to "rights a!t 
to what I am not free to du. 
5. 
"11bert1 •• the objection w111 be mu~h 
powers": I c n conceivably have a right 
Right calltid 11berties in the sense of 
''privileges" capturl! at oest "der1Ved" and 1nstitut1onal rights, but 
cannot account for "underived" (so- alled ~~a 1c") r1ghts, at l~ast not 
prima facie. The notion of pr1v1legt seems tn imply confernl or 
ai.:qu1sit1on becau . of someth1ng that a person ha done: pr1'111eges 
appear to be pec1al, exc ptional, and "art1f1cial". (The d1ff~rence 
between right and p 1v11 1 al ludPtJ , ., 1n a 1Jest1on poaed in 
ca:toonist-writer Sandra nton' amus1ng book "Chocolate: The Consu-
min~ Pas ion"~ "I the pursu1 of cho~olat r1ght or a ?rivilege ?") 
Ne · ther can r1gh be render din tttnns of "ent1tl~•nts", for shntlar 
reasJn ~ ent1tlemen o presuppose some k' nd of acquired status 
and · o refer only to "nonba 1c" rig1t , 1.e., righ~ derived from other 
- bas1c rights (on th1 d1 st1nct1on, ch. 6). :4oreover, •entitle-
lll@nts" appear to apture onl~ ~r1ght - to" but not "rights - against": 
could I have nt 1t1 ~n " ga 1 n~ t" omeone 1 Pet haps a 11 ent 1t1 e· 
ments are rights bu , would be 1ncorrect to say that al 1 rights are 
nt1tlnent .4 - The omnon equa 1on of right wtth 11 cla1ms" r.ervts to 
avoid ~th of the obJect1on , y 1t meet other difficulties. The 
obj c 1on inrnedtat ly ri that '" ant , ch11dren, and perhaps 1111ntal· 
ly hand1capped human b 1ngs, cannot make cla1ms, t~e iinplication being 
that they !.urely de have r1ght , however. Thi argument could be 
cou11 by sey1ng, that infant '.. , e.g., are capable of maktng claims, 
albeit a a rather unsonh1 t1 ted level, that the very crying of a 
hungry baby constitutes a la1m on 1ts mother. It could be argued 
further that claim~ can be madt by other~ on bthalf of those who cannot 
make (more soph1st1cated) ch1ms themselves. A mor serious object1on 
to the identification of right . w1th clatms~ states th&t persons may 
have right~ that a P.n t ever clatlnfd (more on this later - s•~ ch. 6). 
Yet a right cert11nly con!.tttut• a grounJ of cla1n1. 
Another widely held v1ew concerni the correlativity of rights and duttes 
(an analy Is of duti , and whfther every duty has a correlative right, 
will l tnven in ch. 4): "right and duty are different names for the 
same nonnat1ve relat1on, according t.o the po1nt of view from which it 1s 
regarded". The view that r1ght.1 are "correlates of duties" implies that 
..••...••. /6 
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6. 
every right has a correlative duty, e.g., a child's right to moral 
education implies a correlative duty ~o to educate the child. But if 
some rights are "1rrmuni ties 11 (meaning that the bearer 1s unl iab le, 
unanswerable), it m1ght be argued, they do not imply correlative duties. 
Yet even if the antecedent is true (suppC'sc we render "irrmunities" 1n 
terms of "negative rights", i.e., "rights-not-to"), immunities are 
necessarily privileges of avoiding (in the sense of exemptions), and 
hence - like all privileg'!s - derived, nonbasic, and an account of 
correlative negative duties could nonetheless be produced (i.e.,"duties-
not-to). H. L.A. Hart objects to strict and invariable correlat1v1ty, 
however, that there is at least 011e sense in which a right has no 
corre 1 at ive duty, viz. in \. ses of competition. I ndP.ed, a 1 though there 
is no correlative duty manifest here, there exists nonetheless a "non-
right" rn this case, viz. to resort to measures more drastic than 
required in the course of pur~uing one's goal and which would unwarran-
tedly violate similar rights of other individuals. 6 
Moreover, some philosophers are very concerned about the 11 1s-ought" 
controversy they see to be inherent in the correlation of rights and 
duties. Now, this analysis of rights does appear to have the advantage 
that no synonym is given in the elucidation, and therefore the notion of 
rights is not restricted unnecessarily: the explan3tory force is 
provided by the correlation. But does the "1s .. ought" controversy 
constitute a real threat ? ls it a violation of logic and an illegiti-
mate procedure to move from the "is" of rights (wMch are taken to 
involve facts about the standing of persons) to the "ought" of duties ? 
Assuming for the moment that it is, there seem to be two ways out of the 
predicament. The first is to view the notion of rights as being charged 
with an evaluative, prescriptive element, however subtly, and as contain-
ing "oughts" and "ouglit nots": one might wish to speak of rights as 
"qualities of value", or even as .. values" per se, or perhaps "normative 
resources". (On the other hand, to call anything of value a right is to 
argue for a particular moral view by clandestine verbal legislation.) 
Or one might argue like A.I. M'lde~. "If there are facts about human 
beings such that they do justify the ascription to them of human rights, 
then it would appear to follow from these matters of human fa< t that 
there are such human rights", and go on to replace talk of duties with 
•••••••••• / 7 
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talk vr responsibilities (that for which one must answer) and of non-
rights. 7 
I cannot see that any such arbitration would make a fundamental differen-
ce to the basic force of my argument: I am only saying here that the 
controversy can be side-stepped. (!!. it poses an important threat at 
all: for "is" and "ought" appear 1rrer:oncilable only in language and 
logic. But with respect to moral (and not only moral I) issues (which 
may involve linguistic utterances) facts are often - if not invariably -
value-laden, and "is" and "ought" .. 11y be inextricable aspects of the 
same relatior.. We are not bodiless minds that can atford to treat moral 
mat~ers as purely linguistic or logical issues.) 
Even if the correlation of rights with nunrights and responsibilities 
appears to be preferable, it would nonetheless be agair·t principled 
reason to deny an intimate connection between rights and duties. Now, 
whereas duties are prescript1ve (i.e., they concern what a person ought 
t~ do), rights involve, or refer to, facts about the standing of persons 
(without actually being re~ucible to facts) - they imply neither what a 
person must do nor what ~he ought to do but what she may do (if she is 
so inclined or disposed). Yet "right to do" describes only one context 
in which 11 naving a right" may be used, v z. in the sense of rights of 
action. "Rtght - to" may be an abstract right (right to life, liberty, 
or the pursuit of happiness), or a concrete right (right to property, or 
financial assistance), or it may describe rights of recipience, i.e., 
implying someone else's doing something (right to told or protected), or 
correlative duties. It m1ght be argued that the correlativity of rights 
and duties does not follow from the meaning of the expressions "right -
to .. or "right - again!)t", unless these expressions arP defined by th~ 
incorporation of "right" and "wrong" action, etc. Conversely, discus-
sions of right and wrong action which neglect rights may arguably tend 
to err in other respects, 1. e. , tend to ignore some of the comp 1 ex 
features of moral justif1cation, and to offer a distorted representation 
of conmon moral understanding. The cortcept of rights constitutes the 
moral ground for rtght a< tior1, as Hart points out. In short, there 
seems to be good reason for regarding the notion of rights as linked 
with that of right and wrong act in order to make it intelligible and 
to account for the idea of "standing 11 • 8 
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We obta;n two sets of relations: (1) between (moral) status and having 
rights by virtue of that status, and (2) between the rights of an 
individual and the rightness of action. lt seems to be (logically as 
well as morally) safe to postulate an intimate connection between 
rnatter-of -fact status and the r1 ghtness and wrongness of act ions (and 
whether an individual can be "righted" or "wronged"). (It is tenable 
that basic rights give rise to nonrights - which imply reference to 
11 hann" - dS well as to responsibilities - which concern "help" - ; 
nonbasic rights can be held to flow from both. More on this in ch. 6.) 
Detennining the function of rights is central to the attempt of elucida-
ting their place in morality and moral discourse. 
1.2 What is the Function of Rights ? 
What rights are depends on the particular context in which appeal is 
made to them: they may be entitlements, (valid) claims, privileges, 
liberties or powers. A right is somethfog an individual "has" (in the 
sense of "is ascribed") by virtue of her status as a (morally) conside-
rable being. Queries as to what exactly a right is often rest on a 
misconception: a right is not a proprietary artir.le but rather a "moral 
connodity", a function of one's st~tus. 9 
Th1s is not to say that in recognizing a person'~ status one necessarily 
recognizes his rights. A philosopher might claim that human imbeciles 
or the irreversibly comatose do count morally but deny that they can 
have rights. Fundamentally, this attitude characterizes all those who 
have (.oubts about the existence of moral rights, Yet I will argue that 
"takin~ mo,-i - tanding seriously" implies recognition of rights, and 
comp11ancP. h·tt, and respect for, thf!se rights. 
Reformers co111T1011ly point out that an underprivileged group has moral 
rights so far unrecognized. This view implies that rights are things 
that exist in the world prior to conferral er ascription, waiting to be 
discovered by theorists with sufficiently enlighter.ed consciences, and 
this might involve seeing rights as "things". Yet rights do not enjoy a 
quasi-embodied existence prior to their "recognition" but flow from 
agreement between rational human beings and are extended to those who 
cannot participate in such an agreement, e.g., children, and the mental-
ly enfeebled. It is important to realize that their ascription often 
.......... /9 
9. 
precedes social and political changes, and changes In public opinion in 
general, and that appeal to moral rights often makes these ch:mges 
possible. Moral rights are invoked in order to enable individuals to 
exercise their powers of moral choice 10 , and also to s,r.,quard their 
ir.terests, and 9eneral ly to protect individuals. A right is something 
to be taken into account; and to rer.ogni ze a person as be1 ng mora 1 ly 
considerable 1s to acknowledge that she has interests and does not 
merely function mechanically, and ultimately to concede at least basic 
moral rights to her. 
These rights are traditionally held to be possessed by right-bearers and 
regarded as, in some sense, "inalienable" and "rndefeasible" (which is 
not to say they are Mabsolute": Melden and others consider this notion 
to be absurd, since it would imply that rights ~~P claimed and exercised 
under any and a 11 c 1 rcums tances, wi t~c"" 
tra1nts) 11 • If a right 1s overridden, i 
.. to rational cons-
d ghed as a mora 1 
consideration by a more urgent concern: it ' _1red, contra Melden, 
but it does not d1sappear. If one does have a right, its status as a 
right is not c0ftlprom1 .ed by the fact that in special circumstances it 
must yield in the face of other competing considerations. 12 
To hav• a right is to stand in a moral relation with respect to one or 
more persons, and this relation does not simply vanish when the right is 
overridden for good reasons. (On justifiable and unjustifiable viola-
tion of rights, see ch. 7.) 
Rights differ from appeals to k1ndness and sympathy in that they invoke 
ideals like justice and equality. Appeal to rights 1s made as a matter 
of justice. A person with a right has no reason to be grateful to those 
who respect it: she is "injured 11 , c;he is being treated unjustly, when 
this right is denied. (Cf. Lt. "ius" and "iura".) 
"Equality of rights" does not ~tr1ctly imply any kind of 11 natural 11 
equality of talents, goods, or treatment due/or owed, but that everyone 
capable of respecting r19hts i . equally accountable to the one who has 
(a) right(s). ( 11 Equality 11 of talents, goods, etc., similarly does not 
imply that these are "identical": they vary according to the natures of 
the particular individuals concerned. But since these cannot be placed 
on the sam'! sea le, they cannot be "unequa 1" with respect to each other 
(cf. sect. 3.5).) 
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Still, we make provisions for those who are naturally disadvantaged. or 
who we de~ 11 d1sad11antaged 11 , e.g , bl1nd people: we mitigate t:heir 
"inferiority": we attempt to "correct" the natural a· rangement by 
making special provisions for them, thereby according to them treatment 
not conceded to others. 
It may be argued as Robert Noz1ck co~: that "there is only one form of 
wrong-doing" 1nr'. that is "the violat1on of rights", and that "rights 
reflect the facts of our separate existences." The nonviolation of 
rights is placed as a constraint on action, rather than, or in addition 
to, building it into the "end state" to be realized. Nozick writes that 
here i~ no ••5oc1al entity" with a good that undergoes some sacrifice 
for its own good - there are only different individuals, with their own 
individual lives. No moral balancin9 can take place between them, no 
moral outweighing of one of thefr lives by others so as to lead to a 
greater overall "social good. 11 In a s"uilar vein, Ronald Dworkin writes 
that r1ghts concern individuals and indhidual actions (unlike 11 goals 11 
which concern soc1ll entities .r cDf111tunities, and consequences of 
actions.) 13 The model of •balanr.1ng" collective interests against 
personal right-claims is mistaken, 1n that it involves a confusion of a 
group• s goals w1tt1 the rights o. members of the group - th 1s mode 1 poses 
the threat of destroying the concept of individual rights. and the 
usefulness of this concept, 1f they can be overridden in any given new 
s·tuation. The model of securir.g individual rights which can only be 
abridged for compelling reasons is certainly more satisfactory. 
Ascription of moral rights is crucial in that it represents the implicit 
or explicit prom1se of those who confer them to those on whom they are 
conferred that their dignity and equal 1ty will be respected. This 
requirtis the understanding of the former of what r1ghts are, as well as 
their honesty w1 th respect to the full 1m~ 1 icati ons of the rights 
view. 14 Appeal to rights is arguably made primarily for SPlf-interested 
reasons, or self-protection or self-def~nce, but the exten~ion of rights 
to, e.g., human infants or imbeciles is not only a matte: of 
sentimentality or expediency but of genuine moral concern. Indeed, as 
Stephen Clark argues: "The capacity to teel respect and awe for our 
fellows has been built into us because creatures with those motives have 
.••••••••• / 11 
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left more descendants than those that did not. It has Deen profitable 
not to interfere with the doi n9S of others, not to snatch what 1s 
'theirs', not to rP.gard them as merely material for our own purposes, 
••••••• not to disregard the1r ~ iscomfort and annoyance. These complex 
motives, some of which govern our behaviour to other animals than the 
human, lie at the base of our recognition of 'rights 1 ." 15 
To recognize a being as having moral standing i to recognize that she 
has p"rposes and interrsts and 1s not 1 mechanism that m~·rely tunc-
tions.16 Right . are 1nvuked in order to ensure that she i~ left to her 
purposes and that these interests are safeguarded, and hat morally 
considerable beings tan pursue them freely (or at least with1n reasona-
ble 11m1ts) and equally, i.e., 1n acco,.dance with the1r needs and 
c1p1cit1es, who do of cou , vary. 17 Whether 1nvocet1on of rights is 
the only and/or the best way of protect1ng 1ndividuals and safeguarding 
the1r interests, will be dlscussed later. The aim of th1s chapter is to 
delineate the moral context out of which the language of rights arise • 
The definition o right\ it lf do . snot ttle the i sue of who 1s 
capable of having r•ght beyond requiring that right-holders ar'e crea-
tures who have interests (which include, a a particular aspect, a 
creature's welfare). Given the r1ghts have a moral function, are 
expressive of moral standi~g. and are invoked as a matter of expediency 
and moral concern, the question whether ani~•ls can be ascribed rights 
depends on whether animals matter 1n the sense outlined above. The 
tenns "1nterest " and "right " suffer from a certain abstractness or 
vagueness, and some degree of verbal legislation i required in determi-
ning who can intelligibly be ascribed them. This 1s not to say that any 
demarcat 1on wi 11 be arb1 trary - the charge of arbi trartness could be 
met, I think, by showing that one such case of "drawing the line" (if, 
indeed, it 1s a matter of so 11mi ting the sphere of mora 1 concern) 
occurs for better reasons than another: such a demonstration may at 
least purge the tenn "arb1trary" of 1ts negative connotations. 
Questions concern1ng conditions for the ascription of rights, what kinds 
of beings can have rights, are dealt with in ch. 5, questions concerning 
particular ri~hts which these beings have, the distinction bet.Jeen basic 
and non-basic moral rights, and whether possession 1s "equal", or a 
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matter of degree or even kind, are treated in ch. 6. Ch. 1 has high-
1 ighted the intimate link between rights and moral status, or moral 
considerability, and interests. Therefore, before turning to the issue 
of animal rights, I will invel\tigate the motivation behind viewing 
animals as morally considerable be1ngs, a having interests, and address 
the question whether this motivation 1S justified. This investigation 
necessitates an examination - however cursory - of animal behaviour and 
- non-question - begg1ngly - of animal psychology. 
• •••••..•• /13 
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Ch. 2 
Minds, Interests and Mora_l Stand 1,!!i 
The first real animal protection movement wits launched in the nineteenth 
century; without an actual precedent, pr1 · sure groups were formed and systema-
tic agitati~n conducted. Only a hundred yedrs earlier, the general assump-
tion had been that animals were only meJns to human ends and benefits. Human 
dominion was absolute, animals lacked imnortal soul , reason, language, they 
lacked consr' .>usness, and to talk of their possessing "rights" or even to 
consider the possibility was absurd. Transfonnation of public opinion, 
growing condemnation of maltreatment of animal s , and enforcement of, if not 
the rights of animals, at least the duties of humans to them, were probably 
influenced by three main fdctors, moral, scienti1ic and material, or econo-
mic. 
(1) Moral influence: in the Judeo-l ,·1stian tradition, stress was laid on 
man 1 s stewardship and on his duty to God's r reation. (An irteresting paral .. 
lel 1s constituted by the Afrikaner's empha fzing the role of the white man, 
the upper gr<1up, on developing the country, in train1ng and gu1ding the 
uneducated, unmotivdted black , by whatever means necessary. Stuart Cloete 
writes· "!t can now be taken as axiomatic tha~ the progress of any country 
is dependent on the wh1~e-black ratio. The more white men, the greater the 
progress. It is frequently and quite correctly stated that all the work has 
beeu perfc;r"¥.d b.v black hands. But unt1l these hands were directed by white 
brains they built nothing more complex than "lid and µole t-uts roofed with 
grass. White brains, skill and c11pital are the key to African progress. 11 ) 1 
Theologians urged not to i"f11ct unnecessary suffering on 11nimals or exert 
unnecessary crue 1 ty, an appea 1 which 1 ef t much room for debate over which 
forms of cruelty were or were not unnecessary. The eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries saw the ri of the more secular uti 11tarian doctrine which con-
cerned maximization of happiness and pleasure, and minimization of pain of 
all sentie11t beings, and which did not plac~ spechl emphasis on man's 
dominion over nonhuman nature. 
( 2) Scienti fie influence: The Darw1 n1an revelation of significant simi lar1-
tie· in anatomy, physiology and intelligence between human beings and larger 
bpes st-owed that the "di fference 11 between humans and animals cc:Jl d no 1 onger 
•••••• ' ••• /14 
' 
14. 
be viewed as onP in kind bUL ~ ,, 1n degf'ee 
animdis, as Mary rt.1dgley forceful 11 pc1nt ~ 
the 1Hmealog1cal relationsh1p of animals 
we are not like animals, we are 
- -
out. It was thh disclosure of 
to man which arguably lessened 
exploitation, or at least caused ume to reconsider their motives and 
beliefs. (Again, an 111uminat1on parallel 1 onst1tuted by the gradual 
abandonment by some Afr1kaners of the bel1ef that race h associated w1th 
infer1or or superior physical and mental anc even moral qualities, one reason 
for this chang1ng outloo~ being he recent controversy surrounding the 
genet;c compos1t1on ot the outh Afr1 an • oloured people and, even more, the 
A1r dans speaking wh1te . log1col records conta1n reference to 
coloured ancestry.) 
(3) Mater1 1 or •i onomic 1n t luence Indu trial Revolut1on freed humans 
from econom1 - 1 • on an11T I labour · a animal beca1ne marginal to the 
po s1ble to take . more 1ndulgent process of pr ,ju t1on 1. n :y "ilve bE·· 1 rr 
att1 ude toward •heir wel rt. ~Y or concern n this chapter lt with 
the . 1 nt1fi a• or; the l ther k1nd 1 nfl uenc · w111 be rev i eweJ in chs. 
3 and 4. 3 
2.1 COn$<10Usnes · in nllT r l 
The ' '. 1' '1 1 v1ew · ha an1mc11l do not matter morally at all 1s due to 
Rene I· 1r 1 1 de . nptton of an1mal as "natural automata 114 : animals 
are 11 r hine~ ", they 1 • k minds, 1nner life, S'!nsation and conscious-
ness. ' he1r behav1 >ur can be pl 1ned w1thout 1nferring, or reference 
to, consciou tat• · , and .1n ht re not thought of as conscious, 
there 1 . noth1ng to bE· taken into ac ount, morally .peak1ng and we are 
free to trea them a we 11k · . It ha · been suggested 5 that behav1our-
1sm and (reduct1ve) phys1 a11Sm, t.P.., mon1 t accounts, have laryely 
been r~ ponsible for our gener~lly 1ndifferent and often C411ous attitu-
dll! towards, and ridment of, antmal , yet hesr views could be/have 
been responsible for much the ame kind of treatment of human beings, 
since they concern all bodies and all minds. It seems that dualism, 
with tts insistence on man's exclusive possrss1on of an immortal soul, 
has wreaked greater havoc. 6 (Of course, one can be a dualist an~ 
nonetheless acknowledge mind . or souls in animals; cf. the Buddhist idea 
of transmigration of souls, and :he Greek not1on of metempsychosis.) By 
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equating anim~ls (and bodies) with machines or automata which operate in 
accordanc~ with physiological laws and whose notion• originate in thP. 
"corporJal and mechanical principle117 and by pos1t1n9 the separate 
substantial existence of minds, 1.e., the centres of (:,. lf-) conscious-
ness, thought and language, dualism is ultimately cornnittP.d to denying 
animals consciousness, cognitive and conat1vc tates (thoughts, beliefs, 
preferences, intentinns, de 1r1 , emotion , and wills), and - more 
radically - even sensations. Now, "to be able to believe that a dog 
with a broken paw 1'.. not rea 11 y t n pain when 1 t whimpers 1s a quite 
extraordinary ach1evement even for a 
manages to deny animals consctou 11es 
feeling, toe. 8 
ph1losopher 11 , but anyone who 
is omn 1 t tect to aenyi ng them 
Well, do an1ma l'i have consciousness ? Are they capabl1· of having 
sensat1on· , feelings, consc1ou experience ? To say that it is contrary 
to co1T1110n sense to deny thi and to ite behavioural evidence 1n favour 
of animal consciousnes . 1• not $Uff1c1ent 9• 
A hardcore dual1 t 1s not denying fact 1bout an1mal behaviour: an 
automaton (Gr. ~ .. self-moving thing"; Webster's dictionary: •machine 
that 1s relatively self·o~erating 11 / 11 creature who acts in a mechanical 
hsh1on 11 ) can behave "as if' 1t were 1n pain. What 15 denied ts that is 
that these fact · are best under · tood or plained by reference to 
consc1ousnes • Neither w111 1t do to po1nt to a contradiction in 
Descartes' own wr1t1ngs, e.g., when he says ln a letter in June, 1633: 
11 1 have d1ssected the heads of var1ou animals 1n order to ascerta1n in 
what me110ry, imag1nation, etc., cc;,n .1st 11 • lO What 1s reqt•ired in mJking 
a case for an1ma1 consc1ousnes · i " a combinat1on of factors. 
First, it is nec@ssary to defu the Cartesian contention that posses-
sion of language i . essential to possession of consciousness. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein writes that 1t 1s helpful "to remember that 1t is a primi-
tive reaction to tend. to treat, the part that hurts when someone else 
is in pain~ and not merely when oneself is", and that the word "primi-
tive" means here "presumably that thi :.Ort of behaviour 1s pre-llngui s-
tic: ... that it 1s the prototype of a way of thinking and not the 
result of thought." 11 Wittgenstein's 1s the conmonsense view which 
ackrowledges the exi tence of pre11ngu1st1c consciousness. Indeed, it 
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is not clear how language coulJ develop in the absence of prelinguistic 
consciousness: suppose babies arid very young ch 11 dren were not, prior 
to their grasp of language, consciov·. iJf anything - how, then, could 
they be taught a language ? Such instruction is possible only if the 
learners are conscious recipients who can hear, see, touch, and/or feel 
and if children need to possess such consciousness in order to be able 
to learn a language at all, then why should animals be denied conscious-
ness ? Certainly not on the grounds of the lack of ab111ty to learn (a 
human) language . some humans, like animals, 12 lack the potent1al for 
language 1cqufs1tion, owing to 1nternal or external inc11>ac1tat1on, but 
are they therefore not "conscious" ? (Did Tarzan only acquire conscious-
ness when he was "discovered" ?) Moreover, language constitutes orily 
one aspect of cornnunicatfon even among human beings; it 1s not the 
exclusive and solely relevant criterion of mind. 
2.2 Conati~e and Cognitive Life 
Charles Darwin's findings and t~e scier · f1c data furnished by evolutio-
nary theory after Darwin can be used effectively to weaken Cartesian 
claims 'oncerning consciousness 1n animals. Darwin argues with remark-
able consistency that the d1 erence between us and an1mals 1s one in 
degree, not in kind. 13 
There exist important similar1ties in anatomy, physiology, and psycho-
logy, and therefore 1t i neither unscient 1fic nor anthropomorphic to 
say that animals are conscious organisms. Moreover, it is important to 
consider the survival value of consciousness in general, and of pain-
percept1on in particular, - 1f 1t had none, conscious creatures would 
not have evolved and survived. 14 And, of coursP., animals' behaviour is 
consistent with regarding them as consciou ; i.e., behavioural evidence 
can be used, at th1 · point 1n the argument, to corroboraLe other sc1enti-
fic data or enquiries, e.g., of comparative neurology and neurophysio-
logy: human beings share with animal b1o-chem1ca1 substances associa-
ted with pain-transmission as well a perceptual faculties, findings 
which Richard Ryder sees as heralding the decline of dualism and greater 
acceptance of monism. 15 But does possession of consciousness by itself 
suffice for placing animals in the sphere of moral concern and, indeed, 
on a par with human beings ? Kathleen Wilkes' stance is characterized 
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by an emphat1c refusal to do so: "We an attribute con~ciousness to 
animals without becom1ng vegetarians - for they may have little cons-
ciousness, and 11ttle capacity for pa1n. 11 Ever• if Wilkes' implication 
that possession of consc1ou~ne i d matter of degree were true, her 
case against vegehriantsm woulJ not be very tronq~ we eat. almost 
exclusively, the flesh of a 1mah w1th complex nervou') systems. The 
truth 15, however, hat pos 1on of con~c1ou nes 1s not a matter of 
degree but an "all-or-nothing" matt~r. 1ther a creatur definitely 1s 
conscious or 1t 1 not Tht cone .pt of consc1ousne' does not permit us 
to conceive of 9enuin borderl1ne i of ntience, cases 1n wh1th it 
ts inherently 1ndeter:nina t whether a Lreature t ~ consc1ous. 16 
Consciousness, unlike consc 1ou nes -of, 1 not a matter of relathl1 
quantity. Othe philosophers proc d mor subtly than Wilkes. Thetr 
contentton now b Lome the fol lowing· hough we cannot deny animals 
consciousnttss and fee11ng, we do not need to pos1t mental states or 
processes to account for, and 
while inadequate for human , 1 
plain, th~1r behaviour. Behaviourism, 
hfld to constitute a re11able psychology 
for animals~ e haustive explanatio~ of the1r behaviour ts poss1ble in 
tenns o st tmul u -rt ponse mt hanisms, w1 thou reference to thought, 
intflligence, or underly1ng proces 17 It appears here that the 
behaviouri t are the true he1rs of the (dual1st) view of animal mechan-
ism. Mortimer Adl r, .g., espout;e the pr1nc1ple of parsimony or 
stmp11c1ty tn lll'Ch the same way, a Descartes seems to have applied 
Occam' ~ razor: animal are held to "func 1on"; heir behaviour (unlike 
human behav1our) can be explained e:Khau t1vely in terms of sttmulus-
response mechanhms, 1.e., without ""'1.11tiply1ng ent1ti4!S beyond neces-
sity." (E.g., sensation i r:Kphined 1n tenns of affection of bodily 
organs by an external object, wt• Jut referPnce to underlying psycholo-
gtc11l and subJect1ve proce • , Now, such over-zealous rttltance on, 
and appltcdt1on of, the principle of pa,.s1mony i suspect. As Midgley 
Explains: the princ1ple 'Jf pars1mnny "does not dictate that we should 
choose an explanation which does not explain rather than one which does 
••• . the simplicity which we need is that of a conceptual schf'lllt wh1ch 
works - which drdws together the facts of e:Kper1ence so th,.t we can 
interpret them cons1stently a a whole, and which ts fertile 1n further 
relevant pred1c.ttons 1118 
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Is is hardly surpris;ng to find Adler arguing for man's radical diffe-
rence in !'ind from all other living, conscious orga.1isms, 19 which he 
takes to constitute the oasis for moral apartheid, for treating an1mals 
uneQually to {note: not "differently fr001 11 - as I will argue later, 
there exists an lmportant d1 fference between these e.l(press ions) human 
beings. Adler's implication is that if it were to be established by 
some future investigations that animals d;ffer from hunans only in 
degree and not radically in kind, we would then no longer have a.~ moral 
basis for treating them unequdlly to humans, and conversely, this 
kno~ledge would d~stroy our moral b~sis for holding that l· ll humans have 
basic rights and an individual dignit;. Apart from the fact that the 
refusal :o co"s1der such findings as leading to the extension, rather 
than the destruction, of this moral bas1s is rather questionable {see 
below, sect. 5.2), and apart from the fact that, followed logically to 
its conclusion, "ttt•s argument implies that the comparat1ve investiga-
tion of cOfllllunication behaviour has more dangerous potential consequen-
ces than nuclear physics had 1n the 1930s", 20 Adler's position is 
characterized by a kind of morbid fear of truth, for scientific evidence 
shows that evolution demands continuity, and making demarcations by 
invoking slogans like "radical difference in kind" is not only unscien-
tific but exemplary of anthropocentric prejudice. I am not saying here 
that ~ drawing of moral lines 1s indefensible or unjustifiable - my 
point 1s that such demarcations cannot be indicated by a~peaHng to a 
11 radical difference in kind." 
Now, the point 1s not, as it may be tempting to argue against Adler, 
that human superiority 21 in certain respects can be Pccounted for 
without positing any subjective factr..rs or processes, and that our 
superiority and di~ference (in degree) simply consists in the fact that 
th~re are m"re numernus and more complicated mediating processes or 
factors at llfork. 22 The point is r,ther that explanation of animal 
behaviour, like of human behaviour, often requires reference to such 
subjective, psychological states, like desires, intentions, preferences, 
beliefs, emotions, thoughts, etc. It s1mply won't do to try anrl analyze 
animal desires and beliefs {unlike conscious human des1res and le lefs) 
in terms of behaviour-cycles and series of reflex movements which are 
stimulated by - 1ntern~1 - drives, rnstincts, and impulses, and which 
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are individuated by reference to animal needs. According to Frey, needs 
do not make ~ssential reference to possession of a mind and do not eve~ 
presuppose consciousness, but r11 ther r efpr to those conditions ""hich 
define survival and/or normal functioning: when something is "needed", 
it is required through being deficient in respect of it (and the$e ~eeds 
Frey takes to be shared by plants and even b) artifacts, e.g., car~. and 
~ot to be confused with "i"terests"). 
Frey proceeds by way of a chain argument: animals have no rights, 
because they have no interests; they lack interests because they have 
no des ires, no desires because they 1 ack be 1 iefs; and th J have no 
beliefs because they lack the li\nguage required for expressing them. 
Notwithst1ndint FrPy's admijsio~ that animals can feel pain, the parallel 
with Oescarte~ is strik1ng. Jan Narveson argues along similar lines 
when he sci,s that an1ma s lack language dnd that there 1s therefore no 
evidence that they are "subjective": 11 Animals don't really have points 
of view." 23 (Cf. Franz Kafka's hort story "Report to an Academy•, 
where the "erstwhile" ape has no prelinguistic re::ollections: his 
con;itive and cognitive life COITll"enc.e::. only when he comes into contact 
with human language - which, however, ~ignals the gradual abandonment of 
apchood. See c. lso Jay Rosenberg who writes that when we have come to 
understand a lion "he will no longer be that anomaly, a speaking lion. 
Then, of course, he will be one of us. 11 24 ) 
Frey's argument can be faulted on at least two points: (1) that conative 
and cognitive life presuppose language capacity, and (2) that animal 
behaviour can be interpreted ~ithout reference to underlying psychologi-
cal processes and factors. The language-requirement is not plausible at 
all: young children lack language, yet it is impossible adequately lo 
account for their behaviour wi "lout recourse to desires, emotions, or 
beliefs. Indeed, the acquisit10n of language depends largely on the 
power to grasp that words link up with objects in the world, and it is 
difficult to imagine how learning could occur at all in the absence of 
pre11ngu1stic beliefs. The very capac•ty to adapt or modify one's 
behaviour with regard to adverse or favourable circumstar~es presupposes 
the presence of some kind of cognitive life, however rudimentary. 25 
Only where there is no or insufficient modification are we reluctant to 
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ascribe desires, preferences, beliefs. Certainly, the acquisition and 
presence of language makes a difference to the kind of beliefs, inten-
tions, etc., one can have, i.e., it modifies them, but it does not make 
a difference to the fact of their existence. If the most plausible 
explanations of baby and child behaviour and of animal behaviour includes 
reference to belief~, desires, and emotions, why adopt :- theory which 
renders th 1s i mpos s i b 1 e ? That l t may be convenient to do so (for 
whatever rea~on) does not mean that the theory w111 be adequate. 
The case for a very strong rimilarity between human and animal subjecti-
vity can be made to rest also on evolutionary probability and examina-
tion of the prel1ngu1stic abilities of animals, their capacity to 
analogize, to innovate, and tr, ~ncover causal connections. If a certain 
kind of animal behaviour (e.g., a doy wagging his tail} is the same in 
completely different cirt.umstances, as Frey think~ (we should rather 
say: "seems to be" the same), this does not mean that there are no 
underlying beliefs, iriteritions, expectations, or desires, involved; on 
the COntrary t it 1 '_, rather the 1 imitS Of the human Observer IS nature 
which may deny him an understand1ng of motives, habits, and experiences 
of animals. Subtle differences in, e.g., a dog's wagging his tail on 
hearing a familiar voice, and - on another :)CCaCi1on - on smel1111g his 
food, can be understood only, and need to be explained, by reference to 
expectations, beliefs, etc. 26 Behaviour needs to be explained not 
atom1stica11y (1.e., ·in abstraction from its context), but hclistically, 
must be understood 1n context, if i 1s to be understood at all. 
"Understanding a haMt is seeing what C.llllf.iany it keeps. The meaning 1s 
the use", as Midgley writes. Understanding d reason or a motive is 
seeing whether individuals are moved by fear, curiosity, or anger, or 
other emotions. Animals do not only possess and exhi~ t these feelings, 
but they are able to detect them in other~ !.pot tt•c dif.en-nc~ between 
them, and act accordingly. Human beings and an1ml h rt'.'SP"ild t•" ree11ngs 
and intentioris they read in an action, not only to •he act1ou h.~elf. 
and they can therefore be said to act for a reason, and to have mo. · ves. 
(Actions, in Donald Davidson's words, are "pieces ,1f behaviour inten-
tional under some description".) Understanding a particular habit or 
motive involves seeing what set of habits or motives it belongs to, and 
what importance that set has in the life of a species. Norman Malcolm 
considers it "remarkable that philosophers seeking an understanding rf 
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the mental concepts have lost sight of the bearer of ment~l predicates." 
And: "our application of those terms 1s not guided by the examination 
of neural processes but by our knowledge or belief about the situations 
and con~itions in which people and other animals are placed. 1127 
To argue that animal behaviour 1s best understood and explained by 
reference to "subjective st, tes" is, of course, net sufficient for 
showing that an animal actually is in a particular state and certainly 
not for determining exactly whdt that state consists in, what the 
content of that state 1s. Frey and Davidson deny the poss i b111 ty of 
showing that an animal 1s in a particular state at a particular time, 
that animals have such states at all, while Stephen Stich and Thomas 
Nagel (t~ough in a manner very different from St1ch's approach) deny the 
former poss1bility, 1.e., of knowing what the content of a11imals 1 
subjective state is, or what their subjective experience characteristi-
cally consists in. 
Frey's verd1ct 1s that 11 if guesses about the subjective states of 
members of our own · pec1es are r1sky, guesses about the subjective 
s t«tes of members of different species. and about how close such states 
in them resemble such states in us, are posit1vely hazardous; certainly, 
they inject a totally alien element into the obJe-:t1ve study of a•.,in1al 
behaviour." 28 
Now, stuJy ·ng the experiences of a thinking subject 1s not "becoming 
subjective"; they can be studied objectively, by considering their 
surroundings and the circumstances in w;1ich they occ•Jr. The rejoinder 
now becomE::; the follow1ng: dnimals are not "thinking subjects". 
Davidson's argument against attributing thought to animals resembles 
part of Frey's chain argument wh1ch runs: animals have no desires 
because they 1 ack be 11 efs, dnd they have no oe 1 i efs because they 1 ack 
the language with which to express them. According to Davidson, "desire. 
knowledge, belief, fear, interest", etc., "dre all kinds of thought", 
and "belief 1s central to all" of them: it 1s the most basic mode of 
thinking. Belief, again, presuppJses the capacity to interpret the 
speech of others, and the link between having beliefs and being so 
11nguistically proficient is having "the concept of beliefM. 29 David-
son's "chain argument", then 1s the following: animals have no thoughts 
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(e.g •• desires, fears. interests. etc.) becau •1 they lack beliefs; they 
have no beliefs because they do not have the concept of belief; and they 
lack the concept of belief because they lack language (because they are 
not members of a speech co1m1uni ty, cannot interpret the speech of 
others) 30 • 
It h possible to argue against Davidson. as against Frey, that some 
desire~. emotions, and interests are noncognitive, i.e., not cognitively 
informed in the sense of being connected with beliefs, etc.: t!.g., 
unconscious or preconscious desires, interests, and emotions. Of 
course, Davidson could argue that these desires, etc., are "mental 
events doxastic under some othtr description", and this argument w111 
well be adequate w1th respect to human beings to whom on~ ha ~ previously 
ascribed, and can st111 ascribe, 'iuch conscious cognitive states. But 
what about infants, children, and those adult human beings who lack 
lingutstic competence ? Don't they, can't they think ? Can they have 
desires only if they can frar thL'm linguistically, can they have 
interests only if they can recognize and exp~ess them in language ? I 
leave th1s bizarre implication to d1scredit itself. 
DavfdCion•s • .ugumer1t is also vulnerable at d Jeeper level. Not only h 
it unc 1 ear whether there 1s a s i ny le concept of be 1i ef - "the concept of 
be lief 11 seems to me to be a ~yth l - but what requires further argument 
is that the posses ion of beliefs depend4: on the possession or the 
concept of belief, or a concept of belief. Can't a zebra be afraid of a 
lion, because zebras la~k the concept of fear ? Can't a rogue elephant 
be angry because he lacks the concept of anger ? The Davidson1an 
arg~ment implies negat1ve answers to these questions. 31 
(Is the Zen Buddhist not1on of "nonton~eptual awareness" nonsensical ? 
Surely these sorts of questions demand emphatic 1nquiry and empirical 
investigation rathf!r than conceptual legislation.) But what 1s it to 
have "the" concepf· of beliP.f 1 According to Uavidson, "someone cannot 
have a belief unltss he under~tands the possibility of being mistaker., 
and this requires grasping the contrast between truth and error - true 
belief and fdlse belief". But a dog, e.g., certainly can so grasp the 
contrast judging frorr h1s expectation- and disaopointment- behaviour, 
and relating these pieces of behaviour to the circumstances that surround 
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them. (And repeated disappointments may eve~ cause him to "doubt" the 
occurrence of the formerly eagerly anticipated event !)32 
Frey and Davidson must suppose that speech could have oriy1nated among 
creatures who had no beliefs or thoughts, no concepts or understanding, 
but this is highly implausible. The development of linguistic competen-
ce seems to depend on the belief that certa1n words, phrases, or utteran-
ces stand in a particular relation to things in the world. 
Thought, and thinking, are modified by lingu1stic competence but not 
dependent on it. Davidson claim that attributions of thoughts, "inten-
tions and beliefs to dogs smack of anthropomorphism". 33 I submit that, 
rather, failure to do so smacks of prejudiced refusal to take seriously 
ethological findings and i to present an unwarrantly impoverished 
account of the nature not only ~f many animals but also of human infants 
and young children. If language w~re really the only source of concep-
tual order, e.g., as Wittgenstein seems to bel1eve, then all animals 
except the human (and not even all humans would be exempted) would live 
in a total chaos. Th,,y could have no Lise for anything that could be 
called "intelligenceM at all I The truth is, however, that they do vary 
in intelligence and that for each species (even for our own) a great 
deal of the natural order is pre11ngui tically determined. 
Malcolm does not deny that animal Nth1nk 11 but he rejects the idea that 
they can 11 have thoughts", claiming tt'iat "it would sound funny to say of 
a dog, monk~y. or dolphin that the thought that 'p' occurred to him, or 
struck him, or went through his mind". 34 Now, that something "sounds 
funnyM does not con~titute a satisfactory or conclusivP. argument against 
anything. (Too many philosophers rely on ordinary - language - analysis 
and trust 11 ngu1 st1 c conventions rather than ser~c,us ly attempt to 
understand modes and subtleti of interaction, how piece< of behaviour, 
motives and habits, interact holistically, and what role, or roles, they 
have in the life of a particular individual or species. What: 1s the 
case does not d•~pend essent·ially on how it 1s framed in language.) When 
something "sounds funny", it might be time to reconsider certain linguis-
tic conventions and modify them whare necessary, or at least use them 
sufficiently often and !xped1ently to fit the new situation so that the 
novelty of the way they sound may wear off. - More tellingly, however, 
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instances of "insight" (which would fit Malcolm's understanding of 
"thought") can be cited with respect to an1mals, cases of problem-
solving which seems to foliow genuine mental preoccupation: Gareth 
Matthews, e.g., cites the example of a chimpanzee, Sultan, who after 
apparent deliberation, and without the usual trial-and-error routine, 
combined two sticks in order to reach a banana. Other examples, invol-
ving apes, dogs, and horses, although r.we, are nt!vertheless availa-
ble,35 showing the required foreknowledge and preconvicticn and 
constituting a sufficiently large gap between the particular solution 
and any solution the animal would previously have found to the problem. 
Owing to the necessity of this gap, the available evident! is Pstent1al-
ly anecdotal. It 1s safe to say that "insight .. , while not exactly 
"natural" to other than the human spec1es (and here, too, it does not 
seem to be the norm: most scientific progress, e.g., takes place by 
trial and error), nonetheless 1s evident in some animals: in fact, 
successful imitation can be held to involve insight. 
A 1 though he expresses scme scept i c1 sm regarding the menta 1 11 ves of 
animals, Stich does not explicitly deny that animals have beliefs. He 
points out that we cannot detennine the content of thE beliefs because 
we cannot be sure whether they have and understand the samP. concepts of 
things as we do. Indeed, we cannot know whether they have any concepts 
at all. It wo~'t do to say that they have their own concepts - it must 
be shown that they have our concepts, and Stich claims that this is 
impossible 36 • 
Stich's argument, like Davidson's and Malcolm's, is vulnerable to 
anti-verification1st objections, v1z. that it is invalid to argue from 
considerat1ons governing our knowledge of animals' concepts to a conclu-
sion about the conditions for the pos ibility of their having conctpts. 
But not only the form, the content of Stich's reasoning, too, can be 
criticized, as Tom Regan does convinc1ngly. 37 He objects that having or 
understanding a concept i not a mdtter of "all-or-nothing" but rather 
of 11mor1-or-less 11 : a dog may share our concept of a particular type of 
food, viz. that it is edible and tasty, that it satisfies hunger, etc., 
without sharing our knowledge of its chemical composition and nutritive 
value, of the circumstances of its production, etc. - Moreover, we can 
determine the content of a dog's beliefs in many instances by relating 
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his behaviour to. e.g •• preference-beliefs. i.e •• beliefs concerning how 
~h1ngs correspond with desires and their satisfaction. on the basis of 
what he chooses, what choices he makes (e.g •• between types of food. 
types of action 38 ). Without such belief· , manmals. birds, reptiles. 
even invertebrates like the octopus, could not have survived and evolved 
as the kinds of beings they are Given their expectat1on-behaviour, and 
its surroundings, we can even peak of the1r capacity to distinguish 
between true and false bel1efs. i.e., w~ can meaningfully specify their 
disappointment as recognition that their beliefs have been false. 
Expectation- and hesitant behaviour even pennit the ascription to them 
of the capacity to doubt. and to "change their minds 11 • 39 
Despite the apparent resemblanc · 1 his view that human beings cannot 
k"ow the part1cular ubJective character of experience of other animals. 
i.e •• of members of other speci • to St1ch' view. Nagel is concernea 
with cast;ng doubt on both a reduct1v~ physica11sm that seeks to elimina-
te or reduce states of consciou · 1 , 5 and an anthropocentric account of 
consciuu~r.ess that ails to admit the possibility of conative and 
cognitive tates in other peci Reduction of subjective experience 
to ~articular physical operation of a particular organism can succeed 
only if the species- .pecif1 vi !Wpotnt 1s eliminated from what is to be 
reduced, but what thc!n would be left of what 1t is like to be that 
organism ? Such a reduction would simply be 11 changing the subject". 
i.e •• di torting wha , • supposed to bf· uxplained. What h required 1s 
a psychology for human and nonhuman 1ndtvidual .• not for brains and 
genes. 
Tne point of Nagel' question 11 What ts it 1 tke to be a bat 711 is to 
draw our attent1on to the fact 0 1 the exi ~ tence of a part1cular subjecti-
ve point of view which neces drily always remains beyond the scope of 
our inquiry (which being object1ve - necessarily abandons the subjecti-
ve po1nt of view). Now, anthropomorphic inquiry 1s not a species of 
"subjective" study. \ ince it involves extrapolation from a human point 
of view or imagination. 41 (Gregor Samsa 1 \ experience in Kafka's "~eta-
morphos 1S". constitutes such an examp 1 e: 
it is like to be a beetle" but 1s a human 
body. with typically human subjectivity.) 
he does not experience 11wh1t 
being trapped inside a beetle's 
It won't do to argue against 
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Nagel that we can know by analogy (1.e •• likeness due to function), as 
well a• by homology (i.e., likeness due to kinship), given facts about 
our biolog1cal constitution and kinship with animals in general and 
ma11111als in particular, and how their needs, habits and mo+1ves interact 
holistically, what it 1s 11 11ke 11 for a bat to be hungry, thirsty, to be 
afraid, to be 1n pain, to experience sexual desire, etc. The point i~ 
that, although we can k~ow what 1t i like for a bat to be afrai~ (ev~ 
though our fectrs might be modified by our pas.session of language,. ··. 
cannot know what 1t 1 for a bat to be afra1d. 42 "What 1s it likl to 
be •••• " necessarily 1mplies that there 1s a particular (set of) fac-
tor(s) beyond the gra p of the one who asks this question; the essential 
aspect always remains beyond, as 1t does when I ask: "What is it like 
to be a woman ?", or more specifically, "What 1s 1t like to be preg-
nant?", or when a Caucasian ask : 11 What 1s it l1ke to be black 711 • The 
difference is that wherea the latter kinds of questions could be 
11nsuered by women and by bl t k. (though I doubt that their answers C'lul d 
be understood by men and white)) the question "What is it like to be a 
bat ?11 could only be "answered" b humans. It is not only a question of 
linguist1c competence, as Joseph Margolis seems to believP., 43 but also a 
question of the capacity to detect the motivation behind, and the 
relevance of, such question • It is doubtful, e.g., whether chimpanzees 
and gorillas who have been taught sign-language have this capacity. If 
a lion could speak he would probably not see the point of describing the 
subjective character of his experiences. 
Nagel does not c0tm11t the same fallacy as Davidson, Frey, et al., 1.e., 
1nfer from our insuff ic ient acquaintance with animal subjectivity that 
animals do not have subject 1Ye points of view. He w•·i tes 44 that "the 
fact that we 'annot expP.ct ever to atco1m10date in our language a detail-
ed ~escription of ••••. bat pnenomenology should not lead us to dismi~s 
as meaningless the cla1m that bat ••••••• have experiences fully 
comparable in richness of deta11 to our own. It would be f1ne 1f 
someone WPre to develop concepts and a t~eory that enabled us to think 
about those things; but such an understanding may be permanently denied 
to us by thP limits of our nature. And to deny the reality or logical 
significancP of what we can never describe or understand is the crudest 
form of cognitive dissonance ••• My realism about the subjective domain 
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in all its forms 1mplies a belief 1n the exi tence of facts beyond the 
reach of human concept • • . . We can be compe 11 ed to recogn 1 ze the 
existence of such fact •. without b~1ng able to tate or cotnprehend them. 11 
"Fully compara"1 " implies, howev r, that dt 1 • t some degree of 
understanding fs pos~ible: interspec1f i l comparisons are pos ib1e 
precisely because "homo ~apinnc; 1s an an1mdl 11 (Midgley), and they are 
necessarily carried out object1vely. Ref rence to a consciou subject 
slips into the language or motivation, f ling, and intention, simrily 
because language ha been so t ramed to carry 1t. Without ;uch referen-
ces, descriptions would become unintelligibl or m1 1 •ad1ng. (Midgley 
gives as an example descript1ons of laught• r in human!., hyenas, and 
kookaburra birds.) 45 For many ~ pec1es, a reductive model of psycholn-
gical explanat1on 1 1mply not dequa : many an1mal , indeed, so far 
, rom responding only to present tlrnul 1, op ra · largely in tenns of c1 
learned map 46 of the area, wh1ch 1s why bat somet .ne. bump into things 
and laboratory mic • can be induced to leap into e"1pty space with the 
conv1ct1on that they will be 1 nding safely. 
Of course, one way of deny1ng t ha bat· dnd other animal have experien-
ces 1s to link the posses · 1on of per1 · 1 with an introspective 
aware,.. of perceptions, sen tion. and other mental states, and to 
say that 1t is not clear that animal , havt 1ntrospect1ve awareness, or 
that if they do, it must be of a very pr1m1t1vf sort. 47 This approach 
signifies a further attempt to driv a wedge between humans and •nimals 
by shift1ng the empha . 1s from con •r 1ou ne to self-consciousness, in 
order to v1nd1catt unequal treatmer1 and onsidt!ration (such as alluded 
to by Nozick - cf. n. 44 above). Tht intuition here seems to be that 
expressed by Jonathan Glover: 11 in de roy1ng life or mere consciousness, 
we are not destroying anything intr1n ,ically valuable. These states only 
matter because they are nece sary for other things that matter in 
themselves 11 • ~ng the things that make up a 11 l1fe worth living", 
according to Glover, are "autonomy", experiences and act1vit1es of the 
mind, and "self-creation". 48 Now, 1f mental experiences and activities 
are given the high-brow reading of "introspect he awarenr s 11 , and the 
1 ht of things that make up a worthwhile 1 if 1s extended to include 
rationality, the powers of conceptual thought and abstract reasoning, 
self· determination, and perhaps value-giving capacity, the case against 
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animals (for wh1ch reason JCh lists are usually drawn up) seem~ to be 
very strong, even more so when all the ~ var1ous excellences are defined 
as necessarily involving linguisti r competence. 
Perhaps it is granted that ch1mpanzees and gorillas who have been taught 
sign language are 11 ngu1 st ica 1 ly co:npetent and so can be ushered 1 nto 
the realm of "honorary human beings". But th1 · would still leave the 
rest o the animal world and, indeed, some human beings "out in tht: 
cold''. Two - somewhat re lat !d - approache· are poss1ble 1f we want to 
avoid the conclusion or impl1cation that only linguistically proficient 
beings matter mr, dl ly. The on u to show that verbal languftge only 
constitutes a relatively small par· of conmun1cat1on (human and gene-
ra 1). and hat •' 1 f-con 1 ousne • rat i ona 1 ity. autonontY. r onceptua 1 
thought, etc •• arc only mod1f1 · d 49 but not constituted by the posses-
sion of language. and are posse · 1!d in degree by human and nonhuman 
animals. The other approach 1 · to .how that there are other capacities 
and consideration , too, wfli ~ matter morally, 1 ike "1 ife or mere 
consciousness". 
"Language~ dot not solely con 1 t 1r the conwnunication of verbal 
ignals, but alst' 1n ch1nges in the tonti of voice, facial and bodily 
expres· 1on, and ge tural corrmun1catlon, and all these have counterparts 
1n the nonhuman animal world. It i , in 1t manifestation 10 the human 
realm, one aspect of , greater i · em of conmunication, wh1ch includes a 
multitude of sen .1ry modal1t1 · , vi ual, acoustic, tactile, chemical, 
and ultra-sonic .1gnal · . SO Not only 1 1nterspecies cOllll'lunication 
possibl but animal · 1 (11k • human) coornun1cat1on patterns consist in 
Pxpress1Ve and gestural movement , 1n mor" or le~ . c, pontaneous, cons-
cious act1vit1e4i which art mt· int to be undt tood by other conscious 
individual. Animal, 11ke human beings, respond to feelings and 
proclivities they read in artions, not only to the actio~s themselves. 
It is not implausible to say that an anim~l which perc 1ves anger in an 
action and responds accordingly (perhaps by fleeing, or by displayina 
submission, or even by attemp"ing to calm its angry opponent) has tt1e 
concept of anger dnd therefore p?ssesses the power of conceptual thought. 
Adler might c11n1rila1n that we are guilty of anthropomorphizing animals 51 
whe~ ascribing to them conceptual thought, and that animal behaviour can 
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be explained ~at1sfactor1ly by reference to perceptual thought. It 
could countered thit pt:rcept and ,oncept ' bear certain functional 
resemblances and that percepts are rud1mentary concepts. But more 1s 
required: we need to · t1blish that 1t i somet1mes not only plausible 
but parsimonious to speak of conceptual thought 1n animals, e.g., when 
we want to distingu1 · h between a frog' '> and a dog's antfcipation·.,..ha-
viours, the di rim1nations they make, 1· tc. - Certain cases of problem-
so 1v i ng act 1v i ty, too, cou 1 d b• i1 d t.o involve the power and presence 
of cone ptual thought. The 1mpor ant thing to remember i · that., as 
Regan ha put it, thi capac1ty 1 not a matter of "all-or-nothing", but 
•llOre-or-les .• " Unllk 0 consc1ou ·sn · , it i pos 1 • f!d •n degrees. 
Self-con c1ousne s and r~·ional1ty, 
Maltolm sugge t, .g., that r opl 
oo, ~eem to be matters of degree. 
may vary greatly in the1r degree of 
sel f-con-cfou nt Ii , and Clark propc• • that 1 f-consciou ~ ness arises 
with the capac l o 1 oc • one • 1 f in phys 1ca1 space, to know where one 
is and whom one Is dt ling with nd what 1 expected of one. 52 Accord-
ing to l lark, therr 1 good r a t n to thin• that animals may be elf-
cons"ious 1n dfff in~ degree i. ; the ability o fdentffy others as 
dhfdual 1nd o r · •lgn1 1 · one!.• 1 s dfst1nct from others and as an 
object in public pac , 1 perhap~ connected w1th the sort of upbrfn~ing 
an animal recc 1ve ; and 1 li 1 to be present in species who produce 
a lot of you,,,. And in .necf s who produce relatively few offspring, 
the survfv"l valut of •. · lf-con ciou nes would be that much greater. 
Rationality, too, seems to be 11 matter 1 degree. (It may be tempting 
to arguE, 11ke Margo11 · doe , f., favour of tht notion of "species-
specif1c rationality", but th1 notion hopelessly obscure and not 
very usef u 1 • ) 
An)one bent on deny 1 ng that an i ma 1 po . the power of conceptua 1 
thought, self-consciou r nE ~· , and/or rat1onality, needs to supply ~ompel-
11ng answers to tht quest1om what tlre the lower limits of conceptual 
thought? of self-consciousm -. .? ot rationality ? It appears that there 
is, rather, a gradual transit1on from perception to conceptual thought, 
from "consciousness-of" to self-consciousnes , 54 from simple problem-
solving activity to rationality. 
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2.3 Interests and Moral Standing 
Given the conclusions reached so far, that Lil multicellular animals are 
conscious organisms; that many animals possess "consciousness-of". or 
transitive con~ciousness, i.e •• which has an obJect; th~t manmals, 
birds, and perhaps even some reptiles, and invertebrates like the 
octopus, have not only a conat1ve life but also c~snitive states; that 
some (like dogs, cetacea, horses, apes and n!Qnkeys) are aware of their 
attitudes; that it is both mean1ngful and parsimonious to view certain 
species 4: possessing some sense of self, conceptual thought, and even 
rationality; does it follow that an1mals have interests ? Dr they have 
mora 1 standing ? Thl>ugh tt.ese two not i ans a re distinct, they seem 
nonetheless to be connected. To have moral standing involves t11e idea 
o .. aving a life that can be better or worse for one and presupposes 
organic life. (Though one speaks of "growth" in crystals and of the 
"dead rocks" of the Namib desert, rocks and mir ?rals are outside the 
sphere of moral concern. The issue concerning the wrongness or unjusti-
fiability of blow;ng up the Matterhorn raises ecological and aesthetic 
questions i"ather than moral ones. We take a dim vie"" of those who 
attt·lf, to destroy Rembrandt's "Night liiltch", but ;s their action 
"immoral" ? It d~monstrates a lack of appreciation of property, culture, 
tradition, and beauty, but it is difficult to see where morality could 
gain a foothold in this regard, i.e., in abstraction from the indivi-
duals who own the painting, who obtain pleasure from looking at it, 
etc.) This means that 1n order to matter morally someone or something 
must be the •subject of a 11 fe", 55 1.e., an entity of which organic 
life can be predicated and which "it is like to be", which has a perspec-
tive with respect to the world, can flourish or languish, can be the 
"subject of good and evil". 56 
What is the connection between moral standing and interests ? I think 
Coiin McGinn is basically correct in saying: "The interests of a 
creature relate to its biological nature, capacities for enjoyment, and 
distinctive way of life. They define the conditions under whi<.n it 
flourishes or languishes 11 • 57 The term "interest", if we consider the 
etymology of the word 58 (Lt.: "inter" - between; "esse" - to be; 
hence, "to be/lie between"), is relational, connective bet~een subject 
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and object. There is inadequate reason to subscribe to the narrow legal 
usage of "interests" and to take this usage as a model for the whole use 
of the word, to allude to tht! "prescriptive-evaluative overtone" of 
"interests" and to deny that animals have interests, but to speak rather 
of their welfare, dS H.J. Mccloskey does. 59 (But if this denial does 
not mean that we can m~ltreat them, what does it mean "to decline to 
speak of the interests of animals", and what is the point of saying it 
?) We speak of (a subject) "taking an interest in"/"having an interest 
in" (an object). something "beir~ in the interest of" (a subject) and (a 
subject) "being interested in" something. Not only do we fail to detect 
a "prescriptive-evaluative overtone" in these aifferent uses (though 
such an element can doubtlessly be built 1nto the concept), but nothing 
in them precludes the extension of the term to cover animcsls. 
"Taking an interest in x" and "being interested in x" seem to contain 
reference to conative life and capacities, in that they involve preferen-
ces, wishes, desires, and corresponding cognitive states like preference 
- beliefs, des1re - fulfilment - beliefs, etc. Some animals have thes& 
conative and cognit 've capacities, while others - though lacking perhaps 
corresponding beliefs, thoughts, and purposes - can be ascribed simple 
desires. The set:ond sense of "interests" is containeo in "having an 
interest in x" and "x being 1n one's interest": here, "interests" refer 
to needs and advantages and concern the welfare of the subject. Now, 
l'nimals have needs (and so do plants); they have a life that can be 
better or worse •,,r them, someth1 ng can be to their advantage or to 
their d1sadvantage9 they have a welfare - 1.e., they can be helped, and 
~armed, by being made to suffer - either through infliction or through 
deprivation. 
A third set se of "interests", also exhibited in ''having an interest", 
.,.,.# ·~t!> tht• posstssion of a subjective poirt of view, a perspective 
wMch the world is experienced 1n one way or another. To have 
.. rests in this sense 1s to ~e an entity that it is "like" to be, with 
a point of view that 1s to be taken into account. Whether simpler 
organisms like sponges, corals, and plants, have such a perspective is 
doubtful, but c.drs, buildings, works of art certainly do not. Neither 
do they have "needs" (contra Frey and Regan 60 ): speaking of their 
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"needs" is just an elliptical way of speaking of~ needs and interests 
when actually we m~dn improvement of their functioning, or their mainte-
nance - with artifacts, there are no moral factors to be taken into 
account, only aesthetic or economic factors: they are truly means to 
human ends and benefits. 
To human beings, as well as to animals, and even to the simpler organisms 
where we are not sure of the presence of consciousness or mental states 
but whom we might wish to give the benefit of the doubt 61 , it not only 
makes a difference whether ~hey suffer (through infliction or depriva-
tion) or whether they have a life free from suffering, but also whether 
they are dead or alive. Sure enough, death is • misfortune not for the 
corpse but for the living individuali and ther no reason to assume 
that post-humous non-existence should be wo.. than prenatal non-
existence. 62 But dying prematurely, suffering an unt 4 mely death, is a 
misfortune because it concerns a living being. It may be fortunate for 
individuals to be born, ard it is not a misfortune not to be born, but 
dying is, and viewed in this way death~ no matter how painless and 
inevitable it is, still constitutes a loss. 
Peter Singer writes: 63 •There is greater moral significance in taking 
the l 1fe of a normal being than there is in taking the life of, for 
example, a fish •.••••. (A) normal human has hl.lpes and plans for the 
future: to take the life of a normal human is therefore to cut off these 
rlans arid to prevent them from ever being fulfilled. Fish •••• do not 
have as clear a conception or themselves as beings with a past and a 
future". But it does not follow that fish are not beings with a past 
and a future. And, indeed, Singer· says: "This doe~ not •••• mean tt1at 
it is all right, or morally tr1vial, to kill fish. If fish are capable 
of enjoying their lives ••.• ,we do better when we let them continue to 
live than when we needlessly end their lives II . . . . . 
Animals, like human beings, have interests. They are centret of expe-
riencPs, subjects of a life: they have an interest, and ~any i~deed take 
an interest, i'l living. Th~ir lives can be bettP.r or worse for themi 
they are capable of enjoying their lives, and also of being made to 
suffer, of being helped as well as being harmed. Therefore, it is 
plausible to say that they "matter" morally, and to regard them as 
morally considerable individuals. 
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Ch. 3 
Conflicts between Human and Anima 1 Interests 
Conflicts of interest occur usually, though not invariably, in instances 
where animals are utilized for human ends and benefits, e.g.,in the clothing, 
pet and food industries, in scientific research, in sport and entertainment, 
etc. When conflicts occur in such cases one can meaningfully speak of 
"exploitation" of animals by human beings. Despite its trendiness and 
tende11tiousness, this term is nevertheless apt because 1t refers to situations 
where animals are 11 abused 11 , where · ne individual animal stands not only not 
to gain from the distress 1t is made to undergo and from the suffering that 
is inflicted on it but in effect st~nds to lose. 
The irrmediate objection may be: how can we know that conflict~ of interests 
occur at all ? Isn't 1t rather unwarranted extrapolation from a human stand-
point that promotes slogans l 1ke "exploltation", "abuse", etc. ? Do animals 
11 suffer 11 at all in the above-mentioned instances ? And how could we possibly 
assess animal uffer1ng ? Marian Stamp Oawkfns has made some remarkable 
contribut10ns t\> thP 11 science of animal welfare", a.,d her findings and 
suggestions are endorsed even by outspoken a"imal exp'!rimenters such as 
W1111am Paton. 1 Dawkins proposes s 1 x ma 1 n methods of a "ess 1 ng sufferirig in 
animals, none of which 1s decisive in itself, but because each is potentially 
informative, in conjunct1on they constitute a strong scientific bash: (1) 
One might consider the normal pattern of the life of a species and how far 
the particular animal's life has diverged from its natural cour~e. and what 
the impiications are. (2) One might ask whether and in how far tt1e animal's 
general health 1s impaired, judging from its eating an~ drinking habits, 
yrowth, physical appearance, and reproductive performance. (3) Physiological 
signs, lHe 11 stress-symptoms 11 arc• valuaDle indices, (4) as are changes in 
behaviour patters, as well as (5) the expression of an an1mal 1 s own preferen-
ces, which might be detenninable by the hoices it makes. And (6): extrapo-
lation from hunan experience, too, might be informative. A synthetic ap-
proach, i.e., o~e th~t takes into account all these measures, is probably the 
safest and the most likely to furnish a stable basis for an obje~tive ,ssess-
ment of pain, without denying or diminishing the importance of the subjective 
character of pain (which issues in the ab1lity to identify and locate pains, 
move away frtllll sources of pain and learn to avoid them, etc., - which is net 
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Ch. 3 
Conflicts between Human and Animal Ir1terests 
Conflicts of interest occur usually, though not invarial>ly, 1n instances 
where animals are util1zed for human ends and benefits, e.g.,in the clothing, 
pet and food industries, in scientific research, in sport and entertainment, 
etc. When conflicts occur in such cases one can meaningfully speak of 
"exploitation" of animals by human beings. Despite its trendiness and 
tendentiousnes~. this term is nevertheless apt because it refers to situations 
where animals are "abused", where the ind1Vidual an1mal stands not only not 
to gain from th€ distress it 1s made to undergo and from the suff'!ring that 
is inflicted on 1t but in effect stand~ to lose. 
ThP inwnediate objection may be: how can we know that co"flicts of interests 
occur at all ? Isn't 1t rather unwarranted extrapolation from a human stand-
point that promotes slogans like "exploitation", "abuse", etc. ? Do animals 
"suffer" at all in the above-mentioned instances ? And how could we possibly 
assess animal suffering ? Marian Stamp Dawkins has made some remarkable 
contributions to the "science of an1mal welfare", and her findings and 
suggestions are endorsed even by outspoken animal experimenters such as 
William Paton. 1 Dawkins proposes six main methods of as~essing suffering i1. 
animals, none of which i decisive in itself, but because each is potentially 
informative, in conjunct1on they constitute a strong scientific basis : (1) 
One might consider the normal pattern of the life of a speciPs and how far 
the particular animal's life has diverged from its natural course, and what 
the implications are. (2) One might ask whether and in how far the animal's 
general health is impaired, Judging from its eating and drinking habits, 
growth, physical appearance, and reproductive performance. (3) Physiological 
signs, like "stress-symptoms" are valuable indices, (4) as are changes in 
behaviour patters, as well as (5) thP expression of an an1mal's own preferen-
ces, which might be determinable by the choices it makes. And (6): extrapo-
lation from human experience, too, might be informative. A synthetic ap-
proach, 1.e., on~ that takes into account all these measures, is probably the 
safest and the most likely to furnish a stable basis for an objective assess-
ment of pain, without denying or diminishing the importance of the subjective 
character of pain (which is~u~s in the ability to ideni1fy and locate pain~, 
move away fron1 sources of pain and learn to avoid them, etc., - which 1s riot 
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to say that it consists i!l these abilities !).The question is how good the 
arguments are which are produced in favour of overriding animals' interests, 
and whether they havP any real moral weight, especially when and where 
alternatives to these abusive practices are available. 
3.1 ~lothing and Hunting Customs, dnd the~t Industry 
Strictly "moral" arguments in support of huntinq, and using animals in 
sport and of the clothing and pet industries have, to my knowledge, not 
been furnished; and ft is doubtful whether such arguments can be provided 
at all. The "hunting ethic" 1s a myt1i· ~hat is purportedly "ethical" 
about hunting customs refers precisely to their being •customs" -
tradition and more or less rigid sets of rules which are usu~lly stub-
bornly adhered to. The comnon argument which 1s used by game-hunters 
and anglers that they are involved in a "fafr man-against-animal 
struggle is deficient on at least two counts: human beings require the 
use of •unnatural" equipment in such a "combat", designed to take full 
advantage of the animal' reactions and vulnerabilities and to do so 
with ·usually deadly - efficiency: it is usually not a case of 11pitting 
one's strength against that of the animal" (if by "strength" we under-
stand cne's natural physical endowment). Even if it were "fair• in one 
sense (i.e., in being carried out without recourse to artificial weapons 
or equipment), this argument presupposes that the animal involves in the 
struggle considers it "fair• as well and is participating voluntarily, 
i.e., that it has been given a choice. The fact is that the animal has 
a life to lose, and is uften maimed, or wounded in a way which does not 
involve a sudden death, while the ·mter or angler usually stands to 
lose only in person~l satisfaction and professional pride. The obvious 
alternative to hunting is to conduct the "hunt" with binoculars, photo-
graphic equipinent, or video cameras. 
Similarities to customs alluded to in the hunting "ethic" appear in sets 
of rules and regulations governing sport and related forms of entertain-
ment. (Bul 1-fights and rodeos are two of the most prominent forms of 
such entertainment which have in recent times come under severe attack.) 
Show-jumping, to cite only one example, is offensive not only in that 
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the horse is forced to crnnplete a certain parcours in as fast a time as 
possible (similar arguments could be directed against horse-racing, 
greyhound-racing, etc.) but also - and importantly • in that the horse 
(who is not ct natural jumper, contrary to general belief) 1s made to 
clear obstacles of conmonly narrowly rr.anageablt! height, hav1ng to carry 
extra weight in the process. 
The cloth1ng industry has no recourse to even a spurious ethtc: what is 
at stake here are purely human benef1ts, comforts, and luxuries, and the 
practices it in'iolves are not mitigated by claims that captive animals 
live longer and are healthier on fur fanns than thuse in the wild. The 
truth ts that, apart tram the los of life they incur ultimately, 
ranched wild animals are kept 1n cages totally unsuitable for their 
active and highly trung natures. Half the ranch-bred minks are muta-
tions, inbred in order to develop colour variations. Moreover, these 
animals are strongly d1sposed to serious illnesses or are defonned. 
Aleutian di~ease (or mucous membrane bleeding) and anaemia are con111on as 
are defonned sex organs and deafness. 2 The farming of wild animal ~ for 
furs can hardly be reg.uded av humane' even without considering the 
purposes for wh1ch they are actually bred. The case against these 
practices is strengthened further by the existence of natural or synthe-
tic alternatives to leather, fur, wool, feathers, etc. 
My objections to the pet 1ndu try concern three major factors: (1) The 
"industry• as such, the cormlercial machinery governing institutions such 
as puppy- and kitten-mills and the breeding of chronic disabilities; (2) 
the idea of .. pos~ession" of pets, whf , t llows owners more or less to 
treat animals a things, mere conmodities; and (3) the gener31 treatment 
of pets as "renewable resources". Defences of the practices of pet-
production, pet- ket!ping, etc., usually involve some kind of view of 
pets as mere means to human ends (be it for psychological comfort, as 
deterrents of burglars, as toys, or as 11 pest 11 -controll1ng devices 3). 
Of course, this attitude as such m~kes no difference to the individual 
animal - it presumably has little, if any, grasp of the Kantian means-
end distinction: what ~ of concern tn it is whP.ther or not it can go 
about its 11fe in accordance with 1ts natural needs, instincts, and 
capacities. And tail-docking and ear-cropping of dogs, having bitches 
breed every six months, keeping pet monkeys locked up or indoors, 
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clipping parrots• wings, ~nd abandon1ng or putting down cats because 
they constitute an obstacle to the family holiday are just a few exam-
ples of cases where pets' interests are disreg1rded and which are 
charactef'izeti by an unjustifiable meddling in the animals 1 lives. My 
arguments may seem off the mark, in that I discuss some (admittedly 
extreme) practices wh1ch I appirently take to cover all practices. But 
even if the examples cited above are ex,eptions ,.ather than the norm 
(and this is dubious), and even if most pets lead generally happy lives, 
an institution under which these practices could become the hann, where 
every human being has the "right to own a pet 11 , can be opposed on moral 
grounds. A benevolent d1ctatorship is still a dictatorship: the rnerr. 
possibility that the attitude of those in po~er may change makes such a 
system morally repugnant. .. Oppos1ng the practices of the pet and 
clothing 1ndustriP.s does not require me to set my dogs and budgies free 
or to throw out all my leather shoe • but it does require me to stop 
breeding puppies and 11 replacing ' pets (perhaps until there 1s adequate 
leq1slat1on, resembling, e.g., that governinr adoption), and .c; stop 
acquiring leather good • etc. 
Extramoral argument 'i in c;upport of the practices d1scus-;ed in tMs 
section, such a economic or hedonistic considerations, are weakened 
considerably by the onus of vindication placed on defenders of these 
abuses by proponents 01 the an1ma 1 ' cause who emphu 1 u th~ avai labi-
1 ity or existence of economically more viable alternatives, and the act 
that the distress and loss ~u fered by the individual animal c~nnot be 
outweighHd by the pleasures and gains of human individuals or, indeed, 
that no such pitt1ng of pain~ against pleasures 1s possible. 
3.2 Circuses and Zoos 
The purpose underlying the circus tradition 1s entertainment, pure and 
simple, if circuses are entert11inment at all. What h objectionable 
a'.Jout them is not only the treatment of' animals as objects of amusement 
and/or relaxation 4 but the distress suffered by animals by being made 
to endurP. rigorous and occasionally cruel training regimes. To be sure, 
sometimes animals can justifiably be held to enjoy these training 
sessions and performing their tr1cks, but where there 1s no certainty 
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that they do (and 1t would be bizarre to hold that th1s 1s an enrichment 
of their live~, that the1r lives would be impoverished in the absence of 
such practices), animals should be g1ven the benefit of the (consider-
able) doubt. Whether or not s~me animals enjoy certain aspects of the 
training, and perform1ng tricks, 1t could hardly be called "natural" 
that elephants arE made co stand on their heads, or that bears are made 
to ride bicycl ~ . Train1ng usually frustrates -ln anim 1 's natural 
drives, in~t1nct~, needs, and preferenc~s and oftPn let ~ animals appear 
like poorly coordinated humans. 
The frustrat on and inh1b1t1on of inst1nct , proclivities, and desires 
natural to an animal resulting from keeping it in cra11111ed cond1tions and 
from long periods of transportat1on 1s unden1able. The common rejoinder 
is that where an1mals are aptive-born (and this i • o ten the case) they 
cannot be said to have been forced 1nto a new situation. The defence 
concerning the use of animals born 1n captivity is viable in one respect, 
viz. in that 1t can be u ed to count~ r the cla1m that "limited stocks of 
w11d animals" are being plundered 5, but not 1n ih assertion that 
capt ;ve-born animals "know no better", that their natural instincts, 
etc., cannot be fru trated because they have never had the chance to 
exercise them. (A more radicdl as t rt1on might involve the den1al of 
such inst1ncts to these animals.) As observations of neurot1c and 
pathological behaviour and misery gf circus animals, and findings 
concerning illnes ~ or defonnat1ons, show (if we are mindful of 
Dawkins' suggestions), •uch defence !ii are usually 11~-founded. 6 Even in 
the absence of imaginat1on and · elf - on~c1ousness, a life needs time and 
pace to unfold. 
The argument empha ~ tzing the use of c1pt1ve bar~ animals is also c011111on 
with respect to zoos. Thus Roy Wilkenson, curator of the Johannesburg 
zoo: "We only have an1mals here that wer born and bred in captivity, 
and we have extended the boundJrl ·, much as possible so that animals 
may more around. Most a.11mals in ' he wild nE ~d large territorial areas 
in their constant search for food. That problem 1s not relevant in a 
zoo environment". Now, that an1mals are ~ upplied with sufficient food 
in zoos 7 and do not need to defend a particular territory does not mean 
that their territorial and survival instincts are non-existent. In 
e t e I I I I I I. /38 
... . '?; . 
• 
38. 
fact, the possibility t~at they migh~ still be frustrated is alluded to 
in Wilkenson's emphasi7.ing the extension of boundaries. Furthermore, it 
is misleading to reduce many complex motives and habits to a few basic 
ones, e.g., to survival and territorial 1nstincts. Any such reduct1on 
produces a nee• ssar1ly impoverished picture of animal naturP. 
A th1rd objection concerns captive breeding directly : it 1s responsible 
for 1nbreeding, which weakens livestock and heightens suscept1bility to 
infection and 1nc1denc · of infant mortal1ty, and also for cross-species 
breeding, which 1s wholly unnatural. 
Just1 1cations for the exi tenc' of zoos involve referencP. to four maJor 
kinds of benefit (not counting economic considerations, 1.e. of profit): 
(1) entertainment or relaxat1on; ( ,· ) edu<.a 1onal value; (3) opportun1-
ties for scientific research; (4) conservation of w11d and endangered 
spec1es. 8 - As far a the argument for reasons ot amusement or relaxa-
tion 1s concerned, not only 1s 1t doubtful whether animah who are 
inactive or behav1ng 1n stereo yped fa hion (e .g., pacing) are sturces 
of entertainment, but even where they are uff1c1ently young or are 
engaged in interest1ng act1v1 11 .,, this i not itself a good enough 
reason for keeping them aptive. The educational value, too, is doubt-
f"l in that captive an1ma h comnonly exh1Mt tereotyped behaviour or 
develop certa1n neurot1c hab1ts and pathological traits which have never 
been observed 1n tht w1ld. (Though there may be some educat1onal value 
in the develo"ment of uch behav1ours, the point of such findings 
remaim obscurt : do hey 1 , ur 1n the 1ntroduct1on of psych1atr1c 
treatment of zoo animal .. ? Th1 ~ would be ca fe of ighting the symptoms 
instead of curinq tht dhea • ) 9 l 1m1 lar difficulties face the argu-
ment ernphash1ng r ient1f1t r , · rch : fi ld P hol<-JY 1s preferable to 
ob'iervat1on of captive animal · on n entific (as wfll as on moral) 
grounds, hecaure the la hr may 1 •ad to quite mistaken c'lnclusions anti 
because data obta1ned 1n +ht• latter fashion cannot usually be extrapola-
ted to animal in the wild. - The argument conlerotng species-
prtservation might seem to bt· persua 'l ive, but it p , quE• tionable whether 
the possibility that a species be preserved from extinction can hold 1ts 
ground aga1nst cons1derations concern1ng lack of gent tic dlvers1ty, high 
mortality rate of inbred animals, life 1n an artificial environment (for 
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it is unlikely that these an1mah will ever be t free): at what coCit 
to the Individual animal "' extinction betng delayed ? A different kind 
of a~proach is to suggest, as Regan does, that concern about endangered 
species • if it h real concern • reflects the fact of th4!!1r being 
individual animals rather than the fact of thei being rare or enddn· 
gered. lOThe various reasons given 1n favl'1Jr of the existence of zoos 
stres~ the benefit of (human) amusement, knowledge, and gratification, 
but these are in themselves, or: for their own sake, not important 
enough to overcome tht moral presumpt1on against keeping, breeding, and 
rearing captive an1mals. The argument for the abolition of zoos requires 
not that all zoos be closed down i11111ed1ately and that all zoo animals be 
returned to their natural hab1 1 (tht would, 1n al 1 likelihood, not be 
in their interests, owing to d1ff1culties 1n adaption), but that ,iisting 
z~os bf allowed to run down, that no new zoo, be established, and tha 
the acqu1s1t1on and breed1ng of animal cease. More problematic are the 
cases of using animal for food and 111 scient1fic research, since more 
numerous anc1 more complex factors and considerat1ons are involved. In 
both cases aga1n, the onus of ju · t1f1cation 1 placed on practitioner-s 
and defenders of these forms of explo1tation 11 - hence, the1r argumt.•nts 
wi 11 be reviewed and us as a spr1 ngboard for my objections or/and 
considerations regarding these pract1ces. That animals are harmed when 
reared and k il 1 !d for food and when useu in scient 1f ic re ,earch and 
experiments 1s beycmd reasonable doubt. (Cf. Ruth Harrison, Richard 
Ryder, and Peter Singer, who furnish deeply di turbing but soberly 
written accounts of the conditions on f t r ry farms and in laoora-
tortes 12 .) 
3.3 Animals for Food 
It is with respect to our eating habt ts that the most co11111only known 
conflict between human and animal 1nterests occurs. Because ft is a 
conf11ct wt11ch concerns most people directly, they - people in general 
and philosophers in particular, 111ho would otherwise strongly oppose 
maltreatuient and the mass ktlling of animals - offer all k1nds of 
(o\7casiona11v ingenious) justification for their gastronomic and cu11-
nsry habits and pleasure: if they feel the need to Justify their prefe· 
rences, that is. Few are w111tng to admit, like Glover, that their 
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reasons for their nonvegetar1 an ism, "when written down t.ave a discon-
certing air of inteilectual dishone ty". 13 
Strictly moral rt . .~ arc scarce. Tibor Machan pays heed to the motto 
that attack P th' best defence and claims that the advocation of 
vegetar an1 sm which 1 s made "at the XJJense of human we Hare and 
1 iberties", betrays a disregard for man and for "the supreme value of 
human life1114 • The • •on of "supreme value of human life" set aside 
for the moment (1.e., until section 5.1), i the concern #1th animl'll 
suffer1ng and life really a dlsregard for man ? There 1s good reason to 
believe that vegetar1anism will promote greater welfare {phy ically and 
economi rally; I will return to these poirit c; ), and the \osses we incur 
with respect to the liberti of eating what we want resemble those 
which low from the 1mposit1on of countless ot~er expedient strictures: 
we do not assert our freedom by 1 ting whatever we desire - surely there 
are other, more 1mportant freedoms I 
A favouri tc a raument is the 
food tn .. .) wou 1 d not x 1 t • 
prematurely, rear1n9 an1mal 
c1 ng them with more 11 fe 1 
al lowing: if animals were not redred for 
11nd ince 1t i better to live and die 
fo1 food, and - when killing them - repla-
.1 u~tified. Here, we might wish to recall 
Nagel' · poignant ob! .rvation : ••If we learned that we were being raised 
to provide food for other creatures fond of human fl ~sh, who planned to 
turn us into cutlet before we got t)O c; tr1ngy - even if we learned that 
the human rar.e had been developed by animal breed!rs precisely for th1s 
purpose - that would still not give our lives meaning for two reasons. 
F1rst, we would still be 1n th1 dark as to the significance of the lives 
of those other bt• 1 ngs; second, a 1 though we might ac 11.nowl edge that th is 
culinary role would make our 1 ive . meaningful to them it is not clear 
how it would make them mean1ngful to us. 11 Sim11arly, we might ask what 
the si9n1f1cance of our lives 1 ~ a compared or contrasted with that of 
animal lives. It cannot be that we have conat1ve and cognitive states 
concerning our I 1ves, surroundings, etc., which animals lack. In the 
case c.• 111tens1vf fanning, we are dealing with, mostly, ma11111als and 
birds {poultry), .:onscious beings, who have pr f rences, beliefs, and 
desires, a.id not with animals "'tiere we are r t sure whether they have 
mental or conscious states, in dddition to tht 1r natural needs. (Here, 
our knowledge, or lack of it, constitutes the "borderline" aspect, not 
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the animal itself.) To treat these individuals as mere means, as 
things, or replaceable stocks, 1s morally repugnant. Nozick 15 states 
that "once they exist, animals have certain c ' ,afms to c.ertain treatment" 
(though the nature of these claims and of th1s treatment is not eluci-
dated), and hJ goes to say that the fact that some animals were brought 
int: ev1st.ence only because someone want!d to do sometliing that would 
violate one of these claims does not show that the claim does not ~xist 
c:t all. The most repugnant implication of the "human sh.11ghter option" . 
e.g., s that it ir.volves the view that killing is not a problem at all, 
that on 1 y the nt '·~hud of killing 1s an 1mportant issu~. The reasoning 
behrnd :iill food animal fa,-1ning, wliether traditional or intensive, is the 
same, viz. that we can use animals for whatever purpose we wish. While 
't is true that post-humou . nonexistence is as little "harmful" as is 
)renatal nonex• .. tence, and generally, that life 1s a "fortune", whereas 
• !~nexistenc:~ 1s not a 1111isfortune11 , 1t is nonethe1e•s doubtful whether 
t~ 11 l1fe 11 animals ar~ forced to ndure in intensive fann units 1s a 
1
• , tune•. If there is a H fe which can be better or worse even for 
t•eings •: 10 p,.c:sumab~y lack imagi na .. ion, expectations, and £~1 f -conscious-
r.~ss, th~n this is al: that is needed for saying that tneir continued 
1 ife 1s of value. To diny this would be to sanction, e.g., infanticide. 
!';.'''-'" ·in the absenc~ of imagination, expectations, anci self-conscious-
~~,.~, a life needs tirrie as well as space to evolve and unfold, and a 
pretne: t· · r~ 1eath breaks the cycle of such natura 1 unfoldment. Absence of 
imagir1 ';.in, expectat10ns, even of preferences, etc., (.!! there i ~ such 
lack) e.g., in reptiles, fish, or amphibians, does not mean that there 
is not'l1ng tci imagine, expect, or prefer t - Moreover, it is absurd to 
invoke r'P.n&tal preferences or wishes (as impliP.d by the line of defence 
exaMir• • it'.!re); once alive, creatures (especially those with limited 
intel · ~ctJal capacities) obviously cling to their life: they are 
1nca~41 le if preferr1n~ let alone imagining a state of n~nexistence. 
An\l·~~.er ar~Jment in support of carnhorism invokes the "law of the 
jungle". di • ~ls eat nne another, so why should we not eat them? Her~. 
however. a ~istinction needs to be made between killing for reasons of 
survival and kill111g for palatal pleasure - human beings (Eskimo~ .. 1d 
other special cases set aside) essenti~lly indulge in the latter. It is 
strange that we, as responsible, moral agents shC1i1ld tu n to the "dumb" 
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and "lower• animals for moral guidance. In fact, as McGinn explains, 16 
"morality is essent1ally such as to lncline us i~ a direction contrary 
to th~t designed by the laws of natural selection" - morality 1S a 
net:essary co1·ol 1ary of advanced intel 1 iqence and cannot easily be 
selected against. 
Nozick ask (. 17 : 1f eating animals is not nec.essary for our health and 
less expensive tnan al .. 111dte equally healthy diets, then h'>W can our 
gustatory pleasures outweigh the moral weigh to be given to animals' 
lives and sentience ? But is the antecedent of this conditional ques-
tion true ? The objection th might be made at this stage (and here the 
emphasis on moral JUStificat;on is broadened to involve biological and 
economic considerations) rur. that humans require anir.,al protein, are 
naturally carnivorous, and •earing and killing animal!i for food 1s 
economically functional and counteracts famine. The reJoinde:, howeve~, 
1s this: human "needw for animal flesh ha 1:. long been shown to be 
exaggerated. Animal flesh, to be sure, 1s r1ch source of prr teins, 
vitamins, and amino ac10 , but i · is also held to be one of the marn 
contributory causes of heart disease, arthritis, and cancer of tne 
colon. 18 And since equivalent proteins, v1tamins, and amino acids are 
obtainable from other (non-animal) food sources (e.g., soya beans, or 
the combination of pulses and brown rice, etc.), this defence loses much 
of its intend!d strength. Humans are omnivorous, true, but physiolo-
gically 3nd anatomically they bear far greater resemblance to fruit- and 
nut-eaters, and e~en to leaf- and grass-eaters than to carnivores. 19 
The "economic" argument ic simply fdlse: the amount of protein fed to 
food animals is eight to ten times the ainount obtained after slaughte-
ring these anima h. Even on the conservativfl estimate of meat i ndus-
tria 1 i sts the ratio is 1:4 (and to set the balance right: the estimate 
of s'me active campaiqr.er~ tor the abolitiJn of factory fanning sets the 
ratio at 1:20). Wh,.. ' Ver the ratio, tt protein ft!d to food animals 
cou,d con~eivably ·, channelled into undernourished ~ountr1es and 
regions , .ln.J so would be far more functiona 1 in the struygle against 
t3Mlne than a~imal flesh. 20 
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The final argument considered here is "ecological" and, interestingly, 
involves reasoning contrary to the "if all the world were Jews, there 
would be no pigs in ex1stence" - type of argument: if animals Wt:!re not 
slaughtered, they would breed and rr.ultiply indefin1tely, and die even 
more horrible deaths, of starvation, e).posure, etc. But - contrary to 
the implication in th ' s argument - there is such a tl11ng as "natural 
balance" (such as manifested in the radical, quasi-suicidal "mass 
emigration" of lemmingr, or the annual "beaching" phenomenon involving 
sardines), and even if there were an initial "boom" (which is unlikely, 
because 1t is precisely the intensive fanning methods which are responsi-
ble for the counter-naturally high stock~ of "domestic" dnimals), the 
number of animals would ~ oon adju t to what natural resources and living 
conditions were available. (But. 1 suming that natural balunce were 
"off" - as with 1nstances of ecologi ~ 1 ·heat y elephants - the 
question would be: ~ould we reasonably draw 1in · ween culling them, 
and culling Ethiopians 1 "Culling" usually constitutes a case of fighting 
the symptoms instead of the disease, i.e., 1nstead of penetrating to the 
1 JOts of the problem. What seems to be more desirable in instancPs such 
as thes ,. ~ stance of paternalism (which 1s justifiable in that the 
good of the d1v1dual 1s of concern), i.e., the introduction of preven-
tive measures.) (On paternalism, see below, ch. 7.) 
My counterargul"lents in this c tior ire just t 111 t ; "counterarguments". 
They are not directly aimed at sec1 1n< animals' moral stand~ng - this I 
have sought to do in ch. 2. (Suppose re ring and killing animals for 
food wPre a biological and economic r!cess1ty. would still be morally 
repugnant to do so.) Their mora 1 status can be es l i snE~d i ridependent-
1.Y of whether or not their rearing and slaughter correspond with 
dietary, economic or ecological needs. 
3.4 An1~als in Research 
In reviewing the ca~e for thr use of animals in research, I will ct'nceu 
tratc largely on arguments forwardPd by two "insiders", neurologist an::! 
brain transplant specialist Robert White, M.D., and William Paton, 
Profe~sor of Phannacology. 21 
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White, defending vivisection in particular, writes that animals are 
indispensable for scientific research, "particularly a species whose 
central nervous system is similar to that of mar1 11 , and that "the inclu-
sion of lower animals in our ethical system is philosophically meaning-
less and operationally impossible and that, consequently, ntivivisec-
t1on theory and practice have no moral or ethical basis". t.Z l~ot only 
does White's "defence" presuppose, however, that vivisection does raise 
1mportartt moral issues and is not 11 ph1losophically meaninqless" (and 
what is, or could possibly be, 11 operat10nally imposi;ible" about the 
inclusion of animals in our ~phere of concern, does not rece1ve further 
argument), but he - 1 i ke any defender of experim• nta 1 research on 
animals - faces a dilerrma: h1s work is defended scientifically on the 
basis of similarities tetween humans and animals, but morally on the 
basis of differences. Paton writes that "(it) seems illogical to claim 
simultaneously that man is so like animals that to distinguish between 
the two is like sexism or racism, and that man is so unlike animals that 
research on them 1s irrelevdnt to human biology". 23 Indeed, there are 
d1 fferences between species (and these differences often render "neces-
sary" exp~rimentat1on unconvincing: accurate extrapolation from animals 
to humans is often impossible, as the dHf~rential ef :ech on animals 
and humans of thalidomide, eraldine, pe '1 1..il lin, morphine, aspirin, and 
benzene have shown), but 1t is far from clear that these differences are 
mors;ly relevant, and relevant to unequal treatment. There seems to be 
no good reason who differences between species should affect moral 
matters differently than do differenr;es within a species. 24 Among what 
does matter morally are consc1 >usness and sentience. Indeed, the belie1 
in other animals' consciousness and sentience is e .. sential for exploi-
ting them successfully (as 1t is ft.>r sympathy - see sect. 4.4). 
The most c0111T1on defenc r of the practice of using animals in research, 
i.e., the most corrwnor. defence involving moral cons1derations, states 
that their "sacrifice" occurs for the sake of saving lives, both human 
and nonhuman. Thi) is by far the strongest argument, since it appeals 
to that which the spokesman for anima 1 s considers to be fundamenta 1 
importance: liberation from suffering, ~nd promotion and amelioration of 
life and the quality of life. 25 E.g., Paton argues that the choke 
between avoidance of suffering now, and the avoidance of sufferir.g and 
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remediable ignorance in the future is to be made in favour of the 
latter. 26 The problem is that Paton fmp11es here that the only moral 
approach to these issues is a utilitarian one: "If something is wrong it 
is not made any better if something else is worse: that only means we 
should assign 111ore priority to dealing with what we regard as worse". 
What we regard as "worse" is presumably, i.e., in Paton's view, every-
thing that is or might be vaguely hannful to human beings - hC!nCP. 
Paton's latent approval of cosmetics testinq (on rabbits' eyes, rats' 
skin, etc.). A utilitari~n would have to accept the consequencts of this 
reasoning, but not someone concerned with individual well-being, and not 
some "balance" of well-being. (How could such a balance reasonably bP. 
struck anyway ?: Paton does not think that there is a simple utilita-
rian calculus by which we can "minimize" pain, but he does believe that 
we can "simply balance all the cons1derations as best we can" - which is 
neither very good nor simple, I might add I) 
As far as the argument for the 11 l 1beration from suffering, anc! promotion 
and amelioration of life and the quality of life" is concerned, we see 
that it can be couched in two different k 1 nds of approach, with the 
result that we have tw'' argument. whicn do not have the same basis. The 
defender of the use of living animals appeals to consequences, invokes 
maximization of well-being of an aggregate of creatures, living and not 
yet living, human and nonhuman, whereas his opponent is concerned 
fundamentally with the individual, and with his individual well-being, 
needs, preferences, etc. As Ryder points out: "To 1mpose suffering, 
allegedly in order to reduce it, and to take life, allegedly in order to 
save it, are self-contradictory claims. They are made even more dubious 
when one bears in mind that at the time of the experiment any benefits 
that might be accrued from it are merely hypothetical and unu.rhin. To 
attempt to justify the certain suffering of animals against some future, 
as yet uncertain benefit, seems to be an unwarranted gamble". 27 
To weigh or trade off the inc.Jividual 's present interests and real 
benefits against the future interests and hypothetical benefits of an 
indefinite number of humans and animals, as is implied by questions 
like: "Would you not sacrifice a rat if a hundred/thousand lives could 
be saved ?11 , is not only to falsif.v the fActs (since for each experiment 
hundreds, and sometimes literally thousands, of animals, and some even 
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repeatedly, are used in order to verify the finding. but also to treat 
the individuals directly involved as mere instruments, things, as useful 
stepping stone5. However, the benefits of others have moral weight only 
if no individual 1s hanned. (As I will argue with respect to the 
prob 1 em of numbers: th" sum of all 11 ke suffering remains constant). 
Research animals are given no "option", so to speak; human research 
subjects ca~ dt least decide whether they want to undergo a particular 
test or not. If animals could give their opinion (recall Dawkin~· 
suggestions), it is very doubtful whether they would voluntarily u~dergo 
painful tests to safeguard the future well·being of (some) members <'f 
their species (with the possible exception cf rhesus monkeys 28 
display genuine altruism even at the txpense of their own well-being , 
life; and word has 1t that in the US some monkeys have been taught 
sign-language in order to enable them to express their wish to "opt out" 
of a given experiment or to state that they would want to continue. As 
if (sign-) language were tne only reliable medns of detennining preferen-
ces ! ) . 
Arguments against the use of animals ir. medical and nonmedical research 
might include reference to the availability of alternatives. 29 Neverthe-
less, citing the existence and viability of these alternatives 1s not 
directly relevant to the moral 1ssue, and curbing the abuses does not 
depend morctlly on the availability of other valid means of furthei1:ig 
research. Yet the argument from alternatives is instrumental in facing 
the charge concerning scientific progress ("which would be delayed, if 
not disrupted altogether, if animals were not used"). But, as Tom Regan 
points out, scientific progress also involves the discovery and inven-
tion of other or better a1ternat1ves, and it 1s this ch, enge which 
should be accepted unconditio1 . lly by research scientists. Pato~ 
displays a strong scientific con~ervatism when he rules out a priori the 
usefulness of future alternatives, and when he says that "instead of 
funding research into alternatives, rather fund research into methods of 
rP.lief of pain and suffering of animals, especially in the context of 
experimental wurk 11 • Yet difficulties in extrapolation from animals 
(which Paton himself acknowledges) and false results surely lend support 
to the scientific (never mind the moral) desirability of alternatives. 
And economic considerations and investiga t ion render fallacious the 
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clail'I that it h economically more viable to use ani1T1als in 
tried-and-tested procedures than it is to invest in new methods or 
models: recent Pvidence points to the contrary, i.e., that the aw~unt of 
money spent on buying, feeding, rearing, and generally accorrmodating lab 
animals far outweighs the amount needed to establis~ and entrench other 
viable sci .tific means. 3o 
A further o11rgumta.,t against the use cf living animals involves the 
consideration that the suffering imposed on lab animals is quite delibe· 
rate and unnatur ~ 1 nd that the suffering this 1s hoped to prevent is 
aused eithe "'"1 illness or by self-inflicted risks (e.g., 
through the ~ cosmetic, drug, or through smoking). In other 
words, the su • . 11cted on animah deliberately, and beari"g no 
relevance to the nature or condition of the test animal is sought to be 
justified by claims that the knowledge and information so obtained might 
leo~ ~o the relief of hatural suff!r1ng, and if not natural then self-
infli~ted pains or d1scomtnrts, of human beings. This way of arguing is 
not only logically unsound (in that il is paradoxical to impose suffer-
ing purportedly in order to m1nim1 1t ar ·: to take life purportedly in 
crd1r co preserve 1t) but it 1"vo1 Vf an appea 1 to a kind of mora 1 
apartheid, where differences between the human and nonhuman species are 
taken as constituting a moral inr.quality, and this seems to bf! beth 
prejud ctd and selfish. 
3.5 The Argument from Speciesism, and Equal Standing 
MOifference is not equal to inequality. Inequality is not even a 
rea 11 t.Y - only a powttr ploy l 11 So the lyr 1c goes 1 n Jazz singer-song-
wri ter Annette Peacock's song "Survival". Animals have moral standing, 
. 
li e humans. They dre equally centres of consr1ousness, of experience, 
"foci of subjectivity." My dos h the subject of a life as I am the 
subject of a 11fe; and if I treat my doq differently to the way I treat 
my sister, this does not mean that I am t'ving them unequal considera-
t1on as individuals. The confus1or. of ''difference" ar.d "inequality" 
underlies the writings antj ideas of many theorists. 31 Differential 
treatmtant and cons 1derat1on are not the same as uneq'Ja 1 treatment and 
consideration: if I am treating my sister and my dog differently, I 
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might still be giving them equal consideration as individuals, treating 
each according to her capac1t1es, circumstances, and mental and behaviou-
ral idiosyncrasies. 
Now evolution is not a ladder, but a copious ·y branching network, and it 
1s not clear how we, "the titular pokesmen for a few thousaf'd mammalian 
s~ cies, can claim ~uperiority over three quarters of a million species 
of 1nsects who will surely outlive U) not to mef'\tion the bacteri~. who 
have shown rema, '.Able staying power for more than three b1111on years", 
as Stephen Jay Gould contends. Th1s may sound like too strong a 
judgment but it accords with Otrwin's aphorism: "Nevf!r say higher or 
lower." Talk of 11 h1ghe1·" !nd "lower" seems to 1mply that evolution nas 
a plan or purpose, but sc1ent1fic evidence favours the view that it 
proceeds blindly. 32 Gould's evolutionary laddt • which reduces all 
standards to the basic one of survival (and here, arnoebae would occupy 
the highest rank, since they "d1vide", and the "first" of them can in a 
t111 be sad to exist) is as arbitrary as those wt1ch involve the 
standards o nt1onal1ty, self-consciousness, P.t\.. On the ladder of 
social evolut1on, coral polyps and jelly-fish conce1vebly rank highest. 
It 1s s1mply 1mposs1ble to ~s u l i sh an order of rink on one, and only 
.>ne .itlgle seal of evolutionar developmtnt. 
In a two-part lect1Jre he gave a the Un1 ·· rsi of the Witwatersrand in 
~~ ~st 1984, Gou1d aid the dwelling on the hterarchical order of, and 
d 11ference . between, . nd 1 • i duals i essent 1a lly a m1sch i evous exerc 1se, 
designerl tn perpatu1te inequa11ties and e~trench prejudicts. The "equ1-
l 1ty11 I have been ref rr1ng to (and possibly Gould would agree with me) 
ts compatible with such dlffere" . es, 1nt1rpersonal as well as 1nter-
specif1c, and concern~ the eQua1 ' ons1derat1on and equal opportunities 
of each 1ndiv1dua) according to tier ~eed~, interests, ar.d environment. 
Stanley Benn cor. iders it a ''mo"strous sent1menta11ty• to attribute to 
animals interests (do we "attribute" these interest .. , or do we "have" 
them? 11 Jnterests 11 , 1t should be remtl"ber d, are not values which art 
ascribed or bestowed by value-giving agents I) that could be we1ghed in 
tn equal balance with thoie of humans. He says that there exists a 
"fundamental inequality of claims" even between, e.g •• a human imbecile 
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and a dog: the imbedle belongs to a species where rationality fs the 
norm, and to take advanta~e of an isolated defect, and to, e.g., use the 
imbecile in research, would be "unfair". 33 But why, then, shoul~ it 
not be unfair to take advantage of & more general "limitation" (if it is 
that) ? It is precisely this stubborn advocation of a moral wedge that 
sm11cks of "sentimentality". This argument constitutes a defence of 
giving preference to members of our own species imply because they are 
memberj of our own species. But if there exists a biological basis for 
human equality, as Gould argued in the above-mentioned lecture, why 
should this basis be retracted when other species are concerned ? The 
truth is that there is no single relevant criterion which isolotes all 
huuan from nonhuman life. Gould writes that "the deepest cultural 
prejudice of al 1 1s our almost desperate desire to mctke human beings 
special and superior among the arlimals of our earth •••• We are not 
~t-'! but we are different because change in the basic fabrics of our 
social sy .. ter11s occurs, as it does in no other animal, by the non-genetic 
transmission of 1nfonnat1on across generations - in short, by culture". 
34 (Yet some cnimals ma~ntain rudimentary expressions of what we would 
call "culture". E.g., chimpanzees adept in sig1'-1angu1ge have been 
observtd teaching their conspecifics si~ns~ and in other instances, 
training of the "new" sheep-dog has been conducted by the dog currently 
"in charge".) 
Homo sapiens and other species are physiologically, anatomically, and 
psychologically continuous; and t~ough it 1s important to try to order 
spec:ie~ according to stages of evolutionarl development, var1ous such 
orderings are possible lt is unhelpful and, indeed, unscientific to 
continue to speak of "higher•• and 11 lower 11 life-forms, and to suppose (as 
Gareth MatththS does) that "independent 1 i nes of development can be 
melded together suff1c ently well to yield a good general placement of 
species on a single scale from lower to higher". 35 I call this "unscien-
tific" because talk of "higher" and "lower" presupposes a ~antage-point 
and necessarily involves value-judgments, and it is plausible to assume 
that any species capable of grasping the issue would find ~ criterion 
which would plac~ it r?'\ the highest rank. The best we can do 1s to 
r,.Jint out th" relativity of "higher" and "lower" - but: "more or ·1ess 
like us", when we refer to other species, captur-.s the gist of "diffe-
rence in degree", and of "biological continuity" more accurately • 
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It might now be contended that there .!!. a relevart criterion which marks 
off all humari ~ .~ 1ngs from all other species, viz. membership of the 
species "homo sapiens", and that this criterion is not only biologically 
but mor~ lly relevant. This rat iona 1 e has been labelled "species 1st" by 
Ryder, an accusaticn which has Singer as its strongest enforcer, besides 
Ryder himself, and which has received sympathetic consideration from a 
host of philosophers. The main points of the arguments from speciesism 
are that 11 specieshm11 can be likened to racism and sexism, 1n that 
similar forms of discrimination (u contrasted with differentiation, 
which 1s neutral; hence, "discrimination" in the sense of "evaluative 
discrimination") and prejudice underlie these attitudes and practices, 
and that species membership, like race membership or sex membership, is 
morall1 irrelevant and does not sanction unequal treatment and conside-
ration. 36 11 Species1sm11 has become something of a s1ogan among animal 
1 i berators and other eul og1s ts of the anima 1 cause, but has also been 
condemned outright as being not only ' hopelessly inadequate attempt it 
defending anima1s but just another ~rendy and simple-minded term which 
is best scrapped rom the vocabulary of those who seek to promote a 
better treatment of our fellow cre~ t •1res. Because rather a lot hinges 
on the adequacy and a:>propriateness of the assimilation, the argu111ent 
and tht most important objections made to it must be given serious 
consideration. 
Richard Wasserstrom launches the following attack on racism 37 : "(Pro· 
ponents of racial d1scriminat1orl) need to produce a relevant criterion 
or principle of differentiation - yet none which are usually given are 
rel~vant to (1ndeed, a11 neglect) the capacities to enjoy those things 
which are constitutive of w1 11-bting and freedom. Even 1f some genera-
1 izations are correct, they are correct only insofar ~s the distingui-
shing charact~ristics are po,sessed by some (members). Yet, before any 
reason for d1fferentia ring among persons as to the possession of human 
right~ can be a releva"t reason, that rea)on must be relevant in respect 
to each person so ~ffected or distingui~hed." 
•••• Negroes are not conceptualized by white Southerners, usually 11as 
the possible possessors of rights of any kind •.•• and this has certain 
especially obnoxious consequences. In the first place, the white 
Southerner's ~oral universe illustrates both ihe fact that it is possi-
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ble to conceive of duties without conceiving ~f their correlative rights 
and the fact that the mistakes thereby conrn1tted are not chiefly mista-
kes of logic and definition. The mistakes matter morally. If the whit~ 
Southerner fails to do his duty, that is simply a matter Detween h1m and 
his conscience. In the second place, it requires of any Negro that !1! 
make out his case for the equipment of any goods, reduces all his claims 
to the level of requests, privileges, and favours. But there are 
certain thing~ r.o one else ought to have the power to decide or refuse 
or to grant. Third, in a real sense, a society that simply lacks any 
conception of human rights is less offensive than one which has such a 
conception but denies that some ind1viduals have those rights. Not only 
because of the inequality and unfairness involved, but because it 
implicitly, if not explicitly, entails there ~re some persons who do ~ot 
anJ would not desire, or need, or enjoy those minimal goods which all 
men do need and desire and enjoy. It 1s to read certain persons, all of 
whom are most certainly human beings, out of the human race". 
If we substitute in the argument above "species" and "specific" for 
11 race" and racial", "individuals" for "persons", "moral rights" for 
"human rights", "animals" for "Negroes", "humans" for "white South· 
erners", "other species" for "some 1nd1viduals", "some persons", for 
"certain persons", ftnd in the last sentence, "morally considerable 
beings" for "human beings" and "sphere of moral concern" for "human 
race" (which does not seem unwarranted, given the conclusions reached in 
ch. 2 and Wasserstrom's own conv1 ~tion that we have duties to an1mals 
38 ), we obtain a strong argument both for the notion of "speciesism" and 
agdinst the practice of speciesism. Wasserstrom, in order c.u deny the 
validity of this argument, would have to reject demonstratively the idea 
that animals could need and desire and enJoy these "mi"in:al goods", 
fre-.dom and well-be1"9• and 1t is not clear how this could be achieved 
without rtlying on an impoverished view of animal nature 39 • 
Now that a model ~f the argument against spec1esism, explicitly, and of 
the argument from 11 spec1esism11 , implicitly, has been furnished, the 
question 1s not only whether the notion of specit!si• 11 1s inttlligiblt 
but whether the analogy to sexism and racism is a viable one. The main 
objections to the argument from speciesism share a rejection of the 
ade , , and appropriateness of th~ notion and of the aMlogy as a 
wh~·t. They stress (1) the capacity to engage fully in the whole range 
of human activity, an~ certain morally relevant distinguishing factors 
, ••.••• /52 
j 
52. 
between humans and animals, (2) the importance of naturel reference and 
feeling, made reasonable by (human) values and bonding, end (3) the 
scientific, biologi ~al importance of differentiating between species and 
the moral implications which such differentiation has. 
The first kind of objecticn focuses on distinctly human capacitie$ and 
charact r1st1cs in order to render se , ism and ra\:ism indefPnsible 
pr1ct1ces and prejudices and to unmask "spec es1sm" as a myth since it 
does ,,ot involve reference to these capatit1es and haracter1st1cs. 
This seems to be implied in Paton's argument contra Singer· "Surely we 
do not believe that men and women, and black and white, should be 
treated equally, just because they are all sentient, but because they 
can participate fully in the whole range of human activity". 40 The 
implicat1on 1' that the difference between humans and animals is 
considerably greater than between sexes and races, and ~hat therefore 
ttie analogy w1th sexism and racism 15 misleading. Now, in order to 
avoid the charge of triviality (that what is being said here amounts to: 
11 t'•J111 •• r~ are different from an ir a ls because they a re equa 1 ly human") and, 
i1td•1d, the charge of pecies1sm (which, after all, states that singling 
out membership to the human species as solely relevant to giving 
prefe nee to our interests, is an arbitrary move), certain particular 
characteristics const ·,tut1ng exclusively human capacity must be 
furnished. 
Bonnie Ste1nbock names three such excellences: responsib11ity, or moral 
autonomy1 altruistic motivation, 1.e., "in the sense of motivation due 
to the recognition that the needs and interest" of others provide one 
with certain reasons for acting"• and "the desire for self-respect". 41 
It is si1 .. ply false, to assume, however, that these are capacities of a 
kind not prese"t in animJlS - tney do p~s~ess them to a d~qree. E.g., 
an1mals might not be "responsible" in one sense (in that they cannot 
"answer" for their actions, or be maoe to answer for them), but surely 
in the sense of being responsible for their young, for the well-being of 
their conspecifics, for obeying their species-specific eth"'.a (consider 
the etymological origin of "ethology"). hierarchy, etc. ThJy might not 
be morally se. ·determining in the sense of being able to construct· and 
defend systems of valuP, but they are certainly moved by affection, 
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tenderness, deference, prudence, aggression, dominance, and, indeed, 
altruism: consider not only the behaviour of rhesus monkeys but of 
baboons, dogs, most mammalian and avarian mothers, and the circumstances 
in which they so behave. "Desire for self-res~ct11 is somewhat opaque -
animals certainly have desires, a rudimentary sense of self, and purpo-
ses. Steinbock concedes that "(s)ome animals may have some fonn of this 
des ire, and to the extent that they do, we ought to consider their 
interest in freedOf'll and self-determinat•on. (Such cons1der.,t1ons might 
affect our attitudes towards zoos and circuses)". 42 Some animals have 
thPse capacities, whereas some humans do not have them - and this surely 
must cast doubt or1 their exclusive moral significance. Paton's argument 
can be ext.ended in the following manner: sexism and racism are wrong 
because ·,ien and worn~n. and white and olack, are equal in that they can 
partir 1pate 1n most human activities (note: ~ "fully in the whole 
ran~e of human acti~ity", e.g., men cannot give birth to children), and 
speciesism is wt·ong !:: cause humans and ~nimals are equal in that they 
can participate in certa i n activities, in that they share certain 
capacities which matter morally. To discredit the argument from spP.cie-
sism as Paton attempts to do is to miss its point. 
The second kind of objection Jmphasizes the importance of our "atural 
preferences, the special interests we feel in ·:>ur fellow human beings; 
the reason for our sentimental preference for nur own species and the 
~pecial value we place on the lives of humans being that we are 
"bond-forming creatures". 43 This objection attempts to counteract the 
claim that because some humans have capacities inferior to those of some 
animals, discrimination 1'ga1nst animals simply because they are not 
human is unjustifiable: it is because we feel a certain obligation to 
those members of our species, and because animals 11manage very well •••• 
and do not require special care from us", that animals do not matter as 
much as these human beings, and humans in general. 44 Now, if feeling 
and sentiment is so prominent and indeed important in moral thinkin~, I 
surely do not stand to be condemned if I feel a greater obligation to my 
cat than to my neighbour's baby. The point is, however, that although 
feeling is significant in that a capacity for a certain feeling (e.g •• 
of sympathy, protectiveness, et<;.) might be a necessary cond1tion ~ for 
the apprehensi~n of moral values, of who and what matters morally, the 
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moral status of those affected by our actfons does not depend on our 
feelings towards them. Preference for. and the desire to extend special 
care to, members of our own species, motivated by feelings of sympathy, 
protectiveness, etc., does not ;nvalidate the argument against specie-
sism (just as the exhtence 'Jf preference for members of our rare does 
not render inapplicable arguments against "racism"); it may, nther, 
prejudice us against the interests of others. 
It might be argued now that hu1r. 1referenr~ for on€' s own race 1s a 
Jlr"?duct of culture, is not natural, and is · 1ual •o ra ·r "prejudice•, 
unlike the prefe,·~nce for one's 0'-''1 species wt.1Ci1 1.. ..,ral, and 
neither a prejudice nor unfair or unreasonable. 45 Midgl2y points out 
that it is found in all human cultures, and that in cases of real 
competition it tends to operate very strongly, that "it 1s empirical 
rather than a priori and rests its case not on the articulateness or 
rationality of man as an abstract feature but on sheer physical kinship 
and its emotional effect". But it 1s far from clear that it would 
morally be unjustifiablll! for me to rescue my dog rather than someone 
else's child in case of genuine conflict. Here physical kinship and 
emotion would be wholly unconnected. Consider also cases of wolf-child-
ren or ape-children, and the bonds and sense of kinship they form with 
their foster parents and other members of the particular species, or· the 
case of Lucy Temerl in, the chimpanzee who "grew up human" and who 
identified herself - by means of sign language - as human, in contrast 
to other chimpanzees. 46 The argume:it that our "natura 111 preference for 
members of our !S exists and does not involve prejudice (even if it 
concedes that "L ~ h usually, but not invariably, the case) does not 
serve to establish that "speciesism is not just an irrational preju-
dice". 47 It J.! speciesist to fall below one's moral respon~ibility to 
other animals simply because ttiey are not human. The third kind of 
objection stresses the biological, scientif1c. importance ot differen-
tiating between species· ''(r)ace in humans is not a significant grouping 
at all, but species in animals certainly is. It is never true that, in 
order to know how to treat a human being, you must first find out what 
race he belongs to ••• But with an animal, to know the species is 
absolutely essential". 48 According to David Hull, the argument from 
speciesism serves to ignore "important differences that exist between 
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various units of evolution. Biologists do not group organisms into 
species or order species on grounds of similarity. Two forms can be 
e1tremely similar and yet be classed as two separate species (sibling 
species). Conversely, a single species can be n.ade up of extremely 
dissimilar organisms - for example, polytypic species like dogs and 
dimorphic species like the birds of paradise. And species are grouped 
into higher taxa because of descent, not degrees of similarity. From 
the biological point of view, the relations th~t exist between races and 
between sexes of the same species are different in kind from those that 
exist between species. If the principles of evolutionary theory are to 
be taken seriously, there are excellent reasons for us to exhibit a 
. 
greater moral conmitment to a child than to a porpoise, even if that 
porpoise has a greater capacity for suffering or e~periencing enjoyment. 
If this be speciesism, then make the most of it". Similarly, Midgley 
argues that "(t)o liken a trivial human grouping such as race to this 
enormous, inconceivably varied range of possibilities is to indulge in 
what revolutionaries call 'patronizing' thinking - a failure to recog-
nize the scale of difference between theirs and oneself •••••• A belief 
is not a prejudice simply because it indicates a difference". 49 
The argument from spec1esism does ~. as Midgley understands it, hold 
that all interspec1fic differences are morally irrelevant: it says, 
rather, that where we are talking about 11 11~.e" capac1t1es, shared by 
humans and ln1mals, ignoring the moral weight of those of animals, 
simply becat.ise they are not members of the species "homo sap1ens", 1s 
wrong and mora11y unjustifiable. (Singer, e.g •• is fully aware of the 
importance of existing differences between species - he merely den1es 
that the bare fact of belonging to different species has any moral 
weight on the absence of qu~lifying criteria.) If race 1n humans 1s not 
a "s1gnif1cant grouping", but sp~cies in animals is, the question is in 
what way it is significant: biologically ? or also morally ? Its 
biological import cannot be denied - it is the sujden move from 11 biolog1-
cal" to "moral" wh1ch 1s dcLtbtful, and we are left in the dark as to 
what can count as "excellent reason~" (Hull) for the unequ~l cons1dera-
t1on and treatmEnt of animals. If two species (by definition) exhibit 
different lines of descent this does not mean they are unequal • 
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Evidence of conscious, conat1ve, and cogn1t1ve life in other species, 
and which can reasonably be said to be shared by human and nonhuman 
species, is all that is required for showing that there 1s something to 
be taken into ac<.ount morally. And even if there are reasons for 
exhibiting dissimilar mor!l contnitment to human beings than to animals, 
these do not connote exclusiveness. humans do not exist naturally in 
isol~tion from other species. The character of a creature's interests 
depends on the (biological) kind of creature it is; but the view that 
mere difference of species counts for anything is morally unaccepta-
ble. 50 
The ift'ITlinent question is how animals are to be accolllTIOdated in our moral 
considerations and systems of justifications, how they are to be prottc-
ted, how their interest-; can be safeguarded. Accomnodati ng them 1n a 
thaory of right~ is not the only way. Before turning to a discussion of 
this possibility and confronting the issue of an1ma1 rights, I will 
consider other accounts and theories which offer a mora 1 niche for 
.. nimals. 
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Ch. 4 
Duty, Utility, and Sympathy 
The theories reviewed in this chapter invariably involve reference to duty, 
at some stage o,· the argument, with the possible exception of Schopenhauer's 
which eschews mention of duty us an 4mpo .. tant, let alone essential compone'1t. 
Paradigmatii:ally, Kant's is a 11 duty-based 11 theory (the basis br~ing furnished 
by the categorical imperative). Stated simply, in a duty-based theory duties 
are fundamental and generate rights (if they do), whereas in a "right-based" 
theory, rights are fundamental and generate duties and responsibilities, and 
are correlates o• nonrights. In slightly more technical tenns, duty-based 
theories are characterized by a concern with the conformity of individual 
actions: the individual complies with a code of conduct; unlike right-based 
theories where the individual benefits from the compliance of others, i.e., 
compliance enforced or d :nanded for her rights, and where the independence 
rather than a certain degree of conf~rmity of individual actions is 
emphasized. 1 
There seems to be a distinction between dut1 and obligation (that to which 
one is bound), on the one hand, and duty and responsibility (that for which 
one must answer) on the other, in that responsibility prima facie lacks the 
prescriptive element which characterizes both duty and obliQation. If rights 
and duties are, at least very often, different names for the same normative 
relation, depending on the point of view from which it is considered, then 
perh•os duties, obliQations, and responsibilities are different names for the 
same point of view. Yet between duty and obligatiora, too, a subtle 
distinction can conceivably be drawn: duty (that which is due) could be held 
to arise from t11e nature of things (e.g., parents' duties), obligation (that 
which is owed) from certain circumstances (e.g., a debtor's or prom1sor's 
obligations): but in both there is a certain coercive element involved. Not 
all duti~s are duties "to" anyone, as Joel Feinberg points out, e.g., "duties 
of status", but most are: duties in indebtedness, of conwnitment, of 
reparation (where a claim is pressed for the debtor's positive services), of 
reciprocation, (all these are obligations in the sense outlined above, 
unlike:) duties of need-fulfilment, and duties of respect. Duty fa the 
sense of 11moral duty 11 , attaches only to "moral agents 11 , i.e., 1r1d1viduals 
capable of formulating principles of action, of examining their motives, 
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etc., and animals are presumably exempt from moral agency or full-fledged 
responsibi.11ty. (They do have duties to their young, their posterity, their 
conspecifics, and perhaps also to humans, but these are "ethical" rather than 
"moral" duties, as I w11l argut! in sects. 5.2 and 7.1) Normal adult t'tuman 
beings c~n paradigmaticdlly be held mor~lly accountable, and the "duties-to" 
whicn an.oral agent hi'~ -:ofY'crhe duties she hiic; to her~elf, to other 'ndi•,1i-
dua1s as individuals, a~d to the world at large. 2 It would appear tnai all 
duties are "direct", i.e., "to" individuals, yet some philosophers invoke the 
notion of 11 1ndirect duties", i.e., duties "about" or ''in 1·cspect of", when 
dealing with animals. These views are considered first. 
4.1 Accounts of Indir~ct Duty 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas think that a being must be rational if we are 
to have any duties to heri animals lack this capacity - so we do not 
have duties to thetTI, at least not directly. Yet Aquinas explains that 
cruelty to animals is nonetheless to be condemned, since it usually 
leads to cruelty to rational (human) beings. Duties arise out of 
friendship or fellowship which again is based on reason, and to which 
animals by definition (as nonrational creatures) cannot attain. There-
fore, talking of our duties to an1mals is an elliptical way of speaking 
of our duties to our fellow humans. 3 
Now, treated in this fashion, "rat1onality 11 (and similarly, "self-cr>ns-
ciousness") is not ctr empirical characteristic but a "mark of status", 
Clften with the tag (as in Aristotle): "what distinguishes humans from 
animals". Since empirical observations concerning the varieties of 
intelligence (and this is what Margolis presumably is referri~~ to when 
he sptaks of "species-specific rationality") are not permitted to affect 
this account of rationality, the 0expedient and indeed necessary que~tion 
concerning the lower 11m1ts of rationality 4 is not, and cannot be, 
taken into account. Other important questions must be answered. Do we, 
on this view, have no direct duties to human babies and the mentally 
enfeebled, or the irrational ? Why should rationality, or the lack of 
it, be relevant to considerat1ons of direct duties, 1.e., to being a 
beneficiary of these duties ? Why should friendship or fellowship be 
based necessarily on reason, and why should not friendship or fellowship 
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of rational creatures with nonrational creatures be possible ? And how 
good is the evidence to support the belief that cruelty to animals 
usually. if not invariabt • leads to cruelty to human beings ? But it 
1s h4rd to understand why failing in a nonduty (1.e., being cruel to 
animals) should have ariy relevance to the performanc.e of a duty (1.e •• 
being kind to human beings). Indeed, to say that cruelty to animals is 
likely to affect treatment of humans 1s implicitly to point to some 
capacity. or capac1ties, relevantly similar in, and shared by, humans 
and animals. 
Immanuel Kant's approacn is similar to the Thomlst view. The "relevant" 
capacity he cites 1s man's existence as n "end in himself". and not 
merely as a means. (This follows from thl? second formulation of the 
categorical imperative.) Animals lack ratior lity, self-consciousness, 
fr~~ will, and the capacity of judgment, and therefore they lack value 
in themselves. "inherent value" - they have only "instrumental value•. 
exist merely as means to an end, the end being man. n.erefore, our 
"duties• to animals are actually duties to humanity and hence indirect. 
D.G. Ritchie makes much the same point when he states: "Cruelty to 
animals is rightly supposed to be an offence against humanitarian 
feeling. Our duty to the animals is a duty to human society•. 5 Kant, 
between two inversions of the Thomist argument, "Tender feelings towards 
dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind", and "If (a man) 
1s not to stifle his human ·ee11ngs, he must practice kindness towards 
animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealing 
with men", presents the telling remark: "The more we come in contact 
with animals and observe their behaviour, the more w~ l~ve them, for we 
see how great 1s their care for their young". Had It' ,t heeded his o~!"I 
implicit advice, striven towards 'loser contact with an :muls and obser-
ved their behaviour, tt is far from obvious that he would have ins;sted 
that (all) animals lack self-consciousness, free will, and the capacity 
of judgment. If self-consciousness arises with "seeing oneself as 
something" or with the ability to locate oneself in physical space, to 
know where one is and with whom one is de~ling, then surely some animals 
are self-conscious, in differing degrees: it 1s important to remember 
that there 1s a gradual transition from consciousness-of to self-con-
sciousness. 
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A similar trans1tion might be held to exist from the capacity to choose, 
and to adapt (in) one 1 s choices. to free w111. fmd even judgment, 
verbal judgment (although it 1s not at all clear that judgment 1s 
necessarily infonned by language), is a capacity possessed by some 
ardmals, e.g., ch1mpan:ees and gorillas. (With dolphins, and cetacea, 
generally we are still somewhat in the ..:ark as to tt-air intellectual 
powers.) It 1s probably more accurate to say that 11ngu1st1. juda:·"«!nt 
is only one fo~ of judgment, and that an animal capable of spotting the 
difference between fear, anger, and other emotions in other animals, and 
of acting accordingly, possesses the capacity of judgment, in some 
degree. 
The point is, however, as Midgley explains, that only an unworkably 
narrow conception of duty would focus on self-consciousness, fret will, 
and the capacity to judge: 6 "unworkably narrow", because it would 
exclude some human beings. The view that duties and obligations have 
meaning only where there 1s a social convention £xpressible in langu,tge, 
i.e., where the other party can judge, is objectionable. Judgment does 
not even suffice to establish whether we actually have a duty to those 
who have this capacity nor can it be the basis of that duty. It would 
be {tu1te incorrect to regard the institutional form of duty as its 
basis. - A further objection may be made concerning the notion of 
"end-in-itself•. Arthur Schopenhauer poir.ts out in his critique of Kant 
that it 1s not a meaningful notion 7: existing as an "end" requires both 
relation and comparison (an "enti" in lation to/compared with what ?), 
and "end-in-itself" has severed 511 relations and possibilities of 
comparison - it has shrunk to r poir-t without extension. 
There 1s also a problem with the .. ot1on of "inherent", or "intrinsic", 
value (there 1s conceivably a dffference between the two, which I will 
discuss in the next chapter): to employ this notion in an argument, let 
alone as a crucial factor in the aro11 to argue for a point by 
means of mere verbal legislation. of inherent value may be 
useful in providing a contrast t~ instrumental value, but 
ultimately one has to elucidate what ..... ~t1tutes this value. Kant's 
. 
view, like the Thomht view, has the undesirable effect of excluding 
some human beings, viz. those who are not (yet) rational, self-con-
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scious, and who do not (yet) possess the capacity of judgment and uf 
free w111. But they are surely individuals, beings that it 1s like to 
be, and who cannot justifiably be hPld merely to exist for the purposes 
of (more) rational, self-conscious, judging, and freely willing beings. 
Benn claims that one can be not only irrational in one's treatment of 
animals but also morally delinquent or cruel, but that one cannot be 
unjust: animals can be harmed but they cannot be wrongt.1 or injured. 
The duty not to torture an animal 1s a duty "in respect of•, rather than 
"to" the animal. 8 Presumably in order to avoid t.tle charge of specie-
s ism, Uenn explains that it 1s not their humanity, "a simple biological 
characteristic having no necessary mural implications, but their perso-
nality that makes the crucial di ference between right-bearers (read: 
individuals who can be wronged or injured) and other things" (sicl). 
"Personality• consists in the possession of a certain kind of self-
awareness, self-conceptualization, and autonomy, and only •persons" can 
be owed equal consideration ~nd fair treatment. Benn 1s willing to 
admit some chimpanzees, intelligent dogs, and dolphins in the realm of 
beings "with a conception of themselves, as initiators ~f act.ions that 
make a difference to the course of events", so the charge of speciesism 
could not be made to stick. Glover wri~es that speciesism is "objection-
able partly because of its mor• , arbitrariness: unless some relevant 
empirical characteristics can bE rited, there can be no argument for 
such discrimination". 9 Benn " urn1shed empirical characteristics 
constitutive of personality but that they are relevant to our discussion 
of duty (and to the possession of 1ghts) 1s not obvious at all. His 
position cornnits him to denying t:1at nfants, children, and mentally 1ll 
humans can be wronged, suffer inJust1ce . or treated unfairly. He does 
say that the absence of rights-talk (r11.J· considerations of justice 
and equality), even of consciousness of rights, e.g., between father and 
child, should not be taken to show that r' ~ts are irrelevant or unim-
portant to such relations or that they are not acknowl•dged or resr:c-
ted. lO So why should not the same apply in the case of animals other 
than chimpanzees, clever dogs, and dolphins ? Benn's claim that only 
"natural persons" can bf: resp1 cted follows from the view that respect 
-
requires, or consists in, consideration from the individual's own stand-
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point: but human betngs, even in the absence of self-awareness and 
autonomy, as well as animals like mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, 
amphibians, have a standpoint from which it 1s "like" to experience the 
world. To exclude them from (the possibility of) eqL.al consideration 
and fair treatment ;s to adhere to an unfeasibly narrow view of justice 
and equality. 
John Rawls' account of justice 11 must fall prey to similar objections. 
He argues that the limited scope of justice, fairness, and equali~y can 
be explicated by the notion of a hypothetical contract struck by ration-
al (human) beings. Ht acknowledges the existence of, but decides to 
shelve, the problem of our conduct towards human beings deficient in 
allegedly relevant capacities, i , who have no conception of their 
good, no rational plan of lifE .. ense of justir:e, 1.e., 11 a nonnally 
effective desire to apply and \.:t en tl1e principles of justice, at 
least to a certain minimum C.-~·~e". Accor.fog to Rawls, our duties to 
animals (and presumably to some human beings) are not duties of justice 
but "duties of compassion and humanity" (which are generated by their 
capacity to feel pleasure and pain). Since Rawls concedes that it 1s 
possible to have the desire to apply !nd act on the principles of 
justice "to a ain minimum degree", it is entirely plausible to hold 
that some anir. possess this capacity: consider, e.g., some ma11111alian 
and avarhn spe .. tes who "hold court" ( 11 ke cr;ws) or who attempt to 
mitigate naturally or accidentally incurred ,nferiorities or 
deficiencies (like pelicans feeding their blind conspecifics). But, at 
a deeper level, Rawls' account gives r1se ~o the question why relations 
governed by Justice and equality should t ~ciprocal, why there should 
exist a mutual acknowh,dgernent of, an~ . 1erence to, the principles 
involved: is 1t not sufficient that one 1 be , "moral person" ? How 
can Rawls meaningfully drive a w~dge ~et " ~ghtness as fairness" and 
the •wrongness" of cruelty to animal!. t 1e destruction of a whole 
species as a "great evil" ? ("A grl v11" for whom ? For the 
i nd1v1dua 1 endangered animals ? Or fo• t 11 beings ? ) It 1s not so 
much that it 1s not "possible" to ext :ntJ the scope of the theory of 
justice as that Rawls 1s unwilling to Jo so. Midgley objects to this 
account that outsid~ : h1s theory, every "moral concern", etc., seems to 
be slight, optional, a mere matter of taste, desirable in times of 
leisure, but not important. 12 This implication discredits the Rawls1an 
view. 
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4.2 Utilitarianism 
Considerations of 11 Justice 11 and "equality" also occur in utilitarianism. 
Ut11itar1ani~m 1s not a "duty-based" but a "goal-based" theory, 1.e., 
characterized by a concern with consequences (of action), goals 
generating (jut.ies and even rights (althougtl a utilitarian neel'i not 
appeal to rights in making his case for the maximhatfon of happi.iess 
and pleasure, and the minimization of pair1). The obvious virtue of 
utilitarianism 1s not only that it was 1nstrumental in secularizing 
morality but also tt'at 1t proposed that the happiness and suffering of 
all sentient beings count. The ut111tar1an includes animals in tiie 
sphere of moral concern and emphasizes our (direct) duties to them: it 
is as much a moral duty to give cons1u~ration to the pleasures and pains 
of animals as it is to consider those of human beings. The utilitarian 
criterion for (df rect) duty 1s 11 sent1enc! 11 , which can be rendered here 
a5 the capacity to experience pleasure and pain. As Bentham put it, 13 
in a passage containing probably t~e most-cited remarks in the philoso-
phical literature on the treatmen~ of animals: "The day may come, when 
the rest of the an mal creation may acquire these rights which never 
could have been withheld from them but by the l'iand of tyranny •••• It 
may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosi-
ty of skin, or the tennination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally 
insufficient for abandoning a sens ft 1ve being to (the caprice of a 
tormentor). Wh11t else 1s 1t that should trace the insup"rable line ? 
Is it the faculty of reason, or, perh1ps, the faculty of di;course ? But 
a full-grown horse or dog is beyond co~parison a more rational, as well 
as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or fven 
a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? 
The question 1s not Can they reason ? nor, Can they talk ? but, Can 
they 1uffer ?" 
At first sight, the view that sentience is what matters appears entirely 
plausible. After all, sentience is the lowest conmon denominator 
governing all humans and, indeed, most animals. But there are problems: 
some human beings suffer from dysautonomh, a rare congeni ta 1 d1se~se 
re"dering them insensitive to pain - does this mean that they fall 
outside the scope of concern ? And is it pennissible to kill indivi-
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duals pain ~ssly, e.g., lfter anaesthetizing them ? These are 
consider~tions signall ng the demise of the unqualified sentience 
cr1terion of classic~l ut111tar1an1sm. Bentt1am holds the view that 
k111ing the more rational (read: most human) beings in this manner 1s 
wrong in that we have "long-protracted anticipations of future misery" 
wh1ch animals lack. "The death they suffer in our hands cormionly h, 
and always may be, a speed1er, and by that means a less painful one, 
than that which would 1 wait them •n the nev1tabl course of nature. If 
the being killed were all, there is a v~ry guod reason why we should b~ 
suffered to kill such as molest us: we should be the worse for their 
living, 11nd they are never the worse for be1ng dead". And: "(i)f the 
bt1ng eater were all there 1s very good reason why we should be 
suffered to eat such f them as we 11ke ~ eat: we are the better for 
it, and they are never the worse". Th1S talk of "better" and "worse•, 
the p1tting of harms against benefits, etc., are character1st1c of the 
class1cal ut111tarhn concern with conse~uences, and subsequent 
d1sregard of 1nd1v1dual suffer1ng and loss· causing suffer1ng and taking 
11fe are wrong only 1f more ~a1n or greater losses are suffered 1n the 
process by all those 1nvolved than the amount of pleasure, or total 
ga1n' secured. Hence, . 'Vere 1nequa11t1es 11nd 1nju~t1ces could be 
sanct1oned by the pr1nc1ple of ut111ty, promot1nq "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number". 
At a deeper lev 1, th1 doctr1nP. 1s suspect 1n that tt const1tutes the 
attempt to we1gh and measure suffer1ng and happiness against each other, 
a task which seems to be 1mposs1ble to accomplish. 14 How can an 
1nd1v1dual's suffer1ng be weighed against the suffer1ng of many 1nd1v1-
duals ? (Granted, some pa1ns may be moJif1 •d by human be1ngs' super1or 
mental powers, may be more fr.tense owing to psycholog1cal stress fac-
torsi but in some cases limited mental tapac1ties s1gnal more er 1ncrea-
sed ~uffer1ng, owing to the 1nab111ty to understand, and the correspon-
d1ng 1mpossib111ty tu expla1n the reasons for the pred1cament: e.g., how 
do we conv1nce small children or ~1mple-m1nded adults, or an1mals, or 
human~ suff1c1ently culturally remote from us, that the pa1n they are 
made to undergo 1s for the1r own good, e.g., in the cur1ng of an 111-
. 
ness r These appear to be 1nstances of just~f1able paterna11sm, 1n that 
the welfare of the 1nd1v1dL 1 1s of primary concern.) How can even an 
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individual's suffering be weighed against the like sufft:ring o~ mdny 
individuals ? They do not suffer in the aggregate. The distress of the 
former is to that individual as the distress of each of the latter is to 
the particular individual of that group. The point is that the sum of 
all like suffering remains constant. There is no quantity of suffering 
in creatures that changes in accordance with the number of creatures 
suffering in the same way {supposing it were P'-'Ssible to determine 
thi!'.) It might not even make sense to speak in terms of quantity of 
suffering with respect to one and the same creature; or do two or more 
pains (he!dache, backache, etc.) constitute a quantity ? Any other 
measuring necessarily involves reference to intensity or degree. 
ln order to overcome t~~ difficulties encountered by classical utilita-
rianism, Singer introduces the "principle of equalityN, or the principle 
of equal consideration of interests", which states that all capacities 
shared by conscious beings be given equal weight, 1.e., all 11 l ike 11 
suffering is due equal consideration. 15 Singer argues that the idea 
expressed in the Gclden Rule, the Categorical Imperative, and universal 
prescriptivism seems to be the right approach to moral problems, and 
that it implies there are other existences I can imagine myself as 
living. Sentience, or consciousness, is relevant in that application of 
the Golden Rule, etc., implies this capacity: according to Singer, 
possession not of sel f-consc1ousness but of consciousness is cruc1a 1 
here, not only to acconwnodate human beings with limited mental powers, 
but its sufficiency is indicated by the test of un1versa11zabi11ty. 16 
There is, therefore, a conceptual link between acknowledging conscious-
ness and accepting some (direct) duties. A conscious being is one who 
can mind what happens to it, who prefers some things to others, who can 
experience pleasure and pain . can suffer or enjoy. This range of 
cl!pacities is sumned up by Singe"r as having "interests", and - bearing 
in mind the analysis of interests given above - this seems natural 
enough. (And, as Midgley suggests 17 - "if the word is thought unsuita-
ble, others can be sJbstituted 11 .) This kind of consideration is held by 
Singer to be not only possible but necessary, first from the point of 
view of the consc1ou!t crea'ure - since it is conscious, injury and 
extinction {for it has a preference to go on living) will be detrime~tal 
to it: second, more abstractly, because consciousness bestows value, 
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intrinsic value, on 1t: if it is injured er extinguished, the world will 
be Lt.c poorer. 
Singer's account seems quite acceptable up to, and including, the reason 
that suffering and death are evils for the individual: acceptable, that 
is, until he attempts to embed his arguments and considerations in a 
utilitarian framework. Whatever one's intuitions concerning duty-ba~ed 
theories, the idea expressed in the ~olden Rule, while certainly not the 
sole basis of m1Jrality, 1s decidedly a strong one, and Singer could 
consistently defend his views w'~hout recourse to utilitarian justifica-
tion and calculation: in fact, the 1 atter se1 ve to weaken his case 
against the exploitation of animals. By relating his arguments concer-
ning equal consiaeration of interests to tht principle of Jtility, 
Singer is in effect saying that the ;,est consequences are those that 
further the interests of everyone involved. Hence, ~ shift has taken 
place from "individuals" to 11 interests 11 • And because "self-conscious" 
individuals have preferences which may not be reasonably ascribable to 
"merely conscious" beings and simpler organisms, or preferences which 
are mere complex, involving long-term anticipations, plans, and desires, 
their interests count more than those of merely sentient beings: killing 
them or causing them to suffE:r would have undesirable side-effects, 
(e.g., causing fear in others), would frustrate the victim's desires 
and future plans, would violate their right to life (though it should be 
note::I that Singer is not an advocate of rights - at least his primary 
concern is ~ot with appealing to rights), and would constitute a failure 
to respect their autonomy. What is of value in merely conscious creatures 
is their sentience. but the world will be the poorer only if there is no 
other being to take the place of the one which is killed. So, provided 
they are not caused suffering or distress, their death does not have any 
negative side-effects (e.g., 11 t"roubling 11 self-conscious individuals), 
they have led pleasant lives until the time of their death, and new life 
will flourish in their place, the killing of non-self-con)cious animals 
is not wrong: they are "replaceable entities 11 • 18 It is quite uncharac-
teristic of Singer to allow such a crass contraposition of self-con-
sciousness and mere consci~usness to determine the course of his argu-
ment: this (inaccurate) dist~nction serves to include all animals except 
some bright ma11111a ls as we 11 some human beings in the realm of repla-
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ceable entities. Would it be permissible painlessly to kill a retarded 
orphan for food ? Si nee she is not made to suffer, there 1s nothing 
else to be taken into account, no future plans, no side-effects: but 
this is plainly morally repugnant, even when she is "replaced" in some 
way. 
Glover, whose views pretty strongly resemble Singer's in "Practical 
Ethics", similarly argues in favour of some sense of replaceabi dty. In 
the case of foetuses and newborn babies, killing is not directly wrong 
for their life cannot yet reasonably be called "worthwhile" - we do not 
override their autonomy by taking their lives, and "ft would be absurd 
to suppose that (they have) any desire not to die, or even the concepts 
of being alive or dead on which such a desire depends", Glover tells us. 
"In other words, foet1Jses and babies are, in terms of these principles, 
repleceable", 19 and: "it is ,.rong to destroy a worthwhile life. But 
this 1s an ·impersonal' objection, having to do with potential. In 
terms of this objection, newborn babies, like foetuses, are replaceable. 
It is wrong to kill a baby who has a good change of having a worthwhile 
life, but in tenns of this objection, it would not be wrong to kill him 
if the alternative to his existence was the existence of someone else 
with an equally good chance of a life at least as worthwhile". The 
morality of tMs view is que.:tlonable. Side-effects car1 never weigh so 
strongly as to justify consider1ng healthy, normal infants to be repl~~e­
able. What does the individual baby gain from (the possibility) of 
being replaced ? This is to treat babies on a par with material objects, 
rnere things. Consciousness, which Glove!" refuses to give much weight, 
is of vital importance here, and in dri~ing the wedge (.if this needs to 
be ~r • ~etween younger, pre-sentient foetuses, and older foetuses and 
bab:es. tf the interests of the mentally handicapped h!~P equal weight 
with our lWn 20 when they are aaults, why not the ,t, · e~ .. ests of normal 
babies ? Simply because mentally handicapped adults are not (any longer) 
"replaceable" ? (Are they not, really ?) At what age do children cease 
to be replaceable ? 
In "What Sort of People should there be ?" Glover claims "(i)t 1s a 
strength of utilitarianism that the value of states of affairs is not 
thought to derive from some mysterious source external to ourselves • 
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For utilitarians, the v~lue of anything depends on its relation to the 
experiences or desires of conscious beings. Unhappiness and the fru~tra­
tion of desires are to be accepted only where there is sufficiently 
compensating benefit to someone". 21 This last argument is quite 
acceptable if, and only if, we are dealing here with the unhappiness, 
the frus tr it ti on of desires , and the benefits of one and the sl'.'..ne i ndi vi -
d\lal. The kind of "value" Glover mentions here strongly resembles the 
notion of "intrinsic value" invoked by Singer: for Glover, this value 
derive~ from the experiences and desires of conscious beings; for 
Singer, from th~ir interests. In attaching value to their experiences, 
desires, and preference~. and not to the individual~ themselves (this is 
where Regan differentiates betweer. "intrinsic" and "inherent value" 22 ), 
Glover and Singer - in a bizarre way - render even "self-consc"ous" 
individuals subject to replacement. Since th~ utilitarian must evaluate 
experiences, desires, and preferences J ~ef~~ence to numbers and 
intensity, and autonomy and se 1 f-consc, "'" reference to degrees, 
it is conceivable that these individual · e replaceable, provided 
that others are brought into existence l .. .. 11atever fashion: possibly 
also by means of genet1c engineering). who stand a good chance of 
having a life at least equally worthwhile. (These considerations bring 
out both the absurdity and the r~pugnancy of the replaceability condi-
t i vn. ) 
Singe!" can avoid this charge only by appealing to the principle of 
equality and by abandoning the principle of utility at the same time. 
If he insists on relying on the principle of utility as well, the 
rejoinder would be that, in connection with utility, all that Mequal 
consideration" implies 1s that individuals are not to be ignored: they 
might still be substituted, painlessly and without forewarning, by a 
relevantly superior species. If 'the principle of equal consideration is 
linked with respect for the individual, implications such as the abeve 
can be avoided. The point is that the utilitarian, if she 1s to be 
consistent, ca~not afford to emphasize the importance of equal conside-
ration of individuals. Moreover, a utilitarian must take side-effects 
into account: she must consider the inr.onveniences vegetarians incur 
when !!iey are troubled by, e.g., requests for explaining their dietary 
preferences on dinner invitations, finding suitable restaurants. soya or 
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vegetable protein products in shops, questions as to the reason for 
their vegetarianism (as I pointed out earlier, the onus of justification 
is still seen to lie on the vegetarian). She would have to consider the 
frJstrations and psychological "withdrawal symptoms" in people who were 
suddenly asked to give up eating flesh: a gourmet might argue that her 
own pleasure in eating flesh outweighs any d1sutil ity sufferetj by the 
animal in whose remains she hu '1osen to indulge. 23 A utilitarian 
must considPr the difficulties in coming by products which are both free 
of anima 1 ingredients and which have not been tested on animals. The 
dhut i lity incurred through the boycott of anima 1 products would also-
concern all those (people) occupied in the meat, cosmetics industries, 
in the research animal industry, and in scientific research. It would 
imply the loss of jobs, perhaps certain familial hardships, etc., and it 
is not at all obvious that the consequences of abolishing th~se institY-
tions or totally banning the use of animals, are better than the conse-
quences if these methods are continued. 
Singer could argue that this abolition needs to be gradual (and that a 
gradual abandonment is also in the animals' interests), and that even if 
sudden one-time-losses (e.g., of jobs) are weighed against the conti-
nuous suffering caused to animals, tht:tn the suffering caused in the 
latter case would sur~ly exceed the disutility experienced in the 
fonner. He might also arque that the gain in pleasure for free-roaming 
animals, the gain in utility for malnourished countries if they received 
the high-protein grain supplies usually fed to food animals, and the 
gain in physical health and well-being through vegetarianism would 
constitute a solid utilitarian case for refraining from Pat1ng flesh. 
(Similar observations might be made with respect to the cosmetics 
industry and scientific research, coupled with economic considerations, 
etc.) The fact is, however (and this is a point that Regan brings across 
forcefully 24 ), that Singer is not so muc~ concerned with the •consequen-
ces" of practices involving abuse as with the "purpose" of these practi-
ces, and as a cons is tent util i tar1an he cannot be. He rejects these 
practices on grounds other than uti.itarian, name1y by demonstrating the 
moral 1ndefensibility of the purpose only. Singer's arguments, at least 
. 
those in "Animal Liberation", do not have utilitarian basis, but this 
does not mean that they are not forcefu1 and convincing in their own 
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right, when unencumbered by utilitarian ballast. 
A rejection of utilitarianism might give rise to the question whether 
degree, or intensity, and numbers do not count at all. I will attempt 
to address the question of degree in sect. 7.2, and only offer a br1ef 
answer to the question of numbers. Glover, in "Causing Death and Saving 
Lives", 25 defends the policy "that, other things being enual, we ought 
always to prefer to.!.!!!. a larger to a smaller number of people", which 
he calls the 11ma1ir.11zing policy". At first sight, this st1~ms accep-
table; it is only when inserting the phrase "we ought always to prefer 
to tak~ the lives of a smaller to a larger number of people 11 that inoral 
doubts arise. Glover's defence appears to rest on the mistaken utilita-
rian assumption that people's lives can be added u~ to produce a greater 
whole or aggregate. But surely this is impossible: an ind1vidual's life 
is to that individual ~s other particular individual lives are to these 
particular individuals. There is no sum of 1 ives th.st is to a sum of 
individuals. "Things 11 may be different, but tney are equal. Only w~ere 
11 other things" are unequal, e.g., where the ter111 "individual" cannot 
meaningfully be apolied, or w'iere there is the contraposition: normal 
adult human being/nonviable human foetus, does the possibility or 
weighing or trading off lives arise. 
Losses of life cannot be added t" arrive at some total of losses or 
harms. There is only the loss suffered by a particular individual. 
Therefore, numbers do not count in cases where the possibility of saving 
a score of lives is pitted against the possibility of saving one life. 
(Neither is suffering additive in this way: the sum of all like suffe-
ring remains constant.) Regan, arguing against John Taurek, clain1s, 
however, that it is possible to aggregate, e.g., financial losses, and 
that our reflective intuition or 'belief would favour saving the lives of 
the majority. 26 
However, economic considerations cannot ba compared, let alone likened 
to moral considerations. If not six million Jews had been killed during 
World War Il, but "only" 100 000 - 11only 11 ? 1 - surely this discrepancy 
in numbers would not make, or have made, a moral difference. And to 
.. 
consider an opposite case: why would most people find it easier to shoot 
at an anonymous mass of people rather than at a single :ndividual, even 
assuming that the latter could be identified or recognized as little of 
the former ? 
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Regan's contention is that harms can be unequal not only when the same 
i ndividua 1 is harmed in different ways (through inflict ion or depriva-
tion) - they may also be unequal when different individuals are harmed 
in the same way (and he asks us to compare the death of a woman in the 
prime of her life with that of her sen.le mother: the magnitude of the 
loss suffered in the former case are prima facie greater). (I will deal 
with this question below, sect. 7.2) Regan appeals to the "minimize 
overriding (m1niride) princiole" which states that when we must choose 
between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of 
few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be harmed 
in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to override the 
rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the many, 
and which is derivable from the "respect principle" (we are to treat 
those individuals who have int1erent value in ways that respect their 
inherent value"). I find it hard to accept the miniride principle as a 
"inoral" principle - unlike the respect principle, it seems to be an 
economic rather than a moral principle: overriding the rights of the few 
in favour of the rights of the m6.1)' has statistical but not moral 
eligibility. Regan's conclusion has a strongly consequentialist flavour. 
He would reply to me that I am confusing considerations about the 
foreseeable consequences of acting in compliance with the miniride 
principle with the 11 rights-v1ew's" grounds for accepting this principle, 
viz. respect for the equality of the involved individuals. But if this 
1s the consideration that matters, and given that there can be no 
•aggregate individual" who has "1nherent-value-aggregate", then there is 
no moral difference between the two. 
Utilitarianism is not the only theory concerned w1th (direct) duties, 
though it is arguably the most widely espoused or, at hast, f11rted-
with of these accounts. My reasons for reviewing the following theses 
in one and the 'iame section will become more apparent with the objec-
tions made to them: none of these accounts can satisfactorily explain 
our (negative and positive) duties to, and r1sponsibiliti~s concerning, 
animals and indeed human beings. 
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4.3 Other Direct Duty Views 
The •cruelty/kindness viewM is not a unified theory as suth. It covers, 
rather, appeals which characterize much of the content of brochures. 
pamphlets, and journals dealing with humanitarian vegetarianism, experi-
mental research, and statements issued by organisations such as SAAAPEA 
("South African Association Against Painful Experiments on Anim,1s 11 ), 
•aea~ty without Cruelty", SPCA, etc However well-meaning and sincere 
these appeals may be, they do not and cannot establish a basis for their 
respective causes. As Regan puts it: "being against cruelty• cannot 
account for our negative duties to animals, and "being for kindness" 
cannot explain uur positi~e dut1es. He goes on to say that cruelty and 
kindness necessarily involve reference to an agent's mental states, 
feelings, and motiveSi i.e., we fulfi. our duties to others as long as 
we are not cruel or as long as we are kind to them. But this is inade-
quate, for h<M one feeh abrut what one does, e.g., about the suffering 
ont causes or the enjoyment one brings about in an animal, is logically 
distinct from the moral assessml!rit of what one does, 1.e., from the 
morality, the r1ghtntss or wrongn-.ss of one's act.ions. 27 
The rtJolndtr to Regan's argumt"t might be that it 1s not obvious that 
one's attitude towards one's actions 1s logically distinct from tht 
moral assessinent of what one does, and that this is a purely consequentia-
lht claim, tn that it implies that only the consequences of actions 
~tter morally. It is difficult to see how this charge can be averttd, 
but on the other hand it is a critt~ism a nonuti11tar1an can live with. 
She might say that from the point of view of the 1nd1v1dual animal 1t is 
1•attria 1 whether "criuelty• and "kindness" characterize an agent 1 s 
inentol state or her action: what matters to the creature itself, and 
wh11t matters morally, 1s whether it can flourish or whether 1t must 
languish, whether it can enjoy a life in accordance with its natural 
needs, instincts, and capacities, or whether 1t must suffer an existence 
-here it 1s deprived of, or prevented from exercising, its natural 
drives llnd powers. Rejection of utilitar1an1sm as an adequate moral 
theory with respect to matters of help, hann, life, and death does not 
. 
imply the conviction that 111 consequenttalist co"~iderations are wrong, 
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bad, and ought ~u be avoi~ed or discredited. A nonuti11tar1an r.an, 
withol 1. seriou~ 1ncu. ,sistency, hold that to say that an action is cruel 
or ~ind ;s not to say thot it 1s wrong or right. In fact, there is no 
guarantet that a kind act (motivated, e.g., by sympathy, which is 
certeinly a virtue) is a right act; similarly, absence of cruelty (both 
1n one's motives or intentions, and in one's actions) dl)es not ~rsure 
that one avoids doing what is wrong. Hence, questions concerning 
(moral) rightness and wrongness ca~not be answered conclusively by 
considerations of motivation. This last proposition, especially the 
word "conclusively", is important: for, although •dndness 1s not the 
same as right action, it ·1ay nonetheless be a precondition for it. To 
say that the way one eP.1 about what , 1s doing 1s logically distinct 
from the morality of the act is not n say that considerations of 
kindness (and cruelty) have no place in morality: indeed, it would bf 
quite incorrect to say this. Although feelings, and the operation of 
emotion, do not constitute the basi~ of moralit), they nonetheless play 
an important role in morality when linked with reason. Regan, in 
defend1ng the claim that kl ndness cannot serve to explain our duties, 
points owt that although kindness 1s "owed" to animals, it 1s not due 
them. 28 It seems as _trange, however, to invoke "obligations of 
kindness" a .. it is to speak of "duties of kindness". But, it might be 
argued, so n1ch the worse f'or duty, rather ttian for kindness and sympa· 
thy. (Further argument is suspended until the following section, 4.4) 
In developing his "ethic of reverence for life", Albert Schweitzer 
claims that the fundamental principl@ of mora ity be reverence for life. 
Morality, he tells us, cons1 t in the necessity of practising the same 
reverence for life towards all that lives, and that 11wt11s to 11ve", in 
the sense of striving towards more life, pleasure, and seeking to avoid 
pain. A man is really moral only when all life is sacred for him. "He 
does not ask how far this or that life deserves sympathy as valuable in 
itself, nor how far it is capable of fetling. To him life as such is 
sacred. He shatters no ice crystal that sparkles in the sun, tears no 
leaf from its tree, breaks off no flower, and is careful not to crush 
any insect as he walks". 29 Now, since Schweitzer includes things like 
. 
ice crystah in the scope of moral concern, the concept of reverPnce of 
"life" stands in need of elucidation: here, the scope of moral "duty" 
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would be infinite. Ice crystals certainly may matter aesthetically; 
they can be conceived as having aesthetic value. But it is not clear 
how it can be morally wrong to destroy them: they have no 11 fe, 1 et 
a1one are subjects of a life, for whom life "is" in one way or another. 
(Are we not, in Schweitzer's view, morally justified in freezing water 
for ice cubes, and once the deed has been effected, a 11 owing them to 
melt in our drinks and imbibing them ?) 
More fundamentally, still, this account i~ unsatisfactory insofar as it 
links morality essentially with reverence, rendering it dependent on the 
agent's psychology. Because human psychological capacities and 
proclivities vary greatly, we would obta1n a relativistic, if not 
atomistic, picture of morality. And since Schweitzer makes it quite 
clear that he is in principle not opposed to harming animals if 
necessity demands it ("Whenever I injure life of any kind I must be 
quite clear as to whether this is necessary or not" JO), "feel1r19" that 
whatever one is doing is "necessary" could lead to the justification of 
the most atrocious abuses and maltreatment. 
Clark's minimal 1T1oral principle, h1s "dogma" as he calls it (although he 
c~nctdes the possible existence of other moral principles), is that it 
1s not "proper to be the cause of avoidable i 11". 31 Fonnulated in this 
manner, the principle is not convincing; for causing a lesser evil to an 
individual in order to prevent a greater evil concerning the same 
individual seems to be both expedient and justifiable: e.g., taking a 
dog to a vet for a shot is an avoidable ill but it serves to avoid the 
grelter ill of the dog contracting distemper. (And of cour~t. to be the 
•cause" of harm or suffering dots not mean that one is "responsible" for 
it. This distinction will be discussed in sect. 7.2) But Clark rests 
h1s case for "zoophi ly" not only C\n the duty to avoid 'ratui tous har 
and suffering but holds that kinship between humans and animals constitu-
te the basis for moral concern for animals, "kinship" being not only a 
reference to evolutionary relations but conshting in varitid family 
resemblances and (the possibi11' ·of) shared lives. He speaks of our 
feelings of kinship (thinking ''of our cousins as cousins and not as 
trash") for the young, the defenceless, and animals sometimes as "gene-
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tically prograirmei Sym1Jath'tes 11 which are "readily extended in us to 
other species", somet•111es as a "persona 1 hierarchy of friendship and 
attrac~ion", or "personal ties" which can cut across the species-divide. 
But not only 1s it false to view every moral agent a~ a zooph11e at 
heart or, conversely, to view morality or monl agency as requiring 
zoophily; merely to be fond of someone or something does not provide a 
bash for consistent moral concern. If personal affections were the 
w~ol~ basis of moral standing, we would be left with a fragmented, local 
morality. Even moral concern for animals al such does not necessarily 
presuppose zoophily. One can respect, and sympathize with, other beings 
without being fond of them. Indeed, Clark fails to explort the 
implications of ba~ing moral standing on personal affections• he thinks 
that human affections can become sufficiently inclusi~e to extend to ~11 
living beings and perhaps even the inanimate constituents of our 
biosphere, but does not exph1n his own conception of interspecific 
kinship and the way in which this kinship 1s the b.i 1s for moral 
standing. Un11 ke Descart• 11; or Kant, or even uti 11tar1an tradition, 
Clark seeks to deal with morality without recourse to metaphysic~. and 
therefore his appeal to duties to animals can only reach those who fhare 
his conception of kinship. If he were to explain or justify it, kinship 
might turn out to be inadequate as a basis of morality. 
4.4 S.Y!!pathy and Morality 
Sympathy doe~ not rest on any conscious calculation of the greater good 
or concern with consequence, nor can it always be expected to serve such 
a good or consequences. It concerns 1 capacity to share or adopt 
another creature's view-point, not the spurious vantage of an aggregate 
of individuals. (For the sake of un1formit) I will not refer to "comp1s-
sion": I think it 1s stfe to say that "sympathy" and "compassion• are 
conceptually and etymologically identi~al.) 
Schopenhauer's ethic of sympathy betrays a profound influence by Eastern 
thinking, an influence both well-known and well-documented. In "On the 
Bash of Morality", he approvingly cites a prayer ending old Indian 
dramas: "May all living beings rematn free from pain". 32 Before dis-
cussing Schopenhauer's views, I will therefore briefly review possible 
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possible Buddhist, Jain, and Vedic influences. In the Indian tradition, 
the concept of "ahimsa" ("nr.,v1olence") signifies a duty to abstain from 
violence, and concerns nonk1lling, noninjury, nonaggression, tenderness, 
ir.nocence, love, etc. Through sympathy, violence (which includes even 
hann done to an attacking predatory animal, e.g., in self-deftnce) 1s 
prevented. Sympathy embraces ell forms of distress (uneasiness, fear, 
pain, guilt, hostility, grief, etc.). (Similarly, Wittgenstein's dictum: 
"Sympathy, one may say, 1s a form of conviction that someone else is in 
pain", might be given a broader readin\) by repladng 11 ,>din" with "dis· 
tress".) Whereas the Jain rationale 1s that all souls are equal and 
whereas Jains propound the inv101abi11ty 01 separate individuals, Vedic 
thought and Buddhism stress the idea that all life is interrelated, and 
that to hann another creature h to hann all creatures, including the 
one COlllllitt1ng the act of violence. Cruelty is considered essentially a 
lack of its positive counterpart, sympathy. Sympathy concerns the life 
force, the vital drive, shared by alt animals, human and nonhuman, and 
~·ants, a basic motive or motivating factor which Zen teacher and author 
Dahetz Taitaro Suzuki has called "trisna", or "thirst", and which 
strongly resembles Schopenhauer's (and, following h1m, Schweitzer's) 
•will to live". 33 
Schopenhauer's view 1s that sympathy involves the recognition of the 
w111-to-11ve 1n others: 1t rests on the identification of self with 
others, so that their interests, affairs, nePds, distress, and sufferin~ 
become 1n a way mine, which is possible only through the kind of know-
ledge that I have of these others - therefore that knowledge mediates 
between the interests of others and what is, according to Schopenhauer, 
the fundan1ental motivation that governs m£, and in fact all animals, 
namely egoism. 34 Schopenhauer in fact distinguishes bt.tween three 
fundamental mot1vat1c.. for hu~an actions, viz. egoism, mal1ce, and 
sympathy, and claims that only sympathy be a genuine moral mothation: 
because we have sympathy, we see the things which are derived from it as 
of genuine moral worth. 35 Sympathy, he tells us, constitutes the 
foundation of morality: "Boundless (sympathy) for all 11 1ng ~eings 1s 
the firmest and surest guarantee of pure moral conduct •.•• Whoever is 
nspired with it will assuredly injure no one, will wrong no one, will 
encroach on no one's rights 11 • 36 
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Set aside considerations concerning the difficulties involved in redu-
cing a variety of complex motives to a basic one (viz. the w111-to-
li~e), as it stands, this argument ~ncounters much the same criticism as 
the argument from kindness: viz. that it is far from obvious that a 
person's caoacity to identify herself with another, to feel the other's 
need, distress, and suffering as her own, and to share it ~ the other, 
is identical with "pure moral conduct", 1.e., right action. In fact, 
there .!!. no guarantee, contra Schopen~auer, that a sympathetic act is a 
right act. It is conceivable not 011ly that a sympathetic agent causes 
but is responsible for unnecessary hann to anothe: being, e.g., when she 
believes harming an animal 1s necessary when in fact it is not: a 
diagnosis may be false. The mere presence of sympathy in motivation and 
action does not provide an infall i ble guide or access to what is right, 
or genuinely moral, conduct. How one is disposed toward~ what one does, 
does not augtM&nt or diminish the pleasure or pain caused to the creature 
affected by one's action, and this is also true in the case of sympath): 
a sympathEtic act may be a wrong one, morally. 
The other criticism directed against the argument from kindness, that we 
cannot "owe" animals kindness (sympathy), that kindness (sympathy) is 
not their due, th6' we have no duties or obl ig~tions of sympathy to 
them, however, does not obtain: Schopenhauer states explicitly thdt the 
ethic of sympathy does not involve the imperative form exhibited when 
morality is linked with a doctrine of duties. He fs tilting at the idea 
of moral •principles", and the notion of an "ought" in general as well 
as that of an "unconditional ought" in particular. 37 He is concerned 
rather with investigating what sorts of motives function as motives of 
human actions. This, however, renders him vulnerable to what was 
implied by the first criticism: viz. that a person's motives and 1nten-
t1ons are logically distinct from the morality of her action~, the 
rigt•tness anCJ wrongness of what she does. (E.g., that Eskimos consider 
animals' lives and souls of ~~ual value to their own, and that they are 
also able to accornnodate infantlcfde and active euthanasia in their 
cycle-of-eA1stence world view, does not make their killing animals for 
food, killing first-born baby girls, or abandoning thei toothless-and-
c 1umsy-but-otherwhe-he"1 thy e 1 de rs to die either throLt~h exposur; or 
through polar bear attacks, less wrong morally, let alone morally 
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justify their actions, in our eyP.s.) F•1rthermore, and importantly, as 
O.W. Hamlyn points out, there is no attemp' in Schopenhauer to explain 
or justify the claim that it is a concern for others that is fundamental 
to morality as we understand it; that this is a fact is s1mply assumed. 38 
Can the notion of sympathy as thti basis of mora 1 ity, and of our moral 
concern for animals in particular, b~ salvaged ? Philip Herter realizes 
that all morally valut-ble conduct cann,'>t be derived from sympathy, yet 
considers sympathy as such to be "unconditionally morally val•Jable". 39 
He writes that 11 it m;ght be possible to lead a genuinely moral life with 
sympathy at its focus and with only the minimum of recourse to any 
notion of duty", dnd that it can be claimed that tne very capacity for 
moral discrimination logically presupposes a capacity for ;;l'.>me kind of 
sympathetic feeling - and that it is doubtful whether a being unable to 
s.vn1pathi.:e with others, can be said to possess true moral insight into 
her own and other's situations. 40 
Mercer's concept of sympathy 1s both "interpersonal" (i.e., it extends 
over all sentient beirgs who can be helped and harmed, without regard to 
differences like sex, nationaHty, race, species, etc.) and "inten-
sional", (1.e., one sympathizes not only wHh another but also about 
something or in something) and usually involves reference to some kind 
of distress (cf. the etymology of "sympathy 11 - Gk. - and "compassion" -
Lt. - : "suffer with"). Mere awareness of what someone feels 1s not 
sympathy unless we are ready to do something about it, still less are 
states of involunt~ry infection, etc. Sympathy, Mercer tell~ us, is an 
"inescapably practical concept" (hence, the objection made to the 
"cruelty/kindness view" and to Schopenhauer's view which identified 
McrueltyM, "kindness", and "sympathyM with feelings or states of mind, 
does not obtain here): when we ·sympathize with someone, we seek - by 
action or omission - ~o bring about an end to his predicament. Mercer 
wants to be understood as claiming merely that sympathy is relevant to 
morality by virtue of being ! motive for action. Insofar as we can 
cultivate a capacity for sympathy it makes sem·.e to say that we "ought" 
to sympathize, which 1s not to say that the "duty of sympathy 11 is the 
. 
supreme moral principle. When I assert I sympathize with someone, thus 
Mercer, I tacitly acknowledge that I could have an obligation to him; if 
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I can be obli9ed to him, then he has the capacity to have a cldim on me. 
Mercer says that it is no coincidence that we recognize the possibility 
of having obligations only to those with whom we recogni1e th~ 
possibility of sympathizing. 
Now, if sympathy 1s simply! motive for action, if practical sympathy -
although a precondition for genuine moral conduct - is not identical 
with it, and if it is difficult to change anything by arguments which 
appeal to sympathy, humanity, decency, or fairness, when powerful 
interests are involved, 41 what else is required ? "People have to be 
ready to listen", as Nagel puts it: but how is that determined ? In the 
opinion of one theorist, •questions of morals are far too much thought 
of as questions of rights, and not nearly enough as questions of duty, 
or better still, of sensitivity 11 ; 1n that of another, the point and 
function of the concept of a right "can be explained and exhaustively 
elucidated by the language of duty". 42 Not only is it inconceivable, 
however, how duty or "sensitivity" could fulfil the function served by 
rights, but the bracketing of duty and sympathy as coordinate elements 
in morality strikes me as less satisfactory than the linking of sympathy 
with rights. There appears to be a discrepancy between an eth1c of 
sympathy and a duty-based theory: the latter usually involves an appeal 
to (not) treating others in a manner 1 would (not) like to be treated, 
etc., and therefore exhibits self-interested motivation rather than a 
genuine concern for others, a concern whict1 does mark sympathy, on the 
other hand. (And the extension of rights to the hitherto underprivi-
leged is informed much by the sam- kind of concern.) 
Schop!nhauer seems to have the right idea not only in divorcing his 
ethic of sympathy from the language of duty, but 1n saying that the just 
man respects rights irrespective of whether ttiere are any sanctions 
imposed on him, because he recOQnizes his o""n w1 .1 ir1 that of other 
beings. Sympathy, we recall, involves - ,.cogniz'n~ t 1e will-to-live 1.., 
others. Respect for rights and sympathl are not identir"l b&!t they moy 
well be coextensive. 
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Ch. 5 
The Rights of Animals 
Sympathy is an important moral motive and practical concept, but i' consti-
tutes neither the sole basis for morally good conduct nor is it a consistent 
action-guide; nor is sympathetic action the same as right action. An account 
of rights, however (1.e., one which "takes rights seriously"), seems to 
furnish a logically and m~rally compelling basis for right conduct, and for 
our duties and responsibilities to, and nonrights against. others. (This is 
not to say that every right has a correlative duty, etc •• or that every duty. 
etc., is based on an existing right. Only rights which are claimed, explicit-
ly or implicitly, g1ve rise to duties, strictly speaking. And "duties of 
status" seem to be exemplary of duties not based on existing rights. By 
•existing rights" I mean not rights which have been conferred by some "cosmic 
mora 1 1 egis la tu re", but rights whose ex 1s tence 1s based on reason ( s) and 
"discovered" by enlightened, reason-see1ng and reason-seeking, consciences1 .) 
To me, a right-based theory is intuitively more acceptable than a duty-based 
theory because "duty" expresses no t1T1nediate concern with the being who is 
the recipient or beneficiary of duties. Duty-based accounts i nitia 1 ly have 
not much to say about these beings in their own "right" - their i1T1nedi:.:e 
concern is with the agent who has a duty. I think Timothy Sprtgge is essen-
tially right in saying, more specifically, that "duty" sees the moral issue 
as turning primarily on the nature of human reality, while "right" implies 
that there is somtthing about animal reality that matters morally. And, 
again intuitively, the c~rrelation of rights and nonrights appears to Le more 
fundamental than the correlation of r~ghts and duties, 2 because "nonrights", 
unlike 0 duty•, expresses a more i111ned1ate concern with that 11 someth1 ng about 
animal reality". 
5.1 Value, and the Idea of Eguality revisited 
Animals resemble human beings in morally relevant ways: they are con-
scious, sentient creatures who can be helped and harmed, a.id who can 
mind what happens to them. They have interests in the sense of having a 
welfare, and needs, and many (including most of those who are caus~d 
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distress and who suffer losses in intensive farming units, in research 
labs, in zoos and circuses, and most of our pets and prey) have inte-
rests in the sense of having desires, beliefs, preferences. They have a 
subjectivity9 they are subjects of a life which can be better or worse 
for them, of which it is meaningful to speak as "(not) worthwhile 
living". They are individuals (problems of identity and individuation 
set aside: I agree with Regan that morality must assume that individuals 
retain their existence in spac~ and over time), and as "distinct indivi-
duals", creatures with "separate existerices 11 1 they have rights, or as 
Nozick uys, place "moral side constraints" on what we (and they) may do 
which "reflect the fact of our (and their) separate existences". 3 
McCloskey, Feinberg, and RPgan in part rest their respective cases for 
rights on the assumption that creatures who have "inherent value" have 
rights, "inherent" as opposed to "intrinsic value", which attaches not 
to individuals but in the utilitarian sense to their experiences, e.g., 
Veir pleasures and preference-satisfactions, and as opposed to 
"instrumental value" wh.r:h attaches to their usefulness. The concept of 
"value" requires both relation and comparison, and this requirement 
necessarily excludes all referen~e to "inherent". - Rights are ascribed 
to a creature because it has inherent value; but how can one see that it 
has inherent value until one 1s prepared to ascribe to it rights ? It 
seems that in combination with "inherent" not only is 11 value" itsPlf 
opaque but it threatens to render "rights" obscure as well. 
Another problem with "value" is that it is necessarily connected with a 
human perspective. Value-judgments can only reflect what matters in 
human life or be extrapolated to what we think matters in other 11fe. 
(This may be what Nozick has in mind when he says that homo sapiens is 
characterized by his value-seekfng and value-giving tendency.) But in 
fact no species has more or less value than another - "inherent value", 
that is. 
As Margaret MacDonald asserts forcefully: n~tural events themselves have 
no value, and humans as "natural existences" have no value either. What 
conditions rights constitute is not determined by the nature, essence, 
or "value" "f human beings but by human decisions 4 or "rational disco-
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veries·• (in the sense outlined at the beg,nning of tt,fs chap\.er). 
MacDonald's attack 1s certainly ap~licable to "tnherent value". If 
there is such value at all, it is possessed equally, as is "intrinsic 
value": whatever experiences a creature has, they are 11 to11 that creature 
as other beings' experiences are "to" these beings in one way or another 
- they, too, are experiential subjects. A hierarchy of values, both 
"intrinsic" and "instrumental", is acceptable only if the possibility of 
different orderings, according to different standards or criteria, is 
acknowledged. And here the emphasis is on "difference" not on "inequa-
lity•. 
5.2 Conditions for the Ascription of Rights, an~ Moral Agency 
Despite his view of "natural" rights as "nonsense upon sti Its", the idea 
of "animal rights" probably originated in the eighteenth century with 
Benham, and after him, was perpetuated by Thomas Young and John Lawren-
ce: "Life, intelligence, and sentience necessarily imply rights" was a 
principle they took to apply to ~umans and animals alike. 5 "Life", 
"intelligence", and ''sentience", then, are seen by Young and Lawrence 
(and not only by ther.) as conditions for the ascription of (moral) 
rights. (By "rights" I mean 11 ind1vidual (moral) rights": this emphasis 
1s significant in distinguishing our moral concern for more complex 
organisms from that for the s imp 1 er ones, and for plants - cf. sect. 
7.3) (I follow Jonathan Bennett's 1mplication that computers or artifi-
cial-11intellig1nc111- models are not "intelligent" 6, at least not in a 
morally relevant way.) 
What is meant by "intelligence" needs to be clarified. If it is defined 
in terms of a cert~in IQ level, then not only would most - if not all -
animals be excluded (even if they posses~ed the means to participate in 
a test. which tnvolved uniform te~ting proredures, for humans as well, 
t11e.y presumably could not be brought to see the point of such exercises) 
but some human beings, too, would be disqualified, and vicious inequali-
ties and prejudice c~uld be entrenched. IQ tests are questionable in 
that they constitute single-scale-measurings: but intelligence cannot be 
. 
so measured, since it involves different sensory modalities. Once these 
are taken into account, the ramifications of intelligence and its multi-
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tudinous manifestations become evident. There is a growing view that 
evolution has not produced a gradual increase in a one dimensional level 
of intelligence. but rather that species have evolved specific intelli-
gences relevant to their survival in particular ecological niches. The 
underlying process may. or may not. be the same across species. 
Suppose we do opt for a definiti~n allowing for the various manifesta-
tions of intelligence. e.g .• along Bennett's lines: "When we speak of (a 
creature) as 1nte111gent ••••• we credit it with patterns of behaviour 
which (a) involve the organisation or control of complex data. and (~) 
are suitably modified when they no longer prove appropriate in the light 
of the (creature's) needs". 7 The question 1s how far, if at all. the 
possession "f intelligence in this sense 1s relevant to the possession 
of rights. Intelligence 1s certainly important morally but 1t 1s not 
clear at all how it can furnish a necessary condition for the attribu· 
tion of rights. If we opt for a single-scale view of intelligence. we 
must be able to detennine precisely at which point noninte111gence 
ceases and intelligen .. .. begins. if we w.1nt to render ascription of 
rights (and, in a broader sense, moral standing) conditional on the 
possession of intelligence, and it is doubtful whether this can be done 
in a manner which does not involve (clandesti ) verbal ruling. 
What about sentience (where "sentience" can be taken to mean "the 
capacity to experience pleasure and pain) ? Sentience 1s surely, like 
intelligence, a sufficient condition for being considerable: to be able 
to enjoy or suffer means that there is something to be taken into 
account, morally, but 1s it necessary for having moral standing and, 
more particularly, for having rights ? The concept of consciousness, 
intransitive consciousness, it has been established, does not permit us 
to conceive of genuine borderline cases of sentience, cas~ in which it 
1s inherently indeterminate whether a creature feels pain. (Either a 
creature is sentient or it is not. Obviously, once sentience is mani-
fest, there a re degrees: but these a re degrees of intensity, nC\t of 
possession. The capacities of pain-perception vary with the complexity 
of the respective r.ervous systems. But here we obtain a shift from 
intransitive to transitive consciousness, e.g., sensory perception, 
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awareness of stimuli, the capacity to locate sources of pain, etc. )8 
Hence, the objection that sentience 1s & matter of degree, unlike 
possession of rights, cannot obtain. There are, however, at least two 
serious objections to the sentience criterion: the first 1s that it 
would serve tc exclude all those who have slipped into a temporary coma, 
who have been anaesthetised, or who have otherwise fallen u~conscious, 
and indeed those who suffer from dysautonomia. Defenders of the sentien-
ce-condition might seek to modify their criterion, by mentioning the 
importance of other ~inds of perception (all of which can involve 
enjoyment or distress) or the creature's "normal" condition or capaci-
ties, which do include sentience: but any such defence will, at some 
stage of the argument, implicitly or explicitly, abandon talk of "sentien-
ce .. in favour of "interests". 
The second line of criticism 1s advanced by philosophers like John 
Rodman and R.G. Frey. Rodman writes th4t reliance on 11 sentience 11 leaves 
the rest of nature "in a state of thinghood, having no intrinsic worth, 
a~q~iring instrumental value only as resources for the well-being of an 
e'lite of sentient beings", and that anthropocentric rationalhin has 
expanded into a kind of zoocentric sentientism, using Singer's own words 
(characterizing the Brambell report) against Singer et al.: 11 an enlight· 
ened and humane form of spec1es1sm, but .... species ism nonetheless 11 • 
Frey follows Rodman in saying that 1t 1s ironic that the sentience-
cr1terion (which should combat speciesism) 1s itself spec1esht in 
character, since it discriminates against nonsentient creation and 
broadens the category of those who can practise speciesism, or • in the 
case of sentient animals - who can have it practised on their behalf. 9 
- This criticism is serious and forceful in that it confronts antispecie-
shts on their home ground: the obvious way out of the dilerrma 1s to 
shift the emphasis from sentience to the broader notion of "interests", 
which extends over sentience as well as the needs of welfare of nonsen-
tient life. But if all that lives has needs of some sort, the fulfil-
ment of which 1s necessary for the survival or continued existence of 
the organism, does this imply that "life" is the relevant criterion for 
having standing and - more particularly - for having rights ? 
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"Life" is certainly a necessary condition. Morality 1s, if not essen-
tially then at least importantly, concerned with matters of life and 
death. lO (I do not be 11 eve we can meaningfully speak of soil, moun-
tains, underground minerals, rivers, and lakes - in abstraction from 
the fauna and flora they contain - as "being aliv 11 , except in a metapho-
rical sense, let alone as having "moral" standing or rights.) But does 
this require us to 11 ve 1 i ke Ja ins, cover our faces with gauz• so as to 
prevent us from breattiing in and destroying countless m~cro- i1sms, 
sweep the paths before us so as to prevent us from step~,·~ ants, 
avoid treading on grass, and eat only fruits, vegetables, and nuts which 
have fallen off trees and bushes by themselv~s? Though not implausible, 
it is difficult to accept this: mainly because we do not know what 
exactly is to be taken into account - "life", certainly, but life as it 
is to whom, or to what ? Is there a centre of subjective experience at 
all, an individual point of view, in plants, protozoa, corals, even in 
ents ? 11 Thh 1s precisely where consciousness is relevant, viz. in 
rendering possible sympathy, empathy, or imaginative projection. The 
human model of consciousness allows us to say that there is something 
that it is like to be another creature, something that is not possible 
in the case of nonccnscious life. It is not so much our ignorance which 
prevents us from viewing grass, bacilli, starf~sh, etc., as conscious 
individuals, beings who can mind what happens to them, as empirical 
evidence to the contrary. So, while certainly a necessary condition, 
"life" is not sufficient for having moral standing as an individual, or 
for being ascribable individual moral rights. In analyzing the notion 
of rights, and of right-possession, or ascription, we have to "look at 
the company they keep", investigate the context arid circumstances in 
which mention is made of them. Rights are invoked in order to protect 
and defend individuals, and to safeguard the1r interests, to insure that 
individuals can live their lives "in accordance with their needs, capaci-
ties, and optimal circumstantial possibilities. Individual moral rights 
are ascribed and ascribable only to subjects of a life, not to all 
- -living or~anisms, the former including all (human and nonhuman) ma11111als, 
birds, reptiles amphibians, fish, even certain invertebrates like 
~ctopi. Where epistemic borderline cases are concerned, e.g., crusta-
ceans, insects, molluscs, etc., 12 we might wish to give them the 
benefit of the doubt in deciding whether they have rights as individuals 
or species. (See below, sect. 7.3) 
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A co11mon objection to the idea of animal rights 1s that rights arise 
only as a matter of contract, i.e., as a matter of agreement between 
rational agents. Yet the notion of rational agents as equal standard 
units within a contractual circle which constitutes the whole sphere of 
moral concern is not only limited in its anthropocentrism and, indeed, 
in its egocentrism ("you have such-and-such rights provided you do not 
encroach on my rights which are such-and-such") but mistaken: contract 
has its place in morality, not vice versa. As Glover points out, in 
theories like contractar1anism which t1e the moral rights of individuals 
to their bargaining power and their power of retaliation there will be 
many losers, and these losers will include foetuses, babies, children, 
minorities, animals, the poor, the handicapped, and perhaps women. It 
1s easy to flatly exclude animals from "human rights", often just by 
definition of the term 11 human 11 , or (realizing th1s 1s arb1trary) by 
replacing the term by apparently more intelligible ones 11ke reason or 
self-consciousness, 13 and by changing the definition of these terms 
whenever ne~1 findings have been made ~1th respect to animals which would 
(briefly) include them in the realm of rational or sel~-conscious beings 
and therefore bearers of rights. Other favourite terms include "autono-
my", "free wil I", "moral ag~ncy 11 , the capacity to guide one's behaviour 
by "moral principle" and to engage in "mutual limitation of conduct", 
etc. These criteria need to be shown to be morally relevant to the 
possession of rights, i.e., to be necessary and suffic1ert for forging 
thtr required ccmnection between 1nd1v1duating characteristic and moral 
rights. 
Again, the prima facie easy way to solve this problem is to seek recour-
se to the language-criterion: 11 If animals were able to talk to us, it 
would make a striking difference'in most of our opinions about them •••• 
Certainly if animals could employ moral language, as well as act as if 
they experienced pain or pleasure, that wculd put them into the category 
of 'moral persons' .. .. Since animals are unable to talk we can only 
suppose that they are unable tn 'have moral concept\' - if i~deed this 
amounts to anything other than being ablQ to use moral language anyway. 
Therefore, we suppose t~at the reason we have no obligation to respect 
the animal's point of view is that animals do not really!:!.!:!!. p~ints of 
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view"; and in a re ghly similar vein, Jo11i.1than Suzman insists 14 that it 
is "animals' defic iencies, not ours, that deny them rights", "for were 
we able to co1m1unicate w1th creatures with sufficient intelligence to 
manifest rationality, the position could be very differentw. Suzman, it 
should be noted, not only argues along verificationist lines, 1.e., 
infers from considerations governing our knowledge of rationality to 
conditions for the possibility of there being rattoridlity in animals, 
but his view. betrays a rather narrow view of "rationality". Rat;ionality 
is not merely manifested in "knowing-that" (i .P.., framed linguistically) 
but in "knowing-howw. Furthennore, the language-criterion is questior:a-
ble: nonverbal cues give language an essential context, and there do 
exist c~es which m~nifest not only intelligence but rationality in some, 
in only a few, species, e.g., problem-solving activities which do not 
proceed by way of trial and error, successful imitation, etc. 
Philosophers who defend the exclusive moral relevance of, say, 
rationality, autonomy, self-consciousness, free will, etc. - or: more 
specifically, who hold ~hem to be exclusively relevan• to the question 
of rights - need to es tab 11 sh (1) the 1 ower 11mi ts of rat i ona 11 ty, 
self-consciou!.ness, etc., and (2) that animals, all animals, fill below 
tnese limits, i" order to be able to deny that they have r1ghts. It is 
very doubtful whether this can be accomplished by means of producing 
empirical information about the nature of animals and not in ways which 
involve a substitution of intellectual customs for arguments. 
Neurological, psychoiogical, and ethological evidence favnurs the view 
that possession o" what can !:>e called self-consciousness, etc., is a 
matter of degree. (Of course, owing to the inherent vagueness and 
occasional opacity of these tenns, some degree of verbal legislation is 
necessary to rendir them subsumab,e under what can be studied objecti-
vely: but then again, so do terins like "instinct", "aggressionw, wal-
truismw, and the like, requi e definition.) 
Possession of rights, on the other hand, is nc,,t a matter of degree: 
either a creature has or is ascribable a right, or it has no such right, 
is not ascribable a right. 15 Possession of se~f-consciousnP.;s, etc., 
may explain our motivution behind giving preference to the we~l-being of 
a human mother of five over that of a hen with five chicks in a case of 
conflitt (assuming that the hen possesses a far lesser degree of stlf-
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consciousness), ~ut it do~s not make a 'ifference to being morally 
considerable or to having rights in the first place. Even the absence 
of self-consciousness only "rules out certain sorts of value and d1s-
value as pertaining to what goes on in the consciousness of a creature, 
and 1nakes certain rights irrelevant". 16 A creature who 1s not self-
consc;ous in the sense of having a concept of itself as a persisting 
being with a past and with purposes for the future cannot worry as to 
whether its pllns and purposes are going to be frustrated, and cannot 
look back with (d1s-)sat1sfaction on its achievements. Therefore the 
question of benefiting or harming it in respect of these matters does 
not arise. 
ting being, 
at all: it 
But this does not m~an that this creature is not a persis-
th~t it has no past and no future, or that it has no rights 
nly lacks the rights relevant to this sort of self-con-
sciousness, but it does have the basic rights to life, well-being, etc. 
Similar rejoinders are conceivable with respect to arguments from 
intentionality, free will, autonomy, conceptual thought or abstract 
reasoning, and moral agency. 
•Moral agency" 1s often defined in terms of "mor11 self-determination", 
the capacity to reconsider one's motives, to guide one's behaviour by 
moral principles, etc., definitions which effectively exrlude animals 
from the realm of moral agents. Animals, including primat~s (though an 
instance has been record•~ 17 where Koko, a gorilla using sign language, 
apparently expresr.!d regret for having bi ttf!n her teacher three days 
previously, saying that she was angry at the time but did not remember 
why), cetacea, or intelligent gs, ~orses, or pigs, lack the capacities 
of mc,ral self-determination in the sense of living and acting accordirig 
to rational life-plans, to reconsider their motives, to guide their 
behaviour by moral princ1~les, and to claim or w11ve rights. But many 
normal adult human beings are not "moral agents" in this sense either: 
consider relatively simple-minded villagers in more re1note regions, or 
primitive foreign tribes who adhere to a more or less rigid code of 
conduct which has been transmitted over centuries, who are "culturally 
progra11111ed" to follow moral traditions without ever questioning and 
often also without modifying them. The moral principles they follow are 
not conscious principles in that they are not "rought "before their 
minds", and one could not really speak of these people as being "morally 
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self-determining" or c-s "reccnsidering their motives", yet they do 
engage in, e.g., mutual limitation or conduct. 
Here as well, it seems that moral o~ency i! a matter of degree: animals, 
like virtuous humans, are motivated by tenderness, affection, pru~ence, 
deference, altruism, aggression, and dominance, and they c;a:-; reasonably 
be called "ethical agents", 18 in that they certainly possess the 
rudiments of moral agency. Suppose the condition f~r moral considerabi-
11ty and for moral rights ;s located at a rather sophisticated level, 
namely the possession of a morally good character: it is ~n the basis of 
an indiv~dual's virtues that the "basic rights to a fulfilling life and 
dignity• are extended, and in animals these virtues include loyalty, 
affection, altruism, ~tc. The ob1ious problem with this account is that 
it reads many human beings out of the realn: of morally cons ,derable 
t' gs, e.g., infants, children, lunatics, imbeciles, etc., not to 
mention ~ther species of whom it is not incorrect but simply impossible 
to postulate a •morally good character•. (~osstble interjections 
concerning •potential" or "hypothetical moral agency• will be discussed 
shortly.) Similarly, the high-brow readings of rationality, self-con-
sciousneH. etc., would serve to exclude many human beings from the 
reatm of right-bearers as well, in addition to countless other species 
(jf these capac~ties can justifiably b•! held to constitute not only 
sufficient but necessary conditions for ~drnission, and this 1s extremely 
doubtful), viz. the young, the senile, the mentally enfeebled, conceiva-
bly even wholP tr1bes who had renounced all self-consciousness, who had 
perhaps taken "akimcanna", "self-naughting", to its extreme, transcen-
ding individuation. 19 (This transcendence constitutes "self-dental" in 
a metaphysical, not in an ethical sense as implied by ethical doctrines 
of unselfishness or altruism. Indeed, as A.K. t~omaraswamy points out, 
such ~abandonment of the self and of all ties is not literally •un-
selfish" but it h also better and kinder to point out the way to 
happiness by foll owing 1 t than to be 'sympathetic' • • • with those who 
will 'seek peace and ensure it'.") Presumably, indeed: most probably, 
to these "self-naughting" beings the possession of rights would have 
ceased to be funct i ona 1 and important a 1 together, but from our po·; nt of 
view it would te monstrous tc actuall) deny them rights. 
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Contra Wasserstrom, a system in which there are no rights would not 
necessarily "be a morally impoverished one". (Think of Ea stern or 
island societies primarily concerned with balance and harmony.) To be 
sure, Western society would be morally impoverished if the notion of 
rights were forcibly rendered nonexistent, as in George Orwell's novel 
11 1984 11 • (But in how far are certain Eastern and primitive societies 
like Orwell's Oceanian society ?) As Wasserstrom has explained, "a 
society that simply lacks any conception of human rights is less 
offensive than one which has such a conception but denies that some 
individuals have these rights". 20 Yet how could the fonner be 
11 offensive" at all ? It would only be offensive of J!~ to deny thes<! 
foreigners rights. 
My i ntention 1s not to rest my case for animal rights solely on the 
comparison of animals with human babies and on the "argument from 
marginal cases". 21 This argument states that all conditions for the 
ascription of rights which are designed to exclude animC\ls from the 
realm of beings who are possible possessors of rights necessarily also 
exclude some humans (who are the "marginal cases", since senility, 
mental deficiency, lunacy, etc., are not the human norm). But since 
such an exclusion would be unacceptable, and since we do want to speak 
of these "marginal 11 humans (a rather reprehensible way of putting this!) 
as having rights, we must include animals in our considerations and 
concede that they, too, have rights. 
There have been numerous attempts to diffuse these arguments, either by 
flatly denying that human infants, irrbeciles, etc., have rights, or b) 
appeals to "sentimental interests" or partial affections. Other 
attempts ir:..ude reference to potential or hypothetic~l m<'ral agency, 
and the ewDhasis of the degree of likeness to no~nal adult human beings. 
F"'tY see1ns willing to deny, despitP. his dttemp~s to prize them apart 
animals, that human infants, lunatics, imbeciles, etc., have 
,hts. 22 I do not have to ~oint out that such a view might ultimately 
sanction t: e vilest crimes: individuals could perhaps even be rendered 
"mentally deficient" by definition and subsequently be used in 
scientific research. And this is unacceptable for moral reasons, and 
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not only because it is "in general scientifically unsatisfactory to 
experiment not on a normal organism but on the infantile, defective, 
senile, or diseaspj". 23 
H.J. Mccloskey, Alan Donagan, and Alan Gewirth implicitly or explicitly 
state that human infants are "~otential moral agents" (i.e., potentially 
rational, potentially self-conscious, free-willing or autonomous beings) 
and that imbeciles are "hypothetical moral agents", and therefore, 
unlike animals, have rights, although they do not (yet) "exercise" them. 
In Suzman's words: children and idiots do have rights but exercise of 
thes~ rights is denied to them, because of the inadequacy of their 
capacity to choose what is in their own interest. Now, to speak of 
"potentu1l 11 moral agency is not satisfactory: hN can this potentiality, 
present as it may be, confer present (and no potential or future) 
rights on the infant ? The problem with talk •t •present potentia-
1 ity• is that is leaves us at a loss to understand the difference (the 
presence of) potentiality makes to the actual condition of the infant. 
Moreover, as John Kleinig has made explicit, being a .. chooser• (in 
Suzman's sense of being capable of - :tually - "choosing in one's 
interest") is a condition for the posses:.lon of certain rights (e.g., 
the right to vote), but not for the possession of rights as such. 
McCloskey suygests 24 that "it is meaningful to ascribe rights here on 
the basis of what would/will be the moral will of the b~ing who is not 
an infant". Suppose the child died before realizing its potential: 
would the assignation of rights then - posthumously - have made "sense" 
in this view ? "Yes", Mccloskey might say, "if the child had lived, 
etc.", shifting the emphasis from potential to hypothetical moral 
agency, from a contingent matter of fact to a matter of supposition or 
assumption. But the 1dea of "hypothetical" moral agency h even lP.ss 
adequate: how can this hypotheticality confer actual or present (and not 
mere hypothetical) rights on the imbecile ? To say that their moral 
agency is the type of agency they would enjoy or exercise ir they were 
able, 1.e., if they were moral agents. Element of circularity set 
aside, animals could be viewed as "hypothetical moral agen!s" in much 
the same way. 
The point is, however, that "moral agency" (bearing in mind that this 
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term is primarily a verbal vehicle designed to steer clear of animals) 
does not constitute a necessary condition for right-possession. 25 It 
1s not directly or exclusively morally relevant to having or being 
ascribable rights that an individual can deliberate between alternative 
courses of action, examine her motives, develop and act according to 
long-term plans and prospects, or write articles and books on "animal 
rights": all thi$ serves to explain why she can claim and respects - or 
is to respect - rights but not why she has them. Animals are "ethical" 
agents, and, like infants and imbeciles, they are - by definition - not 
"moral agents" but "moral r~cipients". 26 Yet they are relevantly like 
moral agents in that they are subjects of a life, living beings with 
interests, centres of subjective experience, creatures who can flourish 
or languish, and as such, they require protection, and the explicit or 
implicit assurance that their standing will be acknowledged, their 
interests safeguarded, and that they will be given consideration equal 
to other individuals. The fact that they are 1.l the receiving end of 
morality only renders their rights against us, and our duties and 
responsibilities with regard to them, matters of that much greater 
urgency. 
Other arguments designed to exclude ar.imals nclude appeals to 
sentimental intP.rest .. and partial affections we t--ve regarding infants 
and human imbeciles, and the emphasis of the degree of likeness these 
humans bear to normal adults, a resemblance not borne by other animals. 
(These arguments essentially reflect the second and third of the three 
objections to the a·gument from speciesism, discussed in sect. 3.5. 
He~ce, my concern with them here will be somewhat laconic.) 
The underlying rationale governing both arguments 1s that we have a 
"sentimental interest" in the well-being of our young and of the 
enfeebled of our species which we do not have, and cannot have, at least 
not of a similar kind, in the wel1-be1ng of other species. Owing to 
biological barriers, the bonds bt:tween humans and animals cannot in 
strenqth 11pproach the "emotional attachments" people develop in 
of their own young and retarded. A 1 though human "parents" 
extremely "fond" of their "adopted" nonhuman "ch11 dren 11 , animals 
dev~lop intellectually and emotionally beyond a certain point: 
respect 
may be 
fail to 
. 
it 1s. 
therefore, their deficiencies which deny them equal consideration and 
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rights. (Again. we find a remarkable p~rallel to this kind of reasoning 
in the justification of Christian Afrikaner Nationalism: "Separate 
development has its foundation in the Christian national philosophy of 
life of the Afrikaner". Special value is placed "on the ties with one's 
people and on the continued existence of the nation to which one be-
longs", and accelerating and insuring separate development is possible 
by transferring the Bantu in the cities to the homelands - "unless we do 
this we shall be forced to grant political rights to them in the white 
country". 27 ) 
Or is it our deficiencies which deny them rights ? Melden repeatedly 
states that we cannot "Join our lives" with those of ani"1als. Like 
Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman, he emphasizes not only the 
us hared mora 1 understanding" existing between human beings (this under-
standing obv1ously cannot be shared by all humans) but also the comb1ned 
effect of the relations in which human beings stand to one another and 
which binds all humans together into a single overall conmunity of a 
1norally significant kind. That this conmunal fee11ng is real and 
important cannot be doubted: what is doubtful, however, is the insinua-
tion that such a union and coexistence is 1mpossible between humans an~ 
animals. 28 To deny the possibility of interspecific relations is 
mistaken and blind: since they do obtain, philosophers must be wrong. 
Suppose they did not obtain. however: why should only human relations 
matter in our moral considerations 1 Animals, too, are capable of 
forming complex and uniaue relationships, bonds (th1nk of, e.g., wolves 
or swans), of conmu~icating with one another in a variety of intricate 
ways. They "join their Hves 11 with one another on the basis of what 
could be described as a "shared ethical understanding 11 : why should 
matters like breaking up these relationships not be important morally ? 
The "veal calf" has ~ right to rem~in with its mother. and the cow has a 
right (and an "ethical duty") to tend and care for her young as long as 
is required. 
At a deeper level. arguments such as those presented above fall prey to 
the objection that sentimental interests and emotional attachments may 
. 
change over time. Suppose our interests in the well-being of incapaci-
tated human beings were waning rapidly (perhaps as a result of major 
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economic, sociological and political upheaval): would we be justified in 
subjecting our mentally deranged and our infant orphans to scientific 
research experiments ? (We might be able to •rationalize" such practi-
ces: it is one of the traits of rational beings to be able to do that.) 
And although we do ascribe rights to beings with whom we can sympathize, 
with respect to whom we can meaningfully ask the "what is it like ••• ?11 
question, with whom we recognize some kind of emotional fellowship, 
surely the rights of individuals are logically independent of the 
affection (or hatred, or indifference) others may feel or have for them. 
To exclude animals from the realm of beings who have rights simply 
because they are not human (and the arguments advanced by Narveson, 
Francis and Nonnan, Kleinig, and Melden come to just that) is unwarran-
tedly to advocate moral apartheid. The objection that it is not specie-
sht to ascribe rights on the bash of those properties which &re conmen 
to members of an individual's kind, rather than incorrectly to assign 
rights on the bash of that individual's propert~ . s. does not come to 
much: what has to be shown 1s (l) that these pro pert 1e s constitute 
necessary and sufficient conditions for right-ascription, i.e •• are 
directly and exclusively morally relevant, and (2) that only homo 
sapiens, and no other animal - not even rudimentarily - possesses them. 
And this task is difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. 
The analogies between human infants and nonhuman animals and the argu-
me11t from marginal cases are useful in that they cause us to reconsider 
our motives end to eY.amine the logic and conc;htency of our inclina-
tions, but they have implications which lead (l) to a false view of 
animal nature, and (2) to a slight - probably unintentional - weakening 
of the case for animal rights. First, these arguments imply that 
animals are to nonnal adult humans a'i human 1111oral reciphtnts" are to 
nonnal adult humans. But though animals may lack the degree of rationa-
lity, autonomy, sense of moral responsibility, etc., which humans 
nonnally have, and which hYman b~bies and morons lack, the character of 
this lack 1s markedly different in the two cases. Human moral 
recipients are devoid of something which members of their species 
normally possess. but animals are not "devoid" of something because it 
1s only rudimenterily present in their species: they are not "handicap-
ped" by this lack. 
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Animals have different functions in their species-specific circum-
stances, they are "autonomous" in a different sense - unlike human moral 
recipients who require a lot of care, patience, special treatment, and 
hblp not only in a human environment but in any other environment (for 
they are simply not self-subsistent), most animals do not require thfs 
care, etc., in extrahuman environmerts (and perhaps many do not even 
require such special treatment 1n a human environment, provided they are 
left to their own purposes): they are self-sufficient and perfectly 
capable of living in accordance with their natural impulses and instincts 
and preferences, as well as nP.eds. Hence, in an important rtsptct, 
animals are like normal humans, and animal foetuses, neonates, and 
mentally deficient ~nimals are like human foetuses, neonates, and 
ment. ly deficient humens. 
Second, the problem with these analogies is that they render the existen-
ce, or plausibility, of animals' rights conditional on the existence, or 
plausibility, of the rights of human moral recipients: if human neona-
tes, morons, etc., have rights, then (and only then) animals have 
rights. If the case for animal rights were made to rest on this defenct 
it could not be very strong, and doubts about whether the language of 
rights were adequate for the protect1or1 ,,f animals and for the promotion 
of what is in their interest, might (justifiably) arise. The point is, 
and it can be made without placing too much emphasis on the analogy with 
human infants and the argument from marginal cases, that animals have 
moral rights. So do human infants, and so do human lunatics and imbeci-
les. We are not "changing", "misusing, misapplying, or revising the 
contept of a moral right" when we accord rights to animals (as McCloskey 
thinks we do 29 ): w~ are extending he ·onctpt. 
The argument that animals have no rights because they have no interests 
. 1s quickly dispensed with. (This argument is prominent in Frey's and 
HcCloskty's wrftings.) As Midgley has pointed out, it is not obvious 
why the special, narrow leg .. 1 usage of the tenns ''interests" and "rights" 
should have any bearing at all on our thought and action in other 
contexts. There is excellent reason to say t~1t animals do have inte· 
rests (see sect. 2.3 above), and a denial of this would require empiri-
cal investigation, not a conceptual ruling. But this is precisely what 
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Mccloskey seems to be engaged in when he argues that animals cannot 
"have" interests, or rights, for that matter, because they cannot 
"posse~s" anything. 30 
Obviously, this notion of possession serves to misrepresent whet rights 
are: as pieces of property, th~y appear to be emptrtcal facts, en,ities 
in the world, waiting to be discovered by moral end legal theorists, and 
indeed by the moral and legal corrmunity es a whole. ln a way, of course, 
r1ghts are "discovered", in the sense outlined at the beginning of this 
~hapter: rights refer and correspond to facts about individual creatu-
res, theJ relate to capacities possessed end exercised by these indivi· 
duals, whether phys i ca 1 or men ta 1 capec 1t i es, yet the ex 1s tence of 
rights depends on the moral consciousness of human comnunities et e 
particular stage of their historical development. In the absence of 
such a consciousness, rights would not exist. Undue reliance on the 
notion of possession merely clouds the issue and detracts from the 
importance of ascription in this regard. Moreover, to deny that a~imals 
can "have" or "possess" anything 1s to argue from an unwarr1nttdly 
intellectual definition of "possession". ' cannot see anything wrong -
logically, conceptually - with regarding the weaver-bird's nest or the 
squirrel's nuts as their property. What could be the point of denying 
this ? Cannot anirMls "have" a 11fe, instincts, needs, or a welfare ? 
Do they only "live", 11 .. trive or tend towards", "nud", "flourish" and 
"languish" ? This suggestion 1s simply absurd. 
A conJnOn and favourite objection it that in ascribing rights to animals 
we enthropomorphhe them. 31 In the absence of qualifying conditions, 
the question inwnediately arises why "rights" should ptrtain exclusively 
to human beings. (Think of the rights of ships and banks in legal 
discourse.) We can 1nthropomorph1ze only when we attribute something 
that belongs essentially and exclusively to human nature to, say, 
entmals, plants, rivers, or angels. With respe .. t to rights, why draw 
the line between humans and animals, and not already within the human 
realm ? It might then be contended that we 11andromorpMz1" women when 
. 
we speak of 11 women 1s rights" or that we 11c1uc1siomorph1ze 11 blacks when 
we ascribe rights to them. All this is as silly es 1t sounds. (Do we 
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"zoomorphize" humans when we speak of their instincts, or when we say 
someone 1s "cif good bre~d" ?) Again, in the absence of qualifying 
conditions, and because rights have the role and function they do, it 
would be speciesist to withhold them from animals for fear of anthropo-
morphizing the latter. It would be 4nthropomorphic to grant animals 
rights which have no funr.tion or bearing in their life, e.g., the right 
to vote. 32 (Similarly, we would "gynomorphize'' men if we assigned to 
them the right t~ abortion on demand.) The charge of anthropomorphism 
can be co~~t~red by the charge of unwarranted moral anthropocentrism. 
Hart 1s somewhat more cautious in hh contention that "we should not 
extend rights to animals and babies, for the moral situation can be 
simply and adequately described here by saying that it is wrong or that 
we ought not to i 11-trea t them or . • • • that we have a duty not to 
ill-treat them. To ascribe to them rights 1s to make idle use of the 
term 'a right'". In Suzman's view, "talk of animal rights is merely a 
dra1Mtic way of trying to get us to think again about our behaviour 
towards animals", and he insists that the language of rights 1s neither 
necessary nor approprhte for such reconsideration, that claiming for 
animals rights they could never claim for themselves is neither the only 
nor the best way of protecting them. "Not the only way" - true: uti11tl-
r1anhm and considerations of kindness, even indirect-duty-views, may 
provide some pro~ection but not consistently so. "Not the best way" -
but we are left in the dark as to what a better, let alone the best, way 
of protecting animals might be. Suzman seems to imply that "moral 
constraints on our behaviour with respect to harming and killing of 
animals" should be "informed not by a conception of rights but by what 
1s right and wrong". But when h it "r1ght" t~ kill an animal and when 
is it •wrong• to do so ? It appears that an account of what is right 
and wrong ~~ich leaves out considerations of moral rights is deficient 
in that 1t will render moral justification contingent on current (moral) 
standards of right and wrong (which may, and do, change) and so present 
an erroneous picture of what >rality involves. ln a significant 
passage, Hart states that "rights constitute moral rules which not only 
~rescribe conduct but form a kind of moral property of individuals to 
which they as individuals are entitled: only when rules are conceived 
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in this ~ay can we speak of 'rights' and ·~rongs', as well as of 'right' 
and 'wrong' actions. 11 33 This rema k is significant in that it emphasi-
zes the essential coRnect1on between "rights", "right and wrong 11 , such 
that his previous comment is rendered unintelligible: how can it be 
"idle" to use the term "a right" and with respect to babies and ani-
mals ? How can we speak of \lur duty '10t to in-treat U1'!m, and of the 
wrongs of 111-treating them fn the absence of rights ? It is evident 
that there exists a basic discrepancy between his two rem~rks. 
Morality requires consistency, and a theory of rights (provided that we 
"take rights seriously" and ~re mindful of the full implications of the 
rights-view) can offer this consistency. 34 Suzman writes that "respect 
for rights is a prP.condition for good action, but not identical with 
it". Respect for rights is certainly "identical with" "good omission": 
we respect the rights of animals when we refrain from kil 11ng them for 
food, clothing, in the name of scienc~. and from causing them distress 
by testing cosmet1cs on their eyes and skin, force-feeding them with 
food-colouring agents or hair-dyes, keeping them confined in zoos, and 
exploiting them in sport and for the sake of entertainment. Certainly, 
more is required for a morally good attitude or righteous disposition, 
but in Western morality respect for rights .!!. "good acti~n". The 
question regarding conditions for the ascription of rights h not (to 
borrow from Bentham): are animals rational, self-conscious, autonomous, 
•tc. ? or: are they moral agents ? but: can they be protected ? can 
their interests be safeguarded ? 
•••••• /99 
99. 
Ch. 6 
What Rights do Animals have ? 
We should not merely he concerned with establishing the existence of rights 
in the abstract, i.e., showing what sorts of creatures can be said to have 
rights, but also with the extent to whic~ these rignts govern what actually 
happens, and with what particular rights animals have. This is necessitated 
by the consideration that the meaning of rights, primarily, is their use. 
A distinction is customarily drawn between basic and nonbasic moral rights. 1 
Ther.i are several reasons for making such a distinction: first, and most 
important, it 1s instrumental in indicating what rights are shared by all 
right-holders and what rights may be held by some but not by others: all 
morally considerable individuals, in the present view, have the same basic 
rights, yet their nonbasic rights may d1"fer. Second, basic righU are 
"basic", in the sense of being "underived", i.e., not being based on duties, 
obligations, responsibilities, etc., as they wouid be in duty-based theorits 
(provided that these theories permit talk of rights); basic rights generatw 
duties, nonrights, responsibilities, and indeed other rights. These rights, 
then, will be •nonbasic", 1n the sense of being "derived", or dependent on 
basic rights: they are instances of "core rights". Nonbasic or derivative 
rights, it should be noted, are not ~enerated by, or derived from, duties, 
obligations, responsibilities, or nonrights: there exists an intimate 
relation between nonbasi: rights and all of these, but it 1s not one of 
direct derivation. Third, the relation between basic and nonbasic rights 1s 
not necessarily one of entailment but one of order of justification: i.e., a 
nonbtsic right may derive not from one, but from different independent basic 
rights, depending on the circumstances: a nonbasic rigl may be a mere 
generalization from the existence of several independent basic rights and may 
be justified by separate considerations, according to the context in which 1t 
oc.curs ur h appealed to. The .·elation between a nonbasic right and the 
basic right frO'll which it derives, then, is a justificatory one. 
Rights, ever basic rights, are of course dependent o" interests, in that 
inter~~ ts render the invocation of rights, the appea 1 to rights, and hence 
their ex'stence, intelligible and cogent. In the absence of interests, talk 
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of moral rights would mak~ little, ~f any, sense. Interests, ~s I have tried 
to show in sect. 1.1, are not iJentical with rights but tiey represent 
something that 1s to be taken into account in and about an individual: an 
animal's point of vie\o' "eeds, feelings, desires, preferences, and beliefs, 
11 J to be respected, ar. _ .t is in this sense that basic "rights are asserted 
by the very naturP of (individuals') be1ng 11 • 2 Of course, interests IMY 
vary; either in degree (think of differences 1n needs between members of 
different species, e.g., r." 1nkey species, or between members of tlie same 
species, e.g., between ,,, infarits and adults) or in kind (think of 
differences in subjectivity, e.g., between bats and humans, and between women 
and men), and although we migh\ ascrioe different kinds of rights to cnimals 
and to humans at a nonbasic level, the ascription of rights in ~grees is not 
pouible, provided that appeal to rights is made or occurs as a matter of 
justice and equality, i.e., provided that we "take rights seriously• (i.e., 
"not possible" at a bas1c nor at a no~basic level). Nonbasic rights are not 
necessarily shared by animals and huma~ nature of morally cons1derable 
individuals, i.e., they depend ~ particular interests, circumstances, 
prospects, etc. 
It would be false to refer to basic rights as "natural" in order to mark them 
off against nonbasic rights 3: many of the latt:er, too, artt •natural". To 
regard them as "arti fie 1a 111 merely because they are derivative or deri vcd 1s 
not satisfactory. Nrr it 1s useful~ within the realm of nonbasic r1.hts, 
however, 1 distinction could be made between natJral and "artificial", or 
"conve;it1onal", or "spec1al" rights. Inst1tut1onal moral rights seem to 
belong to the latter category (e.g., the right that promises made to me be 
kept, or the r•ght to be told the truth, etc.). A problem with the notion of 
"natural" rights is that it conjures up the idea of ""atural endowment": 
but, strictly speaking, there is onl0y "conventional endowment" of rights, 
1.e., conception and ascriJ,Jtion by morel agents. But insofar as rights 
reflect facts about the nal.ure of an individual (both the nature of the 
s~ecies and the particular nature of the creature), preservation of the term 
"natural~ appears to be J~stified and even helpful. 
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6.1 Basic Moral Rights 
What basic moral rights there are, and the bearing they have on matters, 
can conceivably be established through a process of re~erse derivation, 
i.e., by setting aside those rights which seem to depend on other 
rigt.:s, are justified by other rights, which appear to be mediated by 
duties, nonrights, etc., and which sPem to be generalizations from the 
existence of other rights. An alternative might be to isolate 
intuitively "basic" rights and attempt counter-intuitively to reduce or 
deriv~ them. To producP an exhaustive li~t of ~1sic and nonbasic moral 
rights, 1s bey ... 'ld tri! scope of my inquiry (and, indeed, perhaps beyond 
the scope of any inquiry or investigation). All I can hope to do ~s 
list and tr>nment on s001r. of the su99est1ons made by theorists. Any 
i:ar.didate must, I repeat, not only be nonderivative but must also be 
a cribable to all those who have individual moral standing. If there 
~t:·"e differences between human r"ghts and animal rights, between men's 
qhts and women 1 s rights, or L~tweeri the rights cf wh1 tes and the 
r .ghts 01 blacks. at this basic rnoral level, then the .. otion of rights 
would c1tl'ir:r cease tn be functional (for how could it i~sue in a viable 
moa·al theory if it a1 m1tted of such internal fragmentation n or -
~rst - sanction vicious inequalities and prejudices. Similarly, 
c. 4 ' '. rim~'lation would be perpetuated and partiality entrenched if basic 
r·; ;; , ,.s Bre ascribed to animah, or to women, or to blacks, in an 
attendted fonn. 4 Honesty in the matter of the f&; 11 i.1.,.ll 1cations of 
the '"'; hts view entails the acknowledgement that basic moral rights be 
the s~me in kind and in degre! in respect of all individuJls. 
What ' ~ t~ese rights ? In the "Declaration of Independence" of the USA 
1t W· j proposed that among the "unalienable rights" "all men •••• are 
en~o·· !cJ w~tt. •••. are life, liber'ty, and the pursuit of happiness". The 
"Virg~ni • Declaration of Rights", made one month previously, also 
rehwre~ t .. the rights to "safety", apart from the other three rights 
consh'erti, ''inherent" in "all men". Thirteen years later, the (French) 
"DeclarrAt1l l c,f the l<ights of Man" emphasized as "natural. imprescrir1ti-
ble, and 1na11enable rights" not only "liberty" and safety ("secur ·"j 
but also "property" and "resistance of oppression", to which the 11 Unive1 
sal Declar~tion of Human Rights" only added the 11 rig~ t to education". 5 
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Do these candidates constitute b~sic moral rights ? In order to be 
"basic". in the present view, they have to be nonder1vtit1ve, irreduci-
ble, and they have to be applicable equally to all morally considerable 
i>eings. apa.·t from fulf1111ng a justificatory function with respect to 
other rights (but this is a contingent fact rather than a prerequisite). 
The "right to life" appears to be the mo~.t plausible candidate for a 
basic mor&I right. nnt only because life has been ~~QWn to be a 
necessary condition for moral standing and for the possession of rights. 
In fact. it might be held to be the only basic right in that it is 
po$s1ble to approach it as an aspect of, as being involved in, all other 
rights, or - more radically - to reduce all other rights to the basic 
right of life. The intuition here is that if an h1d1vidual does not 
have a basic right to exist, any other rights become me~n1ngless. While 
this is not implausible, it is more helpful to refrain from making such 
reductions and to attempt to underst!nd particular rights utd their 
function by seeing in 11hat context they are invoked. Life and related 
asrects l ike survival, self-preservation, certainly have an important 
role in other basic rights. Thus Robert Goldwin: "What makes the rights 
to life. liberty. pursuit of happiness. and property basic is t~at they 
all stem from the desire for self-preservation", which constitutes "the 
not-very-lofty source of • • . • • rights" !>ut nonetheless a "solid 
platform•. 6 If these rights, then. are not further rejucible. do not 
themselves derive from other rigtts, then they "pass the first test" of 
being basic. But are they ascribable to all those who have standing ? 
Although the above-mentioned declarations invariably refer to "all n-.en 11 
or "all human beings", it is certainly meaningful to invoke the right to 
life with respect to animals as"wt. 11 · like humans, they not only are 
alive but are subjects of a life, can e~joy the i r life. and they meet 
the "criterion" of havrng or bei!"lg motivated by J desire or drive for 
"self-preservatioP" . It 1s with reg~.·d to the other rights that the 
issue becomes sliyhtly IT'<1re problematic; 1.c., in that many might be led 
to believe that animals have no concept of, therefl>rP. no interest in, 
and hence no r1ght to. liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and property 
So I want to state at the outset of the discussion of these rights that 
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the "'omplexity of organisms (who have been established to be morally 
considerable beings) makes a difference not to the possession of rights 
at the basic level but only to the complexity of rights at a nonbasic 
level. I.e., at the basic level, the rights to liberty, 7 the pursuit 
of happiness, and property (if they are basic moral rights) are 
possessed or ascribed equally; only at a nonbasic level may they have 
different manifestaticns. This will become clearer 1n the following 
discussion. 
Since ~nimals, like humans, are active, self-moving, and self-control-
11 ng organisms, it follows that they are better off unconstrained. In 
other words, they are better off free, and if they can enjoy liberty, 
they are ascribable the """tght to 1 iberty•, at the basic leve1. 8 With 
the variations and differences in complexity of the particular organisms, 
the ramifications of the basic rights to liberty w1l i vary, but only at 
a nonbasic level. There, goldfish may be quite content in a little 
aquarium, provided they have enough room to swim around, and hens may 
feel unrestricted in an enclosurll! big P.nough to allow them to stretch 
their wings, scratch, and dustbathe, while it would be unjustifiable to 
keep wild animals like tigers cooped up in an enclosure of equal 
relative pr;.>portion. At a nonbasic level, too, it would make little 
sense to claim certain rights to liberty for creatures in whose lives 
they would have no function at all: hence, we cla1m the right to freedom 
of expression or the right to reedc1n of speech r human beings but not 
for other animals, at least not yet. ' Perhaps chimpanzees, gorillas, or 
cetacea will one day urge us to do so.) 
I have briefly alluded to the right to property before, saying that it 
makes sense to speak of the nest a weaver-bird has built as "his" and of 
the nuts a squirrel has gathered"as "his". Similarly, animals "have" a 
life, points of view, experiences, and interests. It miyht now be 
contended that here "possession" 1s used in a slightly different sense 
to that implied when we ask whether the cat has a right to the mat. For 
one thing, "having" a life, etc., does not seem to involve a cone~~· of 
self in posse~sion. My rejoinder is that some animals seem to w.eet this 
criterion, e.g., chimpanzees, intelligent dogs, even horses and pigs, 9 
and that mrst animals have territorial instincts: animal territoriality 
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is no 1oubt the progenitor of the human concept of property. - Animals 
may have a more casua 1 sense of property, may not bea,. a grudge when 
deprived of it, but again these considerations are relevant only at a 
nonbasic level. What matters at the basic level is whether animals can 
have property, can be said to "possess" things. If they do - and there 
is good reason to assume that this is the case - then that s all that 
is required for saying that they have the basic moral "right to pro-
perty". 
What about the "right to the pursuit of happiness" ? Some may feel that 
"happiness" merely reflects a certain aspect of an individual's 
wel 1-being, and that - consequently - this right is reducible to the 
mere basic "right to well-being". lO Alternatively, it might be argued 
that the "pursuit" of h11ppiness presupposes that one be free to do so, 
and ~hat the right to the ~ursuit of happine~s seems to be ascribable to 
human beings and to animals. If "pursuit of happiness" involves a 
concept of happiness, then this 1s a consideration relevant only at a 
nonbasic level. And if animals have the (nonbasic) right to the pursuit 
of happiness they might lack it at another nonbasic level, viz. where 
the concept of happiness seems to be a prerequisite. (There is, of 
course, not a single nonbasic level of mo1· I rights, but a multitude.) 
Animels are individuals whose life can be better or worse for them - and 
they can mind what happens to them: e.g., they are endowed with the 
capacity to avoid sources of pain, not only by anticipation but by 
physically shunning or moving away from them. They ha\le a welfare, and 
they can enjoy well-being, not only in the sentient but also in the 
sapient sense. Our nonrights to cause animals gratuitous hann and our 
responsibilities in the matter of helping them and of safeguarding their 
interests in these respects do not ar1~e "ex nihilo 11 • they are based on 
the right of all individuals to well-being. 
The "right to security" ctnd the "right to education", both mention!d i,, 
one or more of the declarations considered above seem to be special 
instances of the right to well-being. "Security", or "safety", 1s a 
riarticuhr aspect of well-being: it in • .,11es the guarantee that a being 
can live and flourish in accordGnce with its natural needs, capacities, 
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drives, and desires. {Here, the right to security might even be said to 
derive from the right to liberty, insofar as safety and security 
presuppose freedom from constraint, th~t is.) Again, I do not intend to 
take a stand on this issue: it may be more helpful to treat the right to 
security as a basic moral right and not to reduce it, since it has its 
own particular function in the lives and treatment of all individuals. 
The rights to financial, ''personal", or professional security, to 
security in old age, etc., are 1nstances of nonbasic moral rights, and 
at a nonbasic level ascribable only to human beings or Mpersons". 
The right to education is more problematic: do individuals with educable 
cherecteristics have a right to education ? 11 If this right is founded 
on the possession of certain capac1ties of educability, does tt follow 
that ch1apanzees and dolphins have that right ? What is required here 
is to look at the context in which this particular right is used and has 
meaning. ituman beings, children, have a right to educat1on because 
education constitutes part of the1r (present and future) well-being: our 
moral responsibility to insure their best possible and proper education 
is based not cnly on their right to we11-be1ng but on their right to 
life as such: it is required for their life, and for their 11ving well, 
that they be educated in whatever way necessary. Now, chimpanzees, 
e.g., - though educable - have a realistic chance of living well without 
be1ng educated (other than by their next-of-k1n, of course - but I am 
referring to "intellectual" education); they do not require a certain 
level of educational achievement (e.g., the mastery of tool-use and 
tool-making) to "be" or "do well", so to speak. Most importantly, 
though curious, they do not show a great interest in using their 
capacities to the full .. merely coming to possess more of them, 1.e., 
through education, would not necessarily result in increased use of 
them. On the other hand, chimpanzees' eager acceptance of sign-language 
constitutes an interesting example of an inner drive towards conwnunica~ 
ting more freely. 12 They certainly do have the right to education, but 
1t rnay not be a right which needs to be claimed. (Compare: the moral 
"necessity" to claim for animals the "right not to be eaten" 1n a 
vegetarian society, to claim for Robinson Crusoe the "right to freedom 
of speech", or to claim for human beings the "right to migrate South/ 
North for the winter months".) Either way, the right to education h 
not a basic moral right. 
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Two further candidates for basic moral rights which I want to consider 
are the "right to justice" and tht "right to e~1.1al1ty 11 • Both are 
implicitly invoked by Rawls in a number of places, and at least once 
explicitly so: 11 moral persons ••. are .:ntitled to equal justice11 • 13 In 
the present view, both rights appear to involve a tautology; for rights 
are invoked as a matter of justice and equality. 11 Justice" informs the 
very notion of rights: cf. "ius" (Lt.), referring to a system of law, 
and "iura". referring to the protection of rights (in the Classical 
Rotnan s~r.se of privileges, powers, or immunities). So.!! there 1! such 
a thing as a right to justice, it is necessarily basic, and it pt-rtains 
to both human beings and to anih1als. Similarly, given our conscien-
tiousness with respect to the full implication~ of the rights • 
"equality• informs the very appeal to rights and renders meaningful . 
functional the dscription of rights. 11 Equal1ty11 , at the basic level, 
concerns the individual herself, and at a nonbasic level, consideration 
of her interests, how she 1s to be treated, etc. - I now t.urn to 
nonbasic rights, without pretending to have given an exhaustive account 
of basic rights. 
6.2 Nonbasic Moral Rights 
It is necessary to remember that at the levels of nonbasic moral rights, 
these rights may, but need not, be shared by all individuals. Some may 
have nonbasic right.s which others lack, not because of differenc~~ in 
value, dignity, or worthiness of respect, but because of simple biologi-
cal differences. Hence, rights derived from the (basic) right to life 
may reflect facts about the particular ecological niches in which 
individuals dwell, their particular needs and what is to their 
advantage, their individutl and species-specific cepaciti\ interests, 
and proclivities, and there ma,.: bu! there need not, be interspecific 
overlap. Many derived rights, in the matter of life, are shared by all 
individuals, e.g., the right to be helped to live (e.g., by means of 
medical intervention). the right not to be killed, the right not to be 
left to die, etc., 14 an~ those rights in turn constitute the basis of 
our duties, re~ponsibilities, nonrights, and arguably even of our 
"rights over" animals (which rr.ight be ~een as an elliptical way of 
sp~aking of our respons1b11ity to defend them). 15 {Similarly, the 
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nonbasic "right to be spared unnecessary distress" is shared by all 
individuals. )The "right to do anything which does not coerce, restrain, 
or injure another individual", and the "right that everyone else forbear 
towards oneself in these respects except to prevent one's coercing, 
restraining, or injuring others" are ex4mples of nonbasic rights, 
der•ved from the right to liberty (and perhaos the latter derives also 
from the t , ght to we 11-be in~). as 1s the "right to pursue one's i nte-
rest 11. 16 All three are presumably ascribable to all morally considera-
ble beings. (Thr;1gh only moral "gents can be responsible for, and not 
merely be the cause of, coercing, restraining, or injuring others. See 
below, sect. 7.1) Other rights derivative of the right to liberty, like 
the right to tr ~orship, the right to freedom of speech, or the 
right to free\. 
bei nqs, and to . 
s1on, on the other nand, pertain only to human 
~ his is not to betray a speciest bias• it w~uld 
simply be mear.ingless to accord this rigtit to animals; either because 
they lack the necessary vocal equipment - e.g., chimpanzees, gorillas -
or ~~:ause there 1s no concept of what "freedom of speech" involves -
e.g., in parrots. It is i~portant to recall that nonbasic rights depend 
not only on other rights but also on particular circumstances, pros-
pects, capacities, and 1nterests, nd they may, and do, vary according-
ly. ( rhtnk of the rcim1f1cations of the right to 1 iberty at nonbasic 
levels.) If "freedom from constraint" has different connototions w1th 
respect to tigers and goldfish, thi~ does not mean that goldfisti posse5s 
the right to such freedom in an attenuated form; in fact, it i~ possessed 
and ascribable equally, but the foterest of goldfish in fretdom is 
comparativel. less ttian that of tigers. 
Similarly, the right to education is possessed equally by human children 
and chimpanzees, but the interest of the latter may be comparatively 
less than that of the fonner. On the other hand, the "right to moral 
t<' .cation", 17 pertains orly to those beings in whose life "moral 
education" and "moral ager1cy 11 ... ~ve a use and, therefore, a meaning. 
(The "actual" right to moral education is ascribed to children not 
bec11use they are "potential" moral agents • this reasoning would consti-
tute a violation of my argument in sect. 5.2 - but be~.ause they are 
"actually' morally educable.) 
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The "right to equal considerat1on of interests" and the "right to equal 
concern and respect". though held to be basic. 18 ~re in fact derivative 
moral rights in that they are general hations from the existence of 
several basic rights. e.g •• the right to life. property, well-being, ano 
(if it exists • and these derived rights might serve to explain the 
intuition that it does exist} the right to equality. Similarl~, 
Dworkin's "right to equal treatment" and "right to treatment as an 
,_.qual" (wherf.t he i:alls the first basic and the second derivative) 19 
are, both, dfrivative. (Both are compatible with the "right to be 
treated difft.:ently•, which is nonbasic, too. All three are 
characterized by a comn1tment to the "equality of difference", and based 
on, e.g., the rights of equalit/ and w~ll-being.) 
Women• s "right to abort ion by request", too can be seen as a 
generalization from the existence of several basic rights, e.g., the 
rights to freeuom and well-being, and perhaps also the right to property 
ill a woman's unborn baby 1s l'teld to be her property). It 1s a 
1lonba ic right .nd pertains only to women, and to withhold it from men 
and nonhu~~n femal ~ is not discriminatory (in tne evaluative sense of 
"d1scriminat1on")t for simple biological reat.ons in the case t"Jf men and 
or biological reasons, too, in the case of nonhuman females: they may 
be sa1d to lac not only the vocal equipment necessary for making such ' 
reques - but also the concept of, and the wi ~ h to have, an abortion. 
'1e list of nonbasic moral rights 1 , o" course, very large, and • as I 
have a1r~ady stated - I do not pretend to have given a near-conclusive 
accou~t of basic moral rights either. W~at is important to note 1s th~t 
there !!! rertain basic moral rights, and that these rights are shared 
equally by human and nonhuman animals. These rights may reasonably be 
held to include the right to 11~e. the right to liberty, the right to 
we 11 ·be1ng. the right to property, per 1aps the right to the pursuit of 
happiness and th£ right to security, and • if they e>tist. 1.e., if it 
makes sense so to speak of them - the rights to just1ce and equality. 
These rights constitute the basis not only of other rights, but of the 
duties, responsibilities, and nonrig~ 5 
i ndividue ls. 
of morally respon~ ibl e 
. 
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If these basic rights are "natural, imprescriptible and inalienable", 
does this mean that they are absolute, and that they cannot be 
overridden ? 
This implication 1s absurd since that would mean that rights are claimed 
and exercised under any and a 11 circumstances, without reference to 
rational constraints. Rights ill justifiably be overridden, can be 
outweighed as moral considerations, without their status as rights being 
compromised, 1.e., without the "wrongs" involved in - Justifiable -
violation being diminished in any way. 
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Ch 7. 
Some Remaining Puz?1~s and Problems 
The violat~on of rights raises some important questions: who can be held 
accountable for. and who 1s exempt from. violation of rights ? When is 
interference justifiable and when is it unjustifiable ? Is such interference 
possible with respect to simpler orgdnhms. i.e .• non-conscious animals and 
plants ? 
7.1 Moral Agency Reconsidered 
Some writer~ 1 imply that according to animals rights. let alone rights 
equal to those of human beings. which animals could never themselves 
claim. would lead to absurd consequences: must w, not. as moral agents, 
protect the weaker animals from the stronger. i.e •• their natura1 
predators ? If yes, we wi11 be recaponsible for the violation of .he 
rights of the stronger; if not. we ~llow the rights of the weaker to be 
violated. This "option" 1s absurd. And why do we c0111T1end cats when 
they ki 11 rats but punish them when they attack our budgies ? (While 
this last argu~ent correctly revea1~ a schism in our thi~king. it does 
not. and cannot. point to an absurd consequence of ascribing rights to 
animals: such comnendation/condemnation cum "punishing" 1s 
inconsistent with the present rights view.) 2 
To be sure, to prevent a cat from hanning ~ budgies is to vio1ate the 
rights of the cat, as it is to prevent r. fox from ki11ing a goose. or a 
1ion from slaying an 1mpa1a. But we need t~ look at the circumstance~ 
of interference and at the perticular interests (in the sense of desires 
and netdi) with which we would fnterfere. We also nued to consider the 
extent to which v1o1ation uf rights is justifiab1e. - Now. budgies and 
cats are domesticated animals - they are not direct1y involved in the 
natura1 struggle for suro11va1. Saving the budgie 1s saving an anima1 
whose survival instincts have - through domestication - been weakened 
somewhat, and overriding the rights of the cat presumab 1y does not 
entail depriving her of an essential food source, b~t means considiring 
the budgie's rights to 1ife und we11-being, and the cat's right t~ 
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freedom from restraint, and giving reflect ! preference to the former. 
(Which 1s not to say that, therefore, the wrong involved in my meddling 
has diminished. The fact that the cat's right must, in this case, yielc 
in the face of other competing considerations, does not render such 
hindering 1 lesser wrong. I cannot be held morally responsible for not 
saving the budgte - my 111rbitr1tfon• 1s not Justifiable morally, only 
emotionally: it .1! arbitrary.) In the Hon-impala c1Se, the situation 
is slightly different: both are used ind adapted to living ar.cording to 
the "law of the Jungle", and interfering with the 11on would be 1 
violation of his rights to well-being and freedom from restraint, as 
well as preventing him from pursuing his needs. (Both the lion and the 
impala are directly caught up f n the struggle for survival where the 
i11pala has a realistic chance to "survive" as well.) Such meddHng 
-.ould not be Justifiable. As Feinberg correctly observes: 11 Ani1111 ls 
have no general claim against humans to the protection of their lives in 
the state of nature where they must hunt. ki 11, and eat one another 
Human intervention to save animal lives in the wild, in fact, would 
itself be 1 kind of cruftlty to the animals whose instincts require them 
to kill. 11 3 The same applies to the fox-goose case: as protector of the 
goose's interests and rights, and as "proprietor" of the goose (hh 
right to property, too, m1ght be held to be at stake here I of course, 
I question morally the ~hole notion of ownership of animals), the fat"ftltr 
1s justified in taking all the "harmless" precautions necessary for 
protecting the goose (i.e., other than directly harming the fox, e.g., 
by blowing up his hole, or by laying out traps before the goose-shack) 
t;ut he 1s not inorally permitted to meddle if the fox has SOl•IC!••~ managed 
to "sneak in11 , by shooting to kill or main him. To the fox, facing 
prevent he measures other than h 1s own death or phys i ca 1 injury 1s 
certainly the lesser e~il, albeit still an evil. 
fllort importantly still, Ritchie - in speaking in terms of 11 tr1ll 11 , 
11 guiley11 , "innocent" and "punishment" • tends to neglect the distinction 
between, indeed confuses, "being the c•use of the violat1on of right1 11 
and "being responsible for the violation", in th,. sense of "1110ral 
responsibility". When 1 fox attacks 1 goose, he 1s the cause of 
violating the goose's rights and of 1nterfer1ng with her interests, but 
ht . 1t morally respon,ible or accountable for this v1olat1on • 
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Only moral agents can so be held responsible or accountable, are 
unexempt from matters of (non-)violation of rights. Moral agency and 
moral respunsib11ity, or answerabi11ty, are logically and necessarily 
connected. The fox canr'"' · be morally responsible for, or have any moral 
responsibility to, the goose: he may not even be ethically responsible 4 
in respect of her (though there may be excepti~ns) - he usually only has 
ethic31 responsib1lities, .!! he has them, concerning me"'bers of Ms own 
species. We sometimes spHk of animal 1 "territorial rights" against 
one another, or of the rights of the young gainst their mothers, and if 
the! are "moral" rights, 5 they are those reasonable finljs whose 
existence is acknowledged only by morally re~ponsible agents. It is we 
who claim these rights for animals and who speak of these rights as 
being violable, both by moral agents and by moral recipients. Animals 
can be "wronged" bot.h by human beings and by other animals, but other 
animals can~~t be held morally responsible for such violation. 
Similarly, animals can only be held to be the cause of, but not 
(morally) responsible for, violation of ~ur rights. because they cannot 
-t•k~ our interest' into acco~nt, carinot acknowledge the existence of our 
rights. Or can t1~ey ? Watch-dogs, guide-dogs, etc., have "duties". 
But these are not •moral duties": in fact, it may be argued, they are 
"01. "duties" at all. They are tasks imposed by means of training or 
conditioning, for strictly human purposes and benefits. (A dog may have 
a right to education but if thh right can .,e secured only through 
interference with the dog's interests and violation of other rights, 
e.g., h1s rights to freedom from coercion and well-being, 1.e., where 
the individual, the dog, stands to lose more than he stands to gain, it 
1s a right which 1s better not claimed. Ttds 1s the only kind of 
paternalism I consider morally defensible - i.e., where the benefits and 
losses of one and the same individual are contraposed; assuming - of 
CLurse - th~t such contraposition is possible.) Yet there are cases in 
which lnimAls seem·~ be able to sense interests (needs, fears, etc.) of 
humans - instances of dogs saving infants from a fire without heving 
been taught to do this. Yet one could not speak of a dog's "failure to 
heed the call of duty", or of h1s failure to fulfil h1s task", by not 
saving a baby. - What tto we mcike of animals' "madness" (e.g., elephants, 
dogs, lion~ .urning against their ~masters" with or without prior 
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warning) 1 But this does not constitut~ a case of {moral) responsibi-
lity for violating the "protectors'" rights. A swarm of wasps invading 
my garage is the c!use of interfering with my iMt~rests, but a group of 
normal adult human beings moving into my garage without my consent are 
responsible, can be held answerable, for violating my rights (to privacy, 
etc.). 
We can make sense of animals' having "ethical duties" or re~ponsibili­
ties to one another, we can speak of th~ir "rights" against o"e another, 
but Mccloskey 1s probably right in ass11ming that they cannot "enjoy", 
11yfeld up" or "forgo", "accept" or "reject" rights. 6 But they can 
"have" them, in the ser.se of "being ascri bed 11 rights. The former 
relations (considered by McClos~ey) are linked with the notion of 
contract and presuppose having the concept of rights, which wha 1 es, 
lt:!l'llllhgs, sardines et al. presumably lack. They do not "waive" their 
r1s11t to life by b:1ng1ng about their own death; neither does a baboon 
who "sacrifices" him~elf for the sake of the group, nor do ants ventu-
ring into a fire "so that'' others can use their bodies as a kir.d of 
"bridge". But the animal rights view I defend here does not depend on 
this capacity. Being defendable by, being the beneficiary of, appeal to 
rights does not presuppose having the concept of rights. 
7.2 Justifiable and Unjustifiable Violation of Righ:s 
~hen is overriding an 1naividual's rights morally ju~tifiable, and when 
is it not justifiable ? It is important to remember that individuals' 
rights are "asserted by the very nature of their being 11 , and that the 
qu~st1on is not what the life of an individual is worth to another but 
what it is worth to the individual herself whose life it is and who is 
the only one to lead it. Hence, the question when it 1s morally tr, 
justifiable violate a being's rights and when it 1s not, does not 
involve considerations of the consequences, the best possible ~utcome 
for everyone involved: the lives, pleasures, and experiences of a few 
cannot be traded off ~'!inst those of many. The rights of the indivi-
dual, of individuals, trump those of the group. 7 It has been establi-
shed further that to call basic moral rights "inalienable" and "undefea-
sible" cannot mean that they are absolute {these terms merely serve to 
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indicate the importance of the individual with respect to rights and 
that individual rights cannot be overridden in any given new situation). 
Rights are not claimed and exercised under any and all circumstances, 
without reference to rational constraints. Rights remain in existence 
when they are outweighed as moral considerations by a mere urgent 
concern - all rights, that is, except the right to life: once 
overridden, it is not only "impaired" but it disappears. This, however, 
does not mean, that t~~ rignt tu life is "absolute", that overriding it 
ca1"!not ever be justified moral l.. • .£!.:i be, e.g., when respect for the 
right to well-being demands that the 1-ife of ar. ~ndividual be 
terminated, in o.der to spare her the distress ~ .. coJr,"f''' ~,.,, say, a 
painful, disabling, incurable, chronic, or protracted dhease, and if 
the individual has not explicitly or implicitly made known her desire to 
go on living. Animals cannot be so explicit, Lild usually •cling to 
their lives", yet there seem to be clear-cut instances {given our 
advances both 1n the ethological and biomedical realms) where we are 
morally justified, as "guardians of their rights" {perhaps: in that we 
have rights 11 over11 them), to sanction violation; if the case is not 
"clear-cut", as it were, we are not justified in doing so. 8 
What about ca~es of conflict between our rights and the rights of 
animals? This issue is, admittedly, thorny. There are cases ~hich 
seem to be less problematic, e.g •• instances of self-defence against 
attacking animals, or of exterminating certain insects or rodents where 
these are disease-bearers and pose a threat to the health of humans. 
cattle, etc., 1" (painlessly) killing rabid dogs, foxes or badgers. 
Midgley writes -• although competition is limited, "(t)here are cases 
where competition between people and other spetles is unavoidable and 
drastic. Crop pests of all kfnds - not just insects, but rodents, 
birds, even deer, baboons, and elephants - must be killed, if only by 
starvation, by people who mean to survive, and this would be true even 
in a world of Jains. T~~ same is true, still more obviously, of disease 
bacilli and parasites - a feature of life not noticed when the Jain 
philosophy was developed 11 • 9 lf we could rely on natural balance to lay 
rjown the law, there would conceivably be no moral puzzle for us to 
disentangle, but the problem is that we cannot, and often are not 
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willing to, wait for natural balance to assert itself. I propose taking 
up a differel'lt perspective: could we kill human crop pests, e.g., 
i~dustrialists responsible for pollution ? Is not the threat they pose 
also morally reprehensible in that they are moral agents who are aware 
of the havoc they are wreaking ? This consideration might lead us to 
realize that killing "crop pests" is merely fighting the symptoms 
instead of the causes. Prevent ' ve measures seem to be more de~ir~ble: 
to "crop pests", facing preventive measures ccher than their own death 
or injury may still be an evil, although a comparatively lesser one. 
Similarly, it migtit be morally justifiable painlessly to take the lives 
of rabid anim~l~ and so to prevent their painful and protracted dying, 
and it simply seems expedient to do so. But where my own life, and 
survival, is at stoke, and where my rights to life is being threatened, 
I do not even attempt to weigh my interests against those of the attacker 
or to justify my action: I just act. We share with animals the "desire 
for self-preservation", the "will to live"; as Suzuki po1nts out, "the 
human trlsna (thir!'t) we feel within us is the tr1sna of the cat, the 
dog, the crow, or the snake". lO P!rhaps it 1s at this, the most basic, 
level of conflict between individuals and their interests that neither 
the need for justification nor, indeed, the possibility of justification 
obtain. Perhaps it 1s at this level that we, too, are mere "natural 
elCistents" and· like the rest of nature .. "beyond good and evil". 
Now consider a "lifeboat case" where there are five survhors, four 
normal adult humans and one normal adult gorilla, but only enough space 
for four survivors in the boat. Midgley writes that "(t)he lifeboat 
model •••• 1s objectionable because it excuses u~ from dealing with 
(questions about the sphere of concern, how arbitration between 
individuals 1s to be handled, el.c.). It draws a sharp line at which 
efforts at further detailed negotiation are simply going to stop". 11 
Owii1g to their uncompromising either-or/all-or .. nothing character, 
lifeboat situations migttt have the effect of ca1lousing to a point of 
distortion our moral assessment of real situations, circumstances, and 
alternatives. (And there ill• almost invariably, alternatives.) Yet 
lifeboat situations constitute logical possibilities which serve to test 
••••• /116 
~ {. 
I 
116. 
our intuitions and are therefore to be taken seriously. My own 
reflective intuition concerning the above case is ti.at the gorilla 
should be "sacrificed", riot because the gori 1 la is not a member of our 
species, or because we have a natural preference for our fellow human 
beings, or because there arc side-effects to be taken into account (such 
as the fee11 ngs of the survivor 1 s family members and friends), or 
because the gorilla is bound to be less helpful, re-operative, and adept 
in rowing than a human, or because he lacks the capacity of mora 1 
self-determination. the concepts of a remote past and a distant future, 
and individual life-plants, or because the life of the gorilla is of 
lesser worth and of lesser importance to the world; 12 intuitively, the 
gorilla should be "sacrificed" because his own sense of loss is 
presumably not as acute as the sense of loss would be in the human 
survivors. But this does not mean that therefore the loss of the 
gorilla's life is of lesser moral import: the gorilla stands to gain 
nothing and to lose as much as each of the hu~an survivors would stand 
to lose. The wrong attaching to this loss of life is not diminished, 
the evil not a lessened one. because the gorilla's sense of loss is less 
acute and because a human being would feel more keenly ti a los~: 
morality, at least in the present view, does not allow for sue~ compromi-
ses, does not make such concessions. Even if our reilective intuitions 
favour taking the life of the gorilla. this doP.s not mean that it is 
morally jus.tifiable tG do so. To say that it is, is to imply that the 
moral status of indiv1ouals fluctuates. I leave this implication to 
discredit itself. 
It is important to remember that conflicts need to be resolved, that is, 
should be attempted to be resolved, by taking the individual's point of 
view into account; i.e., the "perspective from which the world is 
experienced in some way or other. Respect for an individual's rights 
requires nothing less. This of course implies that there is something 
that can be taken into account. Where there is no reason to believe, 
and ~ore importantly, evidence contrary to the assumption that there is 
some such centre of subjective consciousness (that there is something 
that it is like to be that organism), it is very difficult to speak of 
the interests of an "individual" and to ascribe moral rights to an 
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"individual". It 1s not our ignorance or our moral inertia that 
prevents us from putting ourselves into another entity's shoes, in this 
case, but simply the nonpresence of such shoes. Inanimate objects like 
rocks an~ minerals ~s well as artifacts like cars and sculptures 
cunstitute clear-cut instances of nonconscious matter, where as human 
and nonhuman mannals. birds, repti1es, fish, amphibians, even some 
invertebrates like octopi, can reasonably be held to be conscious 
individuals, subjects of experience. What about those animals who are 
currently still occupying a place in the grey area of our decisions 
about individuality, e.g., crustaceans, insects, and molluscs ? What 
about "nonhtdividuals", 11asubject1ve 11 animals, e.g., corals, sponges, 
protozoa ? And - of course .. what about plants ? Do these organisms 
have moral standing ? Do the,>' have rights ? Of what concPrn should 
they be ? 
7.3 The Rights and Wrongs of Simpler Organisms 
If the question of ind1vidua11ty could be reduced to the question of 
consciousness, of the prftsence of a more or less complex nervous system, 
making a decision about moral standing and, morr specifically, about the 
ascription of rights, would be a lot easier than it is. All multicel-
lular animals could justifiably be included in the sphere of moral 
concern, while all acellular animals (protozoa, diselse bacilli, et al.) 
and plants could be flatly excluded. One thing 1s probably beyond 
reasonable doubt: these organisms are incapable of experiencing pain or 
distress, i.e., of physical and mental suffering. 13 There is neither 
behavioural nor neurophysiological evidence that they are sentient. (As 
there is, on the other hand, in the case of most multicellular animals, 
lending support to the Ar1stote11an dictum that nature does nothing in 
vain. ) 
Wittgenstein writes: "The concept of pain is characterized by its 
part1cular function in our life". Pain itself 1s of evolutionary 
importance not only in our {human) life but in the life of all 
multicellular antmals in that it has a survival function - it ser~es as 
an indication of danger and threats to the survival of the organism. It 
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alerts us (in an all-embracing sense of 11 us 11 ) to the fact that something 
is harming us: it is the body's alarm system, compelling us to seek or 
cry out for help when we feel we need it, inmobilizing us when we are 
hurt (and "injured") so that healing can occur, or compelling us to move 
away from the source of th" pain. Kathleen Wilkes remarks that "animt1s 
~an learn to adopt, adapt, or reject an action-routine on the basis of 
one (pair:ful) false rnove. This presu,Jposes not only sc, Mst.icatc.d 
sensory and motor abilities, but also that we c • .rn attribute to the 
organism a drive or instinct of survival, for pain ·ould have no 
rationale, qua signal of danger, unless the an;mal had such a drive". 14 
Now, plants and even some multicellular animlll organisms, like corals 
and sponges, (though we do credit them with a basic drive: they do have 
basic biological needs, and these needs must be satisfied in some way) 
lack sophisticated sensory and motor abilities. They are not able to 
withdraw from the source of pain, let alone avoid it in future, hence 
pain's essential function of indicating danger or threats to the 
survival of the org~nism would be wasted. In fact, it would be 
difficult to see how, if plants and simpler anima 1 organisms were 
sentient, these organisms could have survived and so evolved at al 1, 
i.e., as organisms capable of pain-experience. 
It might now be argued, that not only is not phys ica 1 pe in who 1 ly 
"physical" (though most of the bodily path of the pain-111.!ssage can be 
traced and measured, the fin!l stretch of its pathway is still unk~own 
territory in pain research, i.e., we cannot put an electrode into an 
organism's consciousness), and that the borderline betweer. the 
psychology and the physiology of pain is a blurry one, but that plants, 
e.g., possess powers of primary perception, are capable no~ only of 
mental suffering, distress, but have emotions and "are even sentlent to 
orientation and to the future", "sensitive to all forms of electdcal 
and magnetic influences", means for predicting "natural disasters", end 
"know when spring is coming", and even "remember", and respond to human 
thoughts and intentions. 15 Not only is it impossible, however, t.o 
locate a centre of consciousness, a "psyche", in pl ants, but 
meticulously conducted experiments designed to reproduce the a11eged 
results on which these argumtnts were based, showed no evidence of 
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primary perception, and i- ~ent1sts argue that the "ffodings" were a 
complete artifact and the result of faulty equipment. 16 Even if the 
validity of these data were acknowledged, it would still not be certai~ 
that there could be only one pos~ibll! interpretation of the physical 
evidence. As McGinn's implication with respect to primary perception in 
plants would be: if plants had mental properties, and if these 
properties had cauc;al powers, then predictions concerning plants would 
not be derivable from their physical properties alone: but predictions 
17 
.!!'.! so derhab le. Hence. the idea of prirnary perception in plants 
remains at best 4n int, 1guing hypothesis. 
Rachels claims that "without consciousnesst with all it involves, being 
alive does one no good". This may apply tfJ the irreversibly comatose, 
but it does not apply to plants (or the s1mplt' animal organisms): they 
have an interest in being and remaining alive in the sense of having 
basic biological needs; their roots, foliage, etc •• have distinct 
functions to secure both their survival and their evolution. Life, and 
growth,.!!. manifest in them. 18 They share with us the basic pattern of 
structural and funct1ona 1 organization. i.e., the molecular code to 
store information, and the molecular mach1nery to translate this infor-
mation into the patterns that make up our living processes. They lack a 
centre of sensory perception, the capacity of learning, adapt1ve beha-
viour, and conative and cognitive 11fe. They lack a subjectivity, a 
point of view from which tht! world 1s "experienced" - they cannot be 
"injured" because there is no subject present. (This last point was 
suggested to me, but not expl ic;tly endorsed, by James Grieve.) But 
they can be "harmed", and th1s 1s sufficient for in 11:. ·.,!'! them 1s our 
scope of moral concern. As living organisms that ccan 11 hanned 11 in the 
sense of their growth bein~ curbed and their lif, being terminated, and 
more i~portantly: because of their essential functions of the bio· and 
eco-spheres, they deservt? our moral concern. Becai.se there 1s no 
subject, no individual niJture manifest in these organisms, it 1s not 
speciesist to speak primarily of their "instrumental vulue" (which they 
have even as "aesthetic" objects): harming them means, ultimately, 
harming ourselves. Our responsibility to them 1s not only to them but 
to the bio-sphere (and this includes us) as a whole. 19 They have moral 
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rights, not as individuals, but as species. ("They" would include not 
only plants, protozoa, but also coral , spongJs, starfish, etc. - Those 
whose"individua11ty" has so far neither been asserted nor denied, e.g., 
insects, crustaceans, and molluscs, might be given the benefit of the 
dcubt and accorded moral rights as individu~ls.) 
Th~ impl ir.ations, at lt!ast some of the most imp~H·tdnt one~ ~re t.ne 
following: as Christopher Stone puts it, "(t)o say that the natural 
envirorvnent should have rights (Stone speaks of legal rights) 1s not to 
say •••• that no nne s~ould be allowed to r.ut down a tree". Despite the 
harm done to the tree, this action may be morally justifiable, provided 
that the tree 1s not the last of its kind. In that case, because of 
considerations concerning moral rights as members of a species, no moral 
justification could bt given. (We might even appeal to "replaceab11ity" 
conditions and say that felled trees should have seedlings planted in 
their stead. But because I have given these matters insufficient 
thought, I present this argument merely as a potent ia 1 ly interesting 
speculation.) It 1s in this way that talk cf rights seems perfectly 
compatible with the wider ecological and environmental conc~rn: 20 talk 
of righti 1s both atomistic, or individualistic (in that it concerns 
conscious individual beings), and holistic (in its concern for species), 
and if its moral usage is coupled with talk of ecological rights (e.g., 
concerning rocks, soil, rivers, whole co-systems), a comprehensive 
environmental ethic may well be inminent. 
.. ••• /121 
121. 
~h. 8 
Rights and Beyond 
Dhtrl•at of the notion of morel rights characterizes not only the reasoning 
of those who believe it to be at odds with genuine environmental anJ 
ecological concern. Others question it~ necessity and adequacy for 
expressing matters of ~enuine moral concern, a tradition of cond1111n1tion 
extending back to Bentham's equation of taH of rights with Nterror1st 
language". Interestingly, some theorists acknowledge the appropriateness of 
the idea of rights on one le\ el, while denying it on another; viz. where 
appeal to rights concerns not 1 loose equation of rights with moral standing 
but 1s Made on the bas 1s of 1 pa rt 1cu 11 r more 1 theory. Thu~ , Frey and 
Midgley, add their names to the "dtclaration of belief 1n and protection of 
the rights of 111 sentient crtatures to life, liberty, and the quest for 
happiness", following an "Animal Rights Symposium", (where this appeal to 
rights presumably means that animals matter morally) while denying or 
expressing their doubts about the existence of their moral rights elsewhere 
(where they analyze the notion of rights as such before decidin~ 1t should be 
discarded ·at least with respect to animals, but preferably altogether). 1 
Frey, in hh book "Interests and R1ghts: Th11 Case against Animals", as well 
as in a paper ghen at the very syr. JSium, expresses hh doubts about the 
existence of r1ghts, and wants to wit~ •d them from animals as well as frOll 
humans ( 11 no one has moral r1ghts, · • .n1mals have them least of a11 11 ), 
stating that the history of morality sttows that it 1s not an easy task to 
dmnonstrate that human beings possess mor. t rights. Similarly, Midgley c111ls 
"rights" "the realty desperate word. As A1 J bibliography of political theory 
will show, it was in deep trot1ble long be1~re animals were added to its 
worries •••• It can be used fn 1 wide sense tu dr~w attention to probl1111s, 
but not to solve them •••• 1t seems very important to stop relying on it". 
But tellingly, she admits several pages later tt ... t the conc1pts of "equality 
and natural rights .... ex ht to break down prejudice •••• , they work to 
dissolve th1 screens of callous habit and reveal hidden injustice •••• (and) 
vague though they are, they are very powerfu ·1". Alasdair Macintyre argues, 
like Frey, that there are no (mora ) rights, "and belief 1n them 1s one with 
belief in witches and in unicorns. The best reason for asserting so bluntly 
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that there a no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the Lest 
reason which we suppose for asserting that there are no witches and the best 
reason which we possess for asserting that there are no unicorns: every 
attempt to give good reasons for believing that there are such rights has 
failed". He c1tes Dworkin as conceding that the existence of such rights 
car .. Jt be demonstrated but as remarking on this point simply that it does not 
fnllow from the fact that a statement car 1ot be demonstrated that it is not 
true. "Which is true", Macintyre says, "but could equally be used to defend 
claims about u~icorns and witches". 2 
Mac In tyre's argument i nvo 1 ves two errors, one conceptua 1 , the other factua 1 • 
His conceptual mistake is to equate "rights" with "witches" and "unicorns". 
Ri£hts are not "fictions", not even "mcral f1ct1ons", as Macintyre claims, 
u~like witches and unicorns which! ~tions: rights are characterized by 
their very real functions fn ives which include breaking down 
prejudices, callous habits, and ' .1ng Injustice. And insofar as they are 
instrumental in doing this, their meaning is estabiished (and h not a 
"purported" meaning, as Macintyre would have us believe). Rights, unlike 
witches and unicorns, do not purport to be substantive objects in the world, 
they do not even purport to have a hypothetical corporeality or physicality. 
- Maclntyre's far•11 1 mistake, like Dworkin's, 1s to assume that the 
txistence of righ ~annot be demonstated. In fact, they can be shown to 
exist, simply by . ceeding empirically, i.e., ~y inquiring whether in a 
given social community there is an intellectual or conceptual acknowledgment 
of the possession of rights (whether the concert of a right has a meaning and 
u!i.~ at all), and by investigati.,g to what ext.-nt, in such a cormiunity, there 
exists genera 1 respect for. or noni nterferen· 
rights. 3 And 1 n another sense, of course 
based on mora 1 reasons and considerations 
seeking", rationalizing agents, by "pti11osop· 
with, the exercise of those 
~ .e "existence" of rights is 
1 h "discovered" by "rea~on-
4 11g an . ;1als". 
Moral rights exist, and they matter: both t . 
If they were "sheer nonsense", how could th 
and political effects they do ? We might 
and usage suggest they do. 
,, '? the psychological, social. 
1,. r accept that, in that their 
existence depends on their discovery by ph1l iJphh1ng animals, rights are 
not contingent "facts" of history, but 11 fict1ons", in agreement with Maclnty· 
•••••• /123 
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re. Where we need not, and indeed cannot agree 1s that there 1s a "gap 
between their purported meaning and the uses to whirh they are actuislly put". 
The mean1ng !! the use: they are useful "fictions", for changing the ways how 
hum11n beings relate to each other (and they can certainl.v be helpfi.11 in 
protecting animals from abuse by human beings). 5 The doctrine of the rights 
of man Justified the American and French revolutions which produced many 
important changes. - Yet 1t 1s witn respect to the kinds of changes which 
are to be brought about with respect to the motivating circumstances of 
rights that my own reservations concerning rights-t~lk arise, however 
insignificant. 
8.1 Changes 
"Rights" seems to draw its strength from the existence of adverse 
conditioris. It h significant that the rights invoked in the 
Declaration of independence and the Declaratf on of the Rights of Man 
(the use of the word "man" and "men" 1s of additional significance I) 
wert demanded at a time when the moral value of an individual's 11fe, 
let alone his liberty or his interest in happiness, were yet far from 
established, or officially recognized. Moral right~ almost invariably 
precede institutional rights, and - once instituted - rights function as 
indirectly protective measures in order to prevent previously dominant 
predican•nts from becoming the norm again. Changes do take place, be it 
prior to or following the institution of (particular) rights. Yet these 
changes seem to be of a quantitative rather than of a qual1tative kind. 
The very institution and enforcement of rights presuppose the 
continuing, "low orof11e" existence of combatworthy conditions: the 
"bash" as such has not (been) changed, only the •superstructure". 
Changes are in degree, not in kind. 6 
But are qualitative changes, changes in kind ("re-forms"), possible at 
all ? It might be argued that to posit and to advocate such changes is 
to betray a kind of naive optimism and to offer a distorted concept of 
human nature (in that mankind is not a single entity that can be brought 
to see even basic issues from one a 11-encompas sing perspective), and 
that before attempting to combat speciesism we should rather fight 
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ser.is1~ and racism witt increased vigour: in other words, "get our 
priorities straight". 7 It may certainly be expedient for practical 
social as well as for psychological reasons to proceed in this fashion. 
It may be wis! to do so but it need not be: Adolf Hitler, e.g., was a 
vegetarian. It may not have been genuine cr.ncern for the well-being of 
other creatures thc.tt prompt ·1 him to become one, 8 but it 1s clear from 
this example that the road to better trPatment of animals need not be 
one which has led to better treatment or hu"llri ings previously, or, 
indeed, will lead to such improver.ents. The morel point I arn trying to 
make, however, is that the struggle ayainst speciesism is of t~e same 
moral fabri, as the struggle against sexism and racism, and that it is 
at least possible to conceptive a state of affairs after qua11tat1ve 
changes, 1.e., 11 re·fonns 11 , have taken place. Recall the picture of 
animals living in a society of moral (or humanitarian) vegetarians: 
would it be meaningful st111 to cla1m for them the right not to be eaten 
? I doubt that it would. It would be a right that one would not need 
to claim anymore. 
Stone writes that 1111ch time there 1s a niovement to ronfer rights onto 
some n~w 'entity', the proposal is bound to sound odd r frightening or 
laughable. This 1s partly because unti 1 the rightle s thing receives 
its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thigq for the use of 'us' 
- those who are ht.>lding rights at the time". The conferral and 
enforcement of rights, however, does not n~cessarily imply qualitative 
changes, e.g., in ou.· treatment flf animals: our behavi«'ur towards them 
changes but our attitude towards them may not change. This is probably 
due to the fact that their appeals to rights, law and morality have an 
inescapably coercive aspect. lO As Karl Marx has pointed out, rights 
imply the separation of man from man, of moral atom1sm, while hh own 
conception of revolut1onary emancipation envisages the union of man with 
man, a union which is social (moral?) rather than legal or polit1ca1. 11 
Appeals to equal rights of all humans have - more or less gradually • 
led to the abolition of slavery. Vet racial prejudices and incidents of 
unequal treatment and consideration have not ceased - they still occur 
frequently. Many whites feel threatened by the exi.tence of the rights 
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of blai:ks, rights . hich are held 11 against 11 them. These rights represent 
claims which blacks t:ave on them and for which compliance can be 
demanded and enforced. Whites may feel threatened despite the1r 
knowledge of the fact that there is no biological basis for human 
inequality. Some few whites may be moved, as a result of the invocation 
and institution of the rights of blacks, to reconsider their motives and 
to change their attitudes and outlook, and to develop a genuine kind of 
fellow-feeling. but many respect those rights as a matter of necessity 
and expediency, while harbouring much the same racial prejudices as 
before and without havin~ "liberated" blacks in their own moral conscious-
ness. Similarly, though "the concept of organic evoluticn has become 
one of the most important ideas bearing on modern man's intellectual 
view of himself and the universe", 12 most of us have not accepted its 
implications morally. I.. 1 while the 1n·;titution and enforcement of the 
rights of animals would certainly entail that maltreatment and abuse of 
animals became the exception rather than the rule, it is not at all 
obvious that animals would thereby be "1 iberated" in our moral aware-
ness, that they would be emancipated. 
8.2 The Emancipation of Animals 
Is "animal liberation" possible ? I share the doubts about this possi-
bility with the critics of Singer's concept but I do not necessarily 
endorse the reasons given for the rejection of the idea of "liberation• 
1n the matter of animals. As Christine Pierce hu torrectly explained, 
"liberation" should not be confused with the "right to their l1berty 11 , 13 
a mistake made by many critics, when they argue that Singer's position 
1s implausible because it would be detrimental even to the animals 
themselves if they were set frpe: pets, lab animals, intensive fann 
animals, etc., stand to lose more than they ~tand to gain on suddenly 
being set free. ih1s critic.ism misses the point. "Liberat1cn 11 , 1n 
Pierce' words, consists in resisting 3nd restructuring a whole system of 
psychological and physical oppression: it does not mean "setting 
animals free" in c:ompliance with rights claimed within that system. But 
bringing about changes 1n the social structure is not al 1 that "libera-
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tion" requires: it requires also that individuals liberate themselves, 
and this in turn implies that they have not only a sense of their own 
self, needs and purposes and of the existence of similar interests in 
others, but also the capacity to act in accordance with t1is knowledge. 
The farm animals in Orwell's novel had this capacity, some apes and 
monkeys, cetacea, and intelligent dogs seem to have it, but the over-
whelming majority of animals seem to lack it. (And how could they bring 
about qualitative changes in the str;cture of ~uman social systems?) 14 
So the case for animal "liberation" must fail. It might be argued that 
Wf!l can liberate animals, not \lnly because of our growing body of 
knowledge through biological, neurophysiological, psychological, and 
ethological inquiry, but because of our capacity of fellow-feeling, 
imaginative representation, and of "active" and "conati ve" sympathy, 
where we are concerned with and for the welfare of animals, where we 
help them and l.Ctively seek to bring about an end to t eir predicament. 
If based on respect for their rights (and sympathy requires such a 
basis, if moral concern is to be more than a capricious disposition), 
sympathy may lead us to restructure our social system which is 
responsible for the physical (and psychological) oppression of animals, 
and so "liberate" them in our i'Wareness. This seems fair enough. But 
the point 1s that we cannot develop a sense of self and of their 
interests for them. So liberating them in ~ awareness cannot be the 
same as liberating them in their awareness. Animal "liberation", 
therefore, is romantic. 
Animal 11 emancipation 11 1 on the other hand, is not a romantic concept. 
When we liberate animals in our conscious~ess, when changes occur not 
only in our behaviour towards them but in our attitude towards them, 
generally speaking, i.e., when respect for rights and sympathy int~ract 
in moral motivation and action, we "emancipate" animals. 15 The emanci-
pation of animals, unlike liberation of animals, is possible - it is at 
least a practical possibility. But while it may constitute a distant 
goal for those who are concerned about the lives and well-being of 
animals, it may make little - if any - difference to the animals 
themselves whether they live in a society or world of liberated humans, 
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1.e., whether they have been emanc;pated, or whether "only" their rights 
are respected. And this latter aspect is all that a case for animal 
rights, such as I have attempted to furnish, needs to be concerned with. 
Closed 4ieason is not the end env fsaged by sincere defenders of the 
animal cause and is not as satisfactory as the evanescence of hunting 
would be, but while they wait for the day that the concept of hunting is 
no longer ~pplicable to activities physical and mental of human beings, 
closed season may well be the next best thing. 
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Annotations 
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1 
2 
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See S. I. Benn - 11 Rights 11 (in: Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: New York/ 
London: Collier & MacMillan, 1967); D.D. Raphael - "Problems of Politi-
cal Philosophy" (London: MacMillan, 1976); E. Kamenka - "The Anatomy of 
an tdea 11 (in: E. Kamenka & A. Erh - Soon Tay - eds. - "Human Rights"; 
London: Edward Ar~old, 1978; p. 6); U. Taehtinen - "Ahimsa: Non-Violence 
in the Indian T,.adit1on 11 (London: Rider & Co., 1976); A.M. Prichard 
(ed.) - League's Roman Private Law" (London: MacMillan, 1967; pp. 56, 
64, 66, 152, 154). On the link between rights and individualism, see 
~lso A. Gew1rth - "Reason and Morality" (Chicago/London· University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), esp. sect. 2.15. Gewirth argues forcefully, that 
"the concept of a right 1s not .•.. restricted to modern Wester" socie-
ties" {p. 101), but arrives at this co 1clusion solely by considering 
standards of what seem to approach our t l·~~als of Ju'itice and 
equality, not via the discovery of conce~ 
rights. 
~nt to our concept of 
The particular Declarations are reprinted partially in: A.I. Melden -
ed. - "Human Rights" (Belmont/CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970). See 
also J. Bentham - "Anarchical Fallacies" (ibid.), R. Wasserstrom -
"Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination" (ibid., also in: 
Journal of Philosophy 61, 1964), S.I. Benn - op. cit., and E. Kamenka -
op. cit. 
cf. D.D. Raphael - op. cit., ch. IV: on the link between "rights" and 
"claims", see below. 
As H.J. Mccloskey does; see h1s0 11 Rights 11 (Fhilosophical Quarterly 15, 
1965); "The Right to Life" (Mind 84, 1975); "Rights - Some Conceptual 
Issues" (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54, 1976). 
O.G. Ritchie - "Why Animals do not have Rights" (in: T. Regan and P. 
Singer - eds. - Animals and Human Obligations"; Englewood/C11ffs/N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1976), J. Feinberg, and T. negan (in their contributions 
to the ~ame collection of essays and pdssim in their other writings) are 
among the many philosophers who endorse this identification. 
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The quotation at the beginning of the paragraph is from S.I. Benn and S. 
Peters - "Social Principles and the Democratic State" (London: Geroge 
Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1959, p. 89). See H.L.A. Hart - "Are t~ul!re any 
Natural Rights ?" (Philosophical Review 64; 1955; reprinted in: A.I. 
Melden - ed. - "Human Rights" - op. cit.). 
T.L.S. Sprigge speaks of rights a~ values, "Nonhuman Rights: An Idealist 
Perspective" (Inquiry 27, 1984; ., 440); and R. Noz1ck ("Philosophical 
Explanations'; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981; passion) and J. Degenaar 
("Nonnative Di mens, ons of 01scrimi nation, Di fferent1at1on and Affi nna-
t1ve Action"; in: H.W. van der Merwe and R.A. Schrire - eds. - "Race and 
Ethnicity: South Afrkan and Int£rnational Perspectives"; Caoe Town: 
David Philip, 1980) use the term "qualities of value". See also A.I. 
Mel den - Introduction; in: A. I. Melden - ed. - "Human Rights" (op. 
cit.). Melden ("Rights and Right Conduct"; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1959; and: "Rights and Persons"; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) and A. 
Gewirth ("Reason and Morality" - o~. cit.; and "Human Rights" - Chicago/ 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1982) discuss the "is-ought" issue, 
as does J. Margol1s ("Value an~ Conduct"; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971; 
ch. 4). On •nonrights", see K.R. Minogue - "Natural Rights, Ideology 
and the Game of Life"; in: E. Kamenka and A. Erh-Soon Tay - "Human 
Rights", op. cit. 
On "rights of action" and "rights of reci pience", see D. D. Raphael • op. 
cit., ch. III, where he also mentions the distinction in French between 
"droit de" and "droit 1 11 • On rights and wrong action, see A.I. Melden -
"Rights and Right Conduct", op. cit., Pr~face. H.L.A. Hart - op. cit., 
too, discusses the connection between 11 r1ght action• and "rights". Thi~ 
conn~ction, while it does not setHn to obtain in Eastern and certainly 
not in primitive societies, 1s pertinent to, and prominent 1n, Western 
thinking, - Cf. J. Raz - "On the Nature of Rights" (Mind 93, 1984; p. 
19t) - on the various senses of ''right .. to"; and K. Goodpaster - •on 
being Morally Considerable" (Journal of Philosophy 75, 1978); where the 
notion of rights - correctly, I think - is construed as more specific 
than that of considerability. 
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H.J. Mccloskey - 11 Rights 11 • op. cit. - seems to view rights as posses-
sions in the former sense. The term "moral convnodity" h borrowed from 
R. Wasserstrom - op. cit •• p. 98 in the Melden edition. 
Cf. L.J. Suzm~n - 11 The Moral Rights of the Unborn" (in: E. Kahn - ed. -
"The Sanctity of Human Lift"; Johannesburg: University of the Witwaters-
rand Press. 1983). On recognition of rights and standing. see S.I. Renn 
- "Rights" {op. cit •• passim). 
A. I. Mel den - 11 rh.1hts and PP.rsons" (op. ctt •• pp. 1-2. 12/3). And 
again, S.I. Benn - 11 Rights 11 {op. cit.). {A. Gewirth - "Human Rights", 
op. c1t. - attempts to defend the notion of absolute rights). - Perhaps 
rights fil absolute insofar as no justification - no matter how good -
can diminish the "wrong" inherent in violation. 
Cf. A.I. Melden in his introduction to "Rights and Persons" {op. cit.). 
These issues are also well-marshalled by J. Feinberg - "Social 
Philosophy 11 (Englewood Cliffs/N.J.: Prentice-Hill, 1973). 
R. Nozick - "Anarct-y. State and Utopia" (New York - Basic Books. 1974; 
pp. 33 ff.); R. Dworkin - "Taking Rights Seriously" {London: Duckworth. 
19771 ch. 7 passim): "Individual rights are •••• trumps held by 
individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a 
collective goal is not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss 
or injury on them" {p. XI). - On ut11itar1anhm. see below, ch. 4. 
Cf. R. Dworkin {ibid.: p. 205). 
S.R.L. Clark - "Slaves and Citizens" (Philosophy 60, 1985; p. 30) 
See also J. Raz .. op. cit., pp. 195, 200, 206, 213. On p. 213 he 
writes: "All rights are based on interests. Some rights may be based 
on an interest in having those same r1ghts 11 • o~ the link between rights 
and purposes, see L.J. Suzman - op. cit. 
This is underlying rationale of views that conferral of rights involve$ 
respecting an individual's 11 domain of autonomy" (R. Nozick - Philoso-
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phical Explanations", op. cit., p. 501), her rationality or rational 
agency (A. Donagan 11 The Theory of Morality"; Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977; chs. 3, 5 and 7 passim; A. Gewirth -
"Reason and Morality". op. cit.; passim), showing individuals "equal 
concern and respect" (R. Dworkin - op. c1t.; ch. 12), giving equal 
consideration to their intere~ts (S.I. Benn - "Egalitarianism and Equal 
Consideration of Interests", passim; in: H.A. Bedau - ed. - "Justice and 
Equality"; Englewood C11ffs/N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), insuring their 
freedom and well-being (A. Gewirth • "Reason and Morality", "Human 
Rights"i both op. cit.), or showing concern for their individual good 
(A.I. Melden - "Rights and Persons", op. cit.). 
S. Cloete - "South Africa: The Land, its Peoples and Achievements" 
(Johannesburg: Da Gama Publishers, l969i p. 71). See Also: H.W. van 
der Merwe - "Perceptions of Racial Inequality in South Africa" (in: H.W. 
van der Merwe and R.A. Schrire - "Race and Ethnicity", op. cit.). G. 
Eaton furnishes an illuminating account of stewardship in hh "King of 
the Castle: Choice and Responsibility in the Modern World" (London, 
Sydney, Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1975; esp. ch. 5). 
Cf. H.W. van der Merwe - "Perceptions of Racial Inequality in South 
Africa " (in: H.w. van der Merwe and R.A. Schrire - eds. - "Race and 
Ethnicity", op. cit.; pp. 91 - 94 ff.). M. Midgley's remark opens the 
introduction to her "Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature" (London: 
Methuen, 1980; p. xiii). 
Here, R.D. Ryder provides useful"surveys of the animal welfare movement 
in his "Victims of Science" (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975i esp. ch. 14) 
and "The Struggle aga1nst Speciesism" (in: R.D. Ryder and D. Paterson • 
ed. - "Animals' Rights: A Symposium"i London: Centaur Press 1979). See 
also K. Thomas - "The Beast in Man" ("The New York Review"i April 30, 
1981). 
See A. Kenny - "Descartes" Phi 1osophica1 Letters" (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970, p. 244. In considering Descartes' views, I have relied on 
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the use of Kenny's book as well as of excerpts reprinted in: T. Regan 
and P. Singer - "Animals Rights and Human Obligations", op. cit.). See 
also J. Cottingham - "A Brute to Brutes ? Descartes' Treatment of 
Animals" (Philosophy 53; 1978; p. 553). 
E.g., by T.L.S. Sprigge - "Metaphysics, Physica11sm, and Animal Rights" 
(Inquiry 22, 1979; pp. 114-7, 142). 
Anglo-Indian thinker A.K. Coomaraswarny points out an inherent contradic-
tion in denying animals souls: "How can we t.hink of animals as 
'soulless' notwithstanding that 'ar.imal' literally means 'ensouled' ?" 
(in: "Metaphysics 11 , Princeton/N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977; 
p. 5). Aristotle speaks of plant and animal soul in "De Anima" (rtprin-
t•d as "P,ychology" in: "The Philosophy of Aristotle", ed. R. Bambrough; 
New York: Mentor, 1963). The shortcomings of the Aristotelian view are 
di~cussed in sect. 4.1. 
Of course, the idea of nf\ 'n 1r .. •al soul as inwnaterhl entity gives rise 
to almost insunnountable problems. C. McGinn, e.g., discusses these 
difticulties by asking in what it consists, where and how it could be 
located, and how it could have evolved in the first place, given the 
findings of evolutionary theory that everything has developed from 
matter under the pressure of natural ~election ("The Character of Mind"; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; pp. 23 ff.). Another well-known 
problem of dualism concerns the interaction between the i11111aterial and 
the m~terial, i.e., between mind ard body. 
R. Descartes - in: A. Kenny - ed. • "Descartes' Philosophical Letters" 
(op. cit., p. 243). 
J. Cottingham - "A Brute to Brutes ?" (op. cit., p. 551). Cottingham 
attempts to illustrate that dualism only denies that animals are 
conscious - p. 557 -, for they have no minds, but not that they do not 
feel. He fails to clarify ~ow "feeling" could possibly be accounted for 
w1thout reference to consciousness. 
E.g., L. Wittgenstein: "Only of a living human being and what resembles 
(behaves like) one can one say: it has sensations; 1t sees, is blind; 
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hears; h dut. 1s conscious or unconscious" ( 11 Philosophuche 
Unter·.uc:hungen"; Frankf!'rt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1971, 281; see also: ibid., 
282, 283, 284, p. 358 xi). 
This is paradoxical not only in respett of his dualism, but also in that 
he seems to acknowledge at lrast some deg1ee of biological ~im11arity 
while denying animals any moral significance whatsoever. 
L. W1ttgen5tein - "Zettel" (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of Califor· 
nia Press, 1967; 540, 541). 
It might be pointed out ht-re that ch1 pantees and gorillas, however, 
have astounded the world when they proved capable of being taught s1gn-
language. These apes have proved capable of organizing and controlling 
complex data by, e.g., assessing the evidence, and of creative1y manipu-
lating and modifying these data - to a certain degree, that h: the 
degrees of spontaneity - e.g., initiating a conversation - and of 
originality - e.g., creating new words - dre still rather low compared 
with those in growing, learning hUMan children. And the question 
whether dolphins and otner cetacea have their own syntactic language is 
at this point merely an interesting sc1er1tific hypothesis. 
Portions of his "The Descent of Man" have been reprinted in: T. Regan 
and P. Singer - "Animal Rights and Human Ob11gations" (op. cit.) as 
"Comparison of the Mental Powers 'lf Man and the Lower Animals". (As I 
will argue, the tncorporation of 11 low1r11 h quite inapplicable with 
respect to Darwin; see below, sect. 3.5) 
See J. Margolis - "Culture anti 'Cultural Entities" (Dordrtcht/Boston/· 
Lancaster: o. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984; p. 31): "Ascription of mental 
states and of consciousness confonns wit~ the viability of the species". 
Also cf. L. Wittgenstein· "Zettel", op. cit., 532: "The concept of pain 
is characterized by its particular function in our life". 
"Speciesism in the Lab~ratory" (in: P. Singer • ed. • "In Defence of 
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Animals";Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985). See also M. Midgley - "Animals 
anti why they Matter" (.Hannondsworth/M1ddlesex: Penguin Books, 1983; 
r.140) who agrees with D.R. Griffin ("The Question of Animal Awareness"; 
New York: Rockefeller University Press, revised and enlarged edn., 1981; 
ftrst published, 1976) that, given the d1rect connection of mental 
exptriences with neurophys1ological processes, comparative neurology 
offers evidence that whatever indescribable thing consciousness is, it 
1s present 1r all mult1ce11uhr animals. - We should, however, be 
mindful of T.L.S. Sprigge's warning that "to eq~ate consciousness with 
processes of the brain, or c11 terna the ly w1 th funct i ona 1 features or 
computer-type progranmes currently guiding behaviour •••• is necessarily 
to forget what consc 1ousness 1s" and that "there 1s more (to other 
individuals) than their behaviour and the brain processes which underlie 
it • something we can never hope to observe, but which one can bring 
home to oneself by way of the emphatic imagination. Only when we do so, 
do we really know the kind of ~ ruth about the other •••• which evokes 
the sense of moral obligations towards him" ("Metaphy~ics, Physicalism, 
and Animal Rights"; op. cit., p. 115). 
K.Y. W1lk1s - "Physicalhm" (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978; p. 
105). On possession of consciousness, or mind, see also C. McGinn -
"The Cha ·acter of Mind 11 , op. cit., pp. 12·14, where he compares the 
emergenre of ccisciousness to a sudden switching on of a light. 
This p)int 1s endorsed expl1citly by M.J. Adler ("The Difference of Man 
and the Difference it makes"; Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967) 
and R.G. Frey ("Interests and Rights: lhe Case aga1rist Animals"; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980). 
M. Midgley - "Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. lJS). 
A less extreme view 1s expressed by D.D. Raphael {op. cit., pp. 185/6: 
"human beings •••• are all equally endowed with certain basic capacities 
and needs, and • • • • in some r" these shared qualities, they differ 
radically from othtr animals". What remains to be seen 1s whether, and 
1n how far, these qualities (under which Raphael includes "rational 
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choice") are morc!°I •Y releva"'lt. What 1s more irrmediately wrong with 
Raphael's argument h t.,~t "radical difference" and "other animals" seem 
to constitute a contradiction in tenns. 
D.R. Griffin - op. cit.; r~. 97/8. 
The term "superiority• is rather questionable. Are man's "txcellences" 
virtues or vices ? It has bee~ suggested that man is the sole primate 
capable of torturing and killing his conspecifics and other animals for 
other than biological or economic reasons (cf. T. Loebsack - "Versuch 
und Irrtum: Der Mensch ein Fehlschlag der Natur•, Munich: 
Bertelsniann, 1974; A. Koestler - "Der Mensch - ein Irrlaeuftr der 
Evolution"; in: "Spiegel", 5, 1978; E. Fro11111 - "The Anatomy of Human 
Destructiveness 11 , Harmondsworth/Middlesex: Penguin, 1977), that man h 
the only animal to adapt his environment, rather than adapt !2. it, that 
his language has not only definite advantages but is at the same time a 
threat to his survival (owing to its link with "explosive emotional" 
potential, the possibility of manipulation, deception, etc.): it is an 
"instrument of demdgogy" { •. Koestler, op. cit.) end constitutts a 
barrier between races and people. C. McGinn calls man's rationalit.;• and 
cognitive capacity "powerful aids to survival", which "1s presumably why 
the human species has developed the sort of brain it has" ("Evolution, 
Animals, and the Basis of Morality" - "Inquiry• 22, 1979; p. 93), but on 
thf other hand it might seem that these capacities, while responsible 
for technological prowess, the setting of and acting according to goals, 
do not seem to suffice to master our social problems (A. Koestler - op. 
cit.). I will not pursue these suggestions or use them to develop a 
bleak view of morality. They are introduced here only to redress the 
hahnce slightly and to promote some kind of reconsideration regarding 
urms 1 i ke •superiority", "exce 1 fences", etc. 
What inwnediately springs to mtnd here is J.O. LaMettrie's 
"horrme-mach1ne", developed in resionse to Descartes, and also the 
contemporary, functionalist model of psychological explanation, which 
holds that mental states are identif11ble by their causal role. Even if 
this is true (and there are some legitimate doubts - see C. McGinn -
"The Character of Mind" - op. cit.; 1Jp. 33-6), it does not follow from 
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the fact that mental states .re so identifiable, that t~ey consist in 
their causal role. Such identification serves to capture only the 
active but not the experiential aspect of mental states. 
J. Narveson - "f'. ·rality and Utility" (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
1967; p. 87). 
J. Rosenberg - "Speaking Lions" ("Canadian Journal of Philoscptiy" 7, 
1977; p. 160), on L. Wittgenstein:~ remark: "If a lion could speak, we 
cou'ld not understand him". ("Philosophhche Untersuchungen", op. cit. 
11 xi, p. 358). 
Suppose we could teach a lion s1gn language - surely we could then 
understand him. Or is he then no longer a lion ? Are chimpanzees and 
gorillas who have been taught sign-language no longer chimpanzees and 
gorillas ? Certainly, the chimpanzee Lucy who "grew up human" is 
deprived in many ways, but she t1as surely not ceased to be a chimpanzee, 
despite her own - signed - averments to the contrary. (She called 
herself "human" and referred to other chimpanzees as "black bugs", when 
presented with photographs; M.K. Temerlin - "Lucy: Growing up Human" -
Palo Alto: Science and Behaviour Books, 1975.) (Are n~t autistic 
children "human beings" for that matter ?) 
Frey's own a!.cription to animals of "learned behaviour responses" 
("Interests and Rights"; op. cit., pp. 83/4) seems to imply that animals 
have some sort of beliefs: if they did not, it would be unclear how 
"learning" could take place. 
See J, Bennett ("Ratior 1l ity11 ; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964): a 
dog's expectations (e • , "walk-anticipations") occur in a variety of 
circumstances, unlike a fly's expectations (e.g., "danger-anticipa-
tions", which occur onl~ when ~ometh1ng big and visible approaches it 
rapidly, not when the fly "approaches a wel 1-used fly-paper, or a 
chameleon or a Venus's fly tr1p11 ). Dogs, unlike flies, can interpret 
and discriminate between kinds of behaviour, and their expectation~ are 
tiot only fairly comprehensive but also fairly economical, as a resu1t of 
thi ability (pp. 36/7). - We should, however, not deduce, as N. Malcolm 
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does, that flies therefore are among the kinds of beings in respect of 
whom it is difficult for us to ascribe pain-perception, and perception 
and ..:onsdous11ess in general ("Conscioufness and Causality"; 0 ford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984; pp. 31-3). Cf., e.g., L. Wittgenstein ( 11 Philoso-
phische Untersuchungen 11 ; op. cit.; 284): " .••• look at a wriggling fly 
and at once these difficulties (cf imagining a stone having sensations) 
disappear and pain seems to get a foothold here •••• ". If our attribu-
tion of the term "consciousness" to u. fly only "refers to a tiny bit of 
behaviour", this concerns the state of our knowledge, not what ft is to 
be conscious. Consider C.M. Ginn 1 s question: "Suppose ~.,e know all the 
fActs about a creature: 
wh~ther the creature 1s 
cit.; µ. 13). Either a 
(See above, ch. 2 n. 16.) 
could a ll the facts lea\le 1t indete"111inate 
conscious ?11 ( 11 The Character of Mind", op. 
being definitely 1s conscious or it 1s not. 
T. Regan - "The Case for Animal Rights" (Landon: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1984; p. 80) discusses atomistic and holistic interpretation; see also 
M. Midgley - 11 Beast and Man 11 (op. cit.; p. 58, and chs. 1, 7, 3 passim), 
and "Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 59); O. Davidson -
"Agency11 (fn: 11 Actfons and Events"; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); N. 
Malcolm - "Consciousness a.,d Causality" (op. cit.; pp. 100/1). 
"Interests and Rights" (op. cit.; p. 84) 
"Thought and Talk" (in: S. Guttenplan - "Mind and Language"; Oxford: 
Clarendon Prtss, 1975; pp. 8, 9, 22) 
Here, cf. also L. k'ittgenstein ( 11 Phflosophfsche Untersuchungen 11 ; op. 
cit., 25): "It is sometimes said" that animals do not talk because they 
lack the mental capacity. And this means: 'they do not think, and 
therefore t r ey do no+ talk'. But - they simply do not talk. Or better: 
they do not use a language - if we ~xcept the most primf tive forms of 
language". AlsJ: "Zettel" (op. cit., 129): we do not say of a fish, 
and hardly of a dog, that "now it is thinking'', or "now it 1s not 
thinking", according to Wittgenstein. 
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L. Wittgenstein seems perfectly willing to ascribe intentions to animals 
("Phi losophische Untersuchungen"; op. cit., 647), and - provided they 
are not "verbal" - also memories, wishes, fears (ibid., 649), but not 
hopefulness (ibid., II i, p. 277) or remorse: "Why can a dog feel fear 
but not remorse ? Would it be right to say 'Because he cannot talk ?" 
("Zettel"; op. cit., 518). "Only someone who can reflect on the past 
can feel remorse" (ibid., 519). We can rP ·tainly say of a dog that he 
is hopeful, that he feels remorse, judging from his expectation- and 
guilt- behaviour, in relation to the context in which they occur. It is 
strange to find Wittgenstein singling out pieces of behaviour, quite 
happy to consider them atomistically. 
"Thought and Talk"; op cit., p. 22. - I will deal with the issue of 
"having a concept" in more detail when considering S. Stich's argument. 
- G. Matthews, in his paper "Animals and the Unity of PsychologyN 
("PhflosophyN 5~. 197~), claims that the only possibi 1 ity uf vindicating 
Descartes' refusal to ascribe animals minds is by equating the 
possession of a mind with thP capacity to doubt. But even this is 
doubtful. - Cf. J Margolis - "Culture and Cultural Entities''; op. cit., 
p. 55: "It is not in the least certain that a dog does ~ (in some 
~ense) have the concept of fear i~ perceiving another dog's fear." 
ibid., p. 7. · R. Routley ("Alleged Problems in Attributing Beliefs, and 
Intentions to Animals"; "Inquiry• 24, 1981) counters this claim by 
saying it is an "appeal to a chauvinistic version of the verification 
principle that if we, humans, do not know how to verify, or settle, an 
assertion then it makes no sense 11 (p. 414 n. 16). Contra Oavidson, 
Routley argues that "problem-solving situations afford good evidence of 
1"tent1onal bet-;;vil'.>ur" (p. 415, n. 18). - Routley'c; suspicions concern· 
ing ver1ficat1onist arguments with respect to the thoughts and beliefs 
of speechless creatures are shared by C. McGinn .. "The Character of 
Mind" (op. cit.). where he claims that the way o·f arguing "from conside-
rations governing our knowledge of thoughts to a conclusion about the 
conditions for the possibility of there being thoughts •••• is not valid 
gP.nerally" (pp. 73/4; cf. also pp. 69, 71, 79, 80). 
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"Thoughtless Brutes" (in: "Thought and Knowledge"; New York: Cornell, 
1977; pp. 49/50). - R. Routley (op. cit.; p. 414, n. 16) reiterates his 
condemnation of the verification principle in pointing out that one of 
Malcolm's main arguments to the conclusion that it 1s "really senseless 
to conjecture that animals may have thoughts" (Malcolm - "Thoughtless 
Brutes", pp. 54/5) relies on "just such a defective principle: the 
'rgument is by a verifitation principle from the (qu~te false) premiss 
that the only wa1 we humans can test or verify that a creature has 
thought is by recourse to language". - J. Bennett shifts the emphasis 
from •thought" to "insight", employing similar arguments (op. cit.; ch. 
12 passim.). And in ch. 1 he writes that philosophers who ~laim that 
animals cannot have beliefs, or "think that •••• " must either produce 
empirical information about the nature of animals or show that the 
expression "think that" cannot meaningfully be applied to beings who 
lack a language: but this most likely involves •substituting intellec-
tua 1 fashions for arguments 11 ( p. 2). 
See M. Midgley - "BPast. and Man" (op. cit., passim); S.R.L. Clark - •The 
Nature of the Beast: Are Animl\ls Moral ?" (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984; passim). See G. Matthews (op. cit., pp. 447/8). 
"Do Animals have Beliefs 1• ("Australasian Journal of Philosophy" 57; 
1979) 
"The Case for Animal Rights" (op. cit., pp. 49 .. 61). See also c. McGinn 
("The Character of Mind"; op. cit.; pp 75/8) who argues in favour of the 
logical priority of concepts to la 1guage: "words can only be given 
meanings if they are taken to express certain concepts, and a word can 
be understood by someone only if he has the conceptual resources to 
grasp the meaning" (pp. 77/8). 
Cf. K. Wilkes (op. cit., p. 104): a dog i~ conscio~~ of & c~t, because -
instead of chasing the cat - he could have i!1nortc:t 1t, p; .:tended to 
ignore it, growled, barked, or gone to speep. 'Mcraovcr, other things 
discriminated by his senses at the time coul~ comp1icate, and ca~~e him 
to modify, his initial reaction" (pp. 104/5). 
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Contra G. Matthews (op. cit.; p. 454) who links the capacity to doubt 
with linguistic competence. - But see also R. Routley (op. cit.· p. 400) 
on hesitation. indecision. dnd rapid changing of minds in birds. Contra 
a popular view. there is insufficient reason to assume that these 
capacities require those of generalization and negation. 
T. Nagel - "What is it like to be a Bat ?'1 (in; "Mortal Questions"; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979). 
See also: 11 Panpsychism 11 • arid 11 Subject1ve and Objective". ibid.) - Cf. 
a 1 so M • Mi d g 1 e y - 11 Be a s t a n d Man 11 ( op . c it . • ch . 5 pa s s i m ) . 
L. Wittgenstein who is fully aware that 11 the human body .... is part of 
the world among others. among animals. pla11ts. stones. etc. 11 and that 
11whoever realizes this wi)l not want to procure a preeminent place in 
the world for his own body or for the human 11 ( 11 Notebooks 1914 - 1916 11 ; 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 19G9; 2.9.16), seems to imply that anthropomor-
phic inquiry is not the only oossible means of investigation regarding 
nonhuman life: "Only remember that the mind of the snake, of the lior., 
is your mind. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with 
mind at all. Now of course the question is why I have given a snake 
just this mind. And the answer to this can only l ie in psycho-physical 
parallelism: If I were to look l ·ke the snake and do what it does then 
J should be such and such. The same with the elephant. with th~ fly, 
with the wasp. But the question arises whether ~ven here, my body is 
not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely 
it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine 
nor from mine to that of the wasp. ls this the solution to the puzzle 
why men have always believed that there was .£!l.! mind cormion to the whole 
world ?11 (ibid .• 15.10.16). - But we do not have to subscribe to panpsy-
chism (cf. T. Nagel - 11 Panpsycnism 11 , op. cit.~ esp. pp. 189-192) in 
order to be able to speak meaningfully of fear, anger, joy. etc., in 
animals and even !'ay what (at least some of) their beliefs, thoughts, 
desires, consisL in. 
We can know what it is like to be Dracula the man but not what it is 
like to be Dracula the bat. 
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J. Margolis - "Culture and Cultural Entities" (op. cit., p. 22) 
"~hat is it 1ike to be a Bat ?11 (in: "Morta l QL•estions"; op. cit.; pp. 
170/1). - Cf. R. Nozick who acknowledges the existence of substantial 
puzzles about the experiences of others "fe~ l from the inside", and says 
that what matters, however, i s not only a be ing's experiences and what a 
being is like but the actual activities connected with these aspects, to 
actually "live" one's life, "in contact with reality". Until one finds 
a satisfactory, comprehensive an swer to what matters to people other 
than their experiences, and u~til one determines that this answer does 
not also apply to animals, "one cannot reasonably claim that only the 
felt experiences 'Jf animals limit what we may do to them" ("Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia"; op. cit.; pp. 45-7). 
M. Midgley - "Beast ard Man" (Qp. cit.; pp. 106/7 ) 
S.R.l. Clark speaks of "cognitive mups" (see his "The Nature of the 
Beast"; C' '"' . cit.; pp. 28, 48, 60; "Good Dogs and other Animals" - in: P. 
Singer - ed. - "ln Defence of A, ,imals " ; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985). 
This kind of argument i s advanced by O.M. Armstrong in "Consciousnes$ 
and Causality"; (in : N. Mah.olm and D.M. Armstrong - "Consciousness and 
Cau~ality"; op. cit.; p. 186). 
"Causing Death and Saving Live£1' (Harmondworth/ Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1977; pp. 51/ 74); "What Sort of People :; hould there be ?11 (Harmonds-
worth/Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1984; pp. 111, 154). - I will not 
consider the question of value (whether intrinsic or instrumental) in 
this chapter . 
A. Kenny concedes "nonmechani cal consciousness" to animals (p. 5), 
pointing out that their agency resu·lts from desires, intelligence, 
needs, and certdin capacities and cognitive states (pp. 46 ff), which -
unlike their human counterparts - are not linguistically modified (p.52; 
"Will, Freedom and Power"; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975). 
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It may reasonably be doubted, as J. Bennett does (op. cit.: chs. 2, 3 
and 4), that honey bees have a genuine language: t.11eir behavio.;r is 
regular rather than rule-guided, lacking in spontanPity and innovation, 
and is not modified or modifiable as circumstances change. (But then 
one may also deny that honey bees can, or do, "dance", for that matter.) 
The charge of anthropomorphism is serious but often unfortunately also 
rather simple-minded and indicative of an unwillingness to consider 
ethological evidence. The charge i s not "countered" by asserting that 
all ascriptions of psychological s t ates to animals are netessarily 
anthropomorphic but nonetheless sc ientifically v~lid (cf. J. Margolis -
"Culture and Cultural Entities''; op. cit.~ pp. 7, 8, 21, 43). Margolis 
implies t~at such ascription:i nia ke sense only from the vantage of 
linguistically competent heings. But this i~ quite bizarre: animals 
would have the power of conceptual thought even if there were nc human 
beings present to "ascribe" t hi s power to them. D.R. Griffin counters 
the charge of anthropomorphism be calling the belief that our mental 
experience is the s tandard of a ll mental life "truly anthropomorphic 
conceit" (op. cit.; pp. 124/ 5). - To be sure, the accusation is often 
justified. We might obj ect to a princess kissing frogs for reasons of 
hygiene, not because we woulci have a lot of confused or heart~broken 
frogs on our hands. If we believe the latter, the charge could 
probably be made to stick. 
N. Malcolm - "Consciousness and Cau sality" (op. cit., p. 45); S.R.L. 
Clark - "Good Dogs and othe r Animal s" (in: P. Singer - ed. - "In Defence 
of Animals"~ op. cit.~ pp. 46/7). An animal is unable to use the pronoun 
"I" (ASL apes excluded). but it surely dO'S not mistake itself for 
someone else. 
11 Culture and Cultural Entities" (op. cit. · pp. 30/1); "species-specific 
intelligence" would be more appropr i ate. C. McGi nn suggests that 
rationality seems to involve self-cons c iousnes ~. ("The Character of 
Mind"; op. cit.• p. 20), awarenes s of on ' s attitudes (desires, beliefs. 
pref~rences), in that rationa ity implie s "rational adjustment" of tl1ese 
attitudes. "Rationality", owing to its incorpora t ing "reason", is more 
specific than "intelligence". 
. ..... /143 
-I 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
143. 
Again (see above, ch. 2 n. 16). I want to differentiate between intran-
sitive con!;ciousness ("consciousness" as such) and transitive conscious-
ness ("consciousness-of 11 ); the former, unlike the latter, is not posses-
sed in degrees. I follow N. Malcolm in making this distinction 
("Consciousness and Causa 1 i ty"; op. cit.; p. 3), though he does not 
address the issue of posse~sion (in degrees). 
T. Nagel uses this phrase, though not in q~ite the same context 
("Death"; in: "Mortal Questions"; op. cit.; p. lCl) 
T. Nagel, ibid., p. 6. - Cf. P. Singer ( 11 The Concept of Moral Standing"; 
in: A.L. Caplan & D. Callahan - eds. - "Ethics in Hard Times"; New 
York/London: Plenum Press 1981) who takes the idea of "moral standing" 
to imply that the1° are "other existences which I can imagine myself as 
living". Owing to divergences in our powers of imagination, however, 
this view would entail a kind of relativism with respect to the concept 
of moral standing. 
C. McGinn - 11 Evolution, Anima : . and the Basis of Morality" {op. cit.; 
p. 95) 
As J. Gric·1e has put it, in a corrment on one of my lier papers: "The 
~tymology ~f a word and the history of its uses are often instructive, 
especially in the case of trendy words, and words which express notions 
critical to an argument. Etymology is not philosophy - but it is 
philosophi:ally relevant". 
"Rights" (op. cit.; p. 126); Frey's argument against animal interests 
closely rE!Sembles McCloskey's denial but is more complex in that it 
involves the denial of desires arid beliefs, as we have seen. 
R.G. Frey - "Inter sts and Rights" (op. cit.; pp. 79-81); T. Regan -
"What Sorts of Beings can have Rights ?" (in: "A 11 that Owe 11 therein"; 
Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982; p. 178). 
T. Regan - "The Case for Animal Rights" (op. cit., ch. 9 passim) . 
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T. Ndgel - "Death" (in: "Mortal Questions"i op. cit.; pp. 3-4). Cf. 
also L. Wittgenstein. "Death is not an event in life". ("Notebooks 
1914-16", op. cit.; 8 - 7 - 16). But dying is an event in life ! See 
dlso .J. Glover: "Death is not itself a misfortune, but this does not 
show that killing someone does him no harm" ("Causing Death and Saving 
Lives"; op. cit.; p. j6). 
"Prologue: Ethics and the New Animal Liberation Movement'1 (in: P. Singer 
- ed. - 11 In Defence of Animals"; op. cit.; pp. 8 - 9). 
M. Stamp Dawkins - 11 Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare 11 
(London/New York· Chapman & Hall, 1980) and "The Scientific Basis for 
Assessing Suffering in Animals" (in: P. Singer • ed. - "In Defence of 
Animals", op. cit.). W. Paton - "Man and Mouse: Animals in Medical 
Research 11 {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; ch. 7). Among the most 
ext~aordinary of her findings are the preferences of battery hens, where 
Dawkins establishes c.hat hens actually prefer fine mesh to the coarser 
one thought more comfor able for the hens 1 feet. 
These findings, like some of those concerning the treatment of animals 
in intensive farm units and in research laboratories, are the result of 
what was probably the most distressing oart of my research. 
"Pest" , by the way, is also only a matter of perspective. Mickey Mouse, 
a lovable pet and source of inspiration to some, may be a threat to the 
health, hygiene, and privacy of others; while others again see him as a 
valuable bearer of sci ntific information. 
As far as a1ternativ s are concern d, r li f of human boredom or mental 
stres~ is in no way dependent ssenti lly on the utilization of animals. 
Many circuses now eschew their use , without having incurred financial 
losses: on the contrary • the maintenance of circ us animals is rather 
costly and extravagant. 
.. ...• /145 
I 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
145. 
Note the utilitarian overtone of this ~ontention. The problem of 
whether numbers count is discussed be 1 ow, sect. 4. 2. 
It might even be suggested, that this line of defence could be employed 
with respect to human beings, and indeed that, since human instincts are 
weaker, there is even less to be taken into account than in the case of 
wild animals. And even though some evidence could conceivably be cited 
in favour of this suggestion (think of the children who, on th 
liberation, did not want to leave Buchenwald because in a weira way 
was their "home", and who showed signs of psychological distress"''· ~ 
prospect of being made to leave the camp, and even bit their 
liberators), the practice of keeping individuals in captivity is morally 
reprehensible in that it constitutE.s a prevention of lives to unfold 
naturally, whatever one's potential or capacities. 
The feeding of animals in zoos entails several problems, however: due to 
the economic strictures and perhaps geographical factors, animals are 
forced to consume an insufficient. variety of foodstuffs or foodstuffs 
alien to their natural feedi ng habits. Some are also forced into 
unnatural feeding patters; i.e .• animals used to feeding constantly 
during waking hours {like r.oofed animals and primates) may only be fed 
once or twice daily. Thirdly, social and environmental aspects of 
feeding natural to an animal may be denied them in captivity. (See S. 
Watson and R. Kidd - "Closing Day at the Zoo"~ in:"Outcry". Winter 1984; 
p. 16.) 
Here J follow S. Watson and R. Kidd (ibid.) and Dale Jamieson ("Against 
Zoos"; in: P. Singer .. ed. - "In Defence of Animals"; op. cit.). whose 
lists of reasons corrvnonly cited are identical. 
D. Jamieson asks (ibid.) whether most of the important educational 
objectives could not better b achiev d by exhibiting empty cages with 
explanations of why they are empty (p. 112). 
T. Regan "The Case for Animal Rights" (op. cit.; p. 395) 
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It i$ remarkable, howe·1er, that our social cus ·:oms still imply the 
opposite (which explain latent feelings of guilt of many vegetarians). 
The reason for this phenomenon is not that people are ignorant of facts 
about animal consciousness and their capacity tci suffer or to enjoy 
their life (they are ignorant, or prefer to rema ·i n ignorant, of facts 
regarding the circumstances of production of 11eat, cosmetics , and 
medicinal artlcles of use), but because practices like vegetarianism, 
homeopa hy, etc., arP not the norm. 
See R. Harri son - "Animal Ma chines'' (London: Stuart, 1964); R.D. Ryder -
"Victims of Science"(l.ondon: Davis - Poynte r, 1975, chs. 2-8); P. Singer 
- ''Animal Liberation'' (Wellingborough/Northampton.hire: Thorsons Publi-
shers, 1983, first published 1975, chs. 2 and 3). - An argument colTlflon 
to defences of factory farming and animal experirrentation is that farm 
and 1 ab anima 1 s are reared for those purposes, that they have no 
knowledge and interest in freedom. The question to bear in mind is 
whether it would be justifiable to breed human slaves contented with 
their lot, e.g., by mea ns of genetic engineering. (See J. Glover: 1'What 
sort of People sho11ld there be ? 11 ; op. cit .; pp. 39, 92, 157, 159, who 
writes that contentment does not warrant diminished contact witn reality 
or a diminution of quality; also S.R.L. Clark - "Slaves and Citizens 11 ; 
op. cit.) In asking this question , we are allowi1g for more than might 
be thought nee ssary: for there i s no reason to believe that farm and 
1 ab anima 1 s are actua 1 ly "contented'' with their 1 ot (and this is not 
b~cause they cannot be contented or discontented). A more apprcpriate 
question .:o ask might be wh th r i would be justifiable to brdinwash 
people into unques ioning acceptance of a totalitarian regime. like 
Winston Smith in G. Orw ll's 11 1984 11 • 
J. Glover - "Causing Death and Saving Liv s" (op . c1t.; p. 16) 
T.R. Machan - 11 SomP Doubts about Anim 1 Righ .s" (Journal of Value 
I nq1J i ry 19, 1985; p. 7 ~) . 
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R. Nozick - ''Anarchy, St te and Utopia" (op. cit.; pp. 45/7). The 
argument from replacea 1ty at the beginning of the paragraph is 
rehearsed by O.G. Ritchie (op. cit.) and J. Margolis ("Value and Con-
duct"; op. cit.; pp. 201-4). T. Nagel ma JS the observation quoted in 
this paragraph in "The Absurd" (in: "Mortal Questions"; op. cit.; p.16). 
"E.~olution, Animals, and the Bdsis of Mor31ity" (op. cit. ; p. 98) 
"Anarchy, State, and U opi~" (op. cit.; pp. 45/7) 
The animal body consumed once had a blood circulation, nervous and 
1,vmphat i c sys tc.m undergoing the same assimilative and excretory process 
as our own. Waste products were being manufactured at the time the 
animal was killed, and the fear and the pafn accompanying slaughter were 
responsible for an increase in adrenalin production, and - owing to this 
sharp and drastic escalation - for the creation of poisonous sub~tances 
which h~ve detrimental effects on all body cells. 
Their intestinal tract is twelve imes their body length as contrasted 
with carnivores' ract which is only three times their body 1,~ngth, in 
order to rapidly eliminate decaying flesh; their stomach acid is twenty 
times stronger than that of carnivores ; they have fingers instead of 
claws, molars instead of sharp, pointed, elongated teeth, well-developed 
~alivary glands needed to predigest grains and fruit rather than small 
glands, and they have alkal~ne instead of acis saliva. - See al~o E. 
Frorrrn {op. cit.) on human 0mnivorism (pp. 178/80). 
Cf. F. Moore-Lappe - ''Diet for a Small Planet" (New York: Ballentine 
Books. 1975). See also S.R.L. Clark ("Sl:ves and Citizens"; op. cit.; 
pp. 29-30) who argues that "Hindu r spect for s cred cows preserves 
peasant fanners from the dang r c rroncous calculation of future 
profit. It is almost alway~ b tter .!lQ._ to k111 the cow who w111 provide 
m11k, and fuel, and traction, ven though she seems Clll expensive luxury 
to ignorant Westerners. and ma.v be a temptation to a p~asant in harrf 
times". 
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R.J. White - "A Defense of Vivisection" (in: T. Regan and P. Singer -
"Animal Rights and Human Obligat1011 11 ; op. cit.;) w. Paten (op. cit.). -
D.A. DPwsbury, Professor of Psychoiogy. unlike White and Paton, does not 
attempt to "def~nd" the use of animals in psych"logical research as 
such. His considerations are purely scientific, viz. that comparative 
behaviour study, i ,e ., the interaction of ethology and experimental 
p ychology, is the most reliable and eff 'c ient mode of study ("Compara-
tive Animal Behavior"; New York; McGraw-Hill, 1978; also: "Animal 
Aggressive Behaviour", "Animal Intelligence", etc .• in: R.J. Corsini -
ed. - "Encyclopae~ia of Psychology", vol l; New York/Toronto: John Wiley 
& Sons. 1984). 
Op. Cit.; pp. 165/169 
Op. cit.; p. 123 
!\ee R. D. Ryder - "Victims of Science" (op. cit.; pp. 12-5), in "Experi-
ments on Animals" (in: S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris - eds. -
"Animal~. Men, and Morals"; London: Gollancz, 1971; p. 80). 
Thus J. Glover: "It may be hard to sustain an opposition to medical 
xper1ments on anima·1 s when I remember m.v responses to human suff~r ing 
caused by diseases" ("Causing Death and Saving Lives"; op. cit.; p. 27). 
Simil~r risk-benefit cons1deratio11s infom the aoproach in his "Wh.!t Sort 
of People should there be?"; op. cit.) Yet on p. 25 in "Causing Death 
and Saving Lives", Glover warns that "(i)t is often said that human 
suffering matters more than animal suf . . ring because we have rationality 
of a kind o.· degree that animals lack. But reflection about feeble-
m1nded children may make us question this as a reason for thinking that 
animtl sufferin!J is 1css 1mporta1;1. 1 • 
Op. cit.; passim; pp. 2, 26/7, 69/70, 77/78, 91. and also pp. 128, 132, 
159. 
"Victims of Science" (op. c1t.; pp. 22/3) 
Cf. J. Rachels - 11 00 Animals have a Right to Liberty ?" (i..: T. Regan 
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and P. Singer - eds. - "Animal Qights and Human Obligationsn; op. cit.; 
pp. 215-8). He cites experimenters as saying that "a majority of rhesus 
monke.rs will consisten~1y suffer ht ~ '1er rather than secure food at the 
expense of electroshock t o a conspecific". 
E.g., tissue, organ and cell cultures obtained from ~~~opsies and 
biopsies; umbilical cords; cell transformation assay; bacterial mutation 
tests and chrcmosome damage tests; combination f 9~s chromiltography and 
mass spectrometry; models, i.e., dumm'es, cnmputer models, mar:hematical 
and electro-thermical neural models; qualitati 1e anc quantitative 
analysh.; educational, 3-0 films. computer for data processing and 
diagnosis. - Cf. T. Hegarty - "Alternatives" (in: S. & R. Gor'.lovitch and 
J. Harris - "Animals, Men ar.d Mo:als" (op. cit.); R.D. Ryder - ''Vi:tims 
of Science" (op. cit.; ch. 12). Soine doubts are expressed LY Ryder 
self as well as by ~. Paton (op. cit,; ch. 8). 
Even w. Paton admits this (ibid . ; p. 108); ,ee also pp. 26/7 on 
alternatives, and p. 127 on extrapolation. R.D. Ryrler ("Victims of 
Science"; op. cit.; passim) stresses th2 eccnomic viability of 
alternati :es. T. Regan argues from scientific challenqe in "The Case 
fo ·· /l limal Rights" (op. cit.; pp. 388, ~97/ 8). 
E.g., G. Vlastos ("Justice and Equality", in: A. I. Mel den - ed. - "Human 
Rights"; op. cit.) fails to differentiate between "differential" and 
"unequal" treatm~nt and to realize that "equal" and "differential" 
treatffient are not incompatible. Also see D.D. Raphael's telling remarks 
(op. cit.; p. 177): "Ju~tice and injustice, impartiality and part ·i ality, 
arise or,ly i:i our treatment of human beings and only in relation to the 
conferinent of benefits or burdens on them. i\J question of justice 
arise$ over the action of the crackpot who treats his chairs 
differently, or of the farrr1f:r who treats his cattle differently". 
"Telling" not only in that Raphael allocates animals to the realm of 
t~ings and so excludes them from considerations of justice and equality, 
but also in that he - though ac.knuwledging that 11 equal 11 is not the same 
as "identical" - fails to see that "equal" and "diffe,~e;-.~ia~" are 
compatible. - .J. Feinberg emnloys the term "foci of subjectivity" in 
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"The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations" (in: "Rights, Justice and 
the Bounds of Liberty"; Princeton/N.J. Princeton University Press, 
1980). 
S.J. Gould - 11 The Ghost of Protagoras" (The New York Review; January 22, 
1961; p. 43). See also T. Loebsack, A. Koestler, and E. Fromm (all op . 
.:it.). On evolution being a ladder. see A. Gowans-Whyte - "The Ladder 
of Life" (London: Thrift Books, 1951), who tracec; the stages of develop-
ment from the 1Jnconscious to the conscious and 11 mind 11 and 11 inte1l igence 11 
(and the capacities of reasonin~ , of memory, etc.). See also B. Brophy 
-
11 The Darwinists 1 s Dile1T111a 11 (in: R.D. Ryder and 0. Paterson - 11 Animal~ 1 
Rights: a Symposium"; op. cit.). 
"Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests" \op. cit.; pp. 
159-61). P. Singer argues forcefully against Benn in his "All Animals 
are Equal" (in: T. Regan and P. Singer - eds. - "Animal Rights and Human 
Obligations"; op. cit.). 
Op. cit.; p. 44 
Op. cit.; p. 437 
R.D. Ryder - "Victims of Science", 11 Experiments on Animals", 11 lhe 
Struggle against Speciesism", 11 Speciesism in the Laboratory" (all op. 
cit.}; P. Singer - 11 All Anima l s are Equal 11 , 11Animal Liberation 11 (botn 
op. cit.), "Pracf:ical Ethics 11 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). J.J. DP.genaar speaks of 11 neutral 11 and "evaluative 
discrimination (op. cit.; pp. 28/9). 
(Op. cit.; pt. 107-9) . Wasserstrom, it should be noted, does not think 
that animals have rights - our duties to them are duties which hdve no 
cnr. P~at ive right!. (p. 98); yet he does not arguP. in support of this 
Accorjing to Wasserstom, the racist fails to acknowledge that the 
o is as capable of suffering as tlie white person; and th~ reason why 
a person is said to have a right not to be made tc suffer unnecessarily 
is t~at we all in fact prefer freedom from such pain. And "i f all 
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persons do have equal capacities of these sorts and if the existence of 
these cupacities is the redson for ascribing these rights to anyone, 
then all persons o~ght to have the right to claim equality of treatment 
; n respect to the possession and exercise of these rights" ( p. 106). 
Since animals share these capacities with human beings, it is unclear 
how one could, in \·!:isserstom 1 s view, consistently withhold from them 
rights. It will not do to say thej· cannot 11 claim 11 or "exercise" them -
there are many human beings other than ~ nfants, imbeciles, anrt the 
senile, who have r.o concept of rights, strictly speaking, and therefore 
cannot be said to 11 claim 11 or 11 exercise 11 them. 
See above, n. 37. 
A. Ge~i rth, despite his favouritism and mora der-type approach, 
certainly does not wish to deny that animals '•-• . these basic goods 
("Reason and Morality"; op. cit.; sect. 3.4. passim). 
op. cit.; p. 161 n. 4/3 
"Species1sm and the Idea of Equality 11 (Philosophy 53, 1978; pp. 252/3). 
ibid. i p. 253 
M. Midgley - "Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 102). I 
suspect that the main reason for our preference is our ignorance of 
other individuals, species, and that our preference goes hand in hand 
w1 th a certain comp 1 acency, and unwi 11 i ngness to remedy this ignorance 
(if we recognize 1t as such in the fir~ t place). All cats are grey in 
the dark of our ignorance. 
B. Steinbock (op. cit.; pp. 251, 25~/6). She concedes, incidentally, 
that similar preferences may exist with respect to members of our own 
race, that it is not wrong to extend ~pecial care to th~m (p. 256), and 
that it is racist only 11 to fall below your moral obligation tc a person 
because of his or her race 11 • 
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M. Midgley - "Animals and why they Matter" {op. cit.; pp. 104, 103). 
C. Maclean - "The Wolf Children" (Harmondsworth/Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1977); M.K. Temerlin (op. cit.) 
M. Midgley - "Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 26). 
M. Midgley - ibid. ; p. 98 
0.1 . Hull - "The Rights of Animals" (Science 192; 1976; p. 680); M. 
Midgley - "Animals and why they Matter" {op. cit.; pp. 99, 101). - It 
is important to realize. however, that the possibility of classification 
does not make for inequality. The idea of equality, in this sense, is 
not a l i beralistic sentiment, but a contingent fact of history, 
"contingent" because there could have been a difference in kind between 
human beings and nonhuman life (and as there might be between us and 
extraterrestrial organisms). 
Cf. C. McGinn ("Evolution, Animals, and the Basis of Morality" op. cit.; 
p. 96): 11 1ecies .... are natural kinds , and what determines something 
as of a given k ~ nd may not be open t o casual observ~tion. Suppose •... 
that some evolutionary biologist discovered that G -=ertain group of 
persons, hitherto ren · ded as members of the human ~~ecies, were in fact 
not really of the same biological species as the rest of us: perhaps 
they evolved by parallel evolution, or perhaps they were subtly, though 
fundamental ly, different in genetic structure. But suppose al~o that no 
mistake had been made as to their qualifying as persons Would we then 
find ourselves ready to change our legal system in respe.ct of the 
biologically deviant group or r.ease to regard them with the sc:me degree 
of moral concern as before 7 Of course not; so identity of biological 
species cannot haYe the moral relevance the speciesist claimed. In 
fact, this point is obvious once we ask whether our moral treatment of 
each other rests on recherche bioloyical knowledge; it depends rather on 
our recognizing each other as persons". 
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R. Dworkin (op. cit.; ch. 6) - discusses "duty-based" and "right-based" 
theories. singling out I. Kant's categorical imperative and T. Paine's 
theory of revolution as examples. Utilitarianism is cited as an example 
of a "goa 1-based" theory. which is characterized by a concern with 
nonindividual aims, with consequences of actions. 
Cf. J. Feinberg - "Duties, Rights and Claims" (in : "Rights, Justice, and 
the Bounds of Liberty"; op. cit .; p. 134); al~o see pp. 130-4 on the 
diff~rent kinds of duty, and p. 135 on "duties of status". 
Aristotle - "Animals and Slavery" and "How Humans Differ from other 
Creatures"; T. Aquinas - "Differences between Rational and other 
Creatures" and "On Killing Living Things and the Duty to Love Irrational 
Creatures" (all in: T. Regan and P. Singer - eds. - "Animal Rights and 
Human Obligations"; op. cit.). In hi$ booklet "God's Animals" 
(Westminster: 1973). Dom A. Agius, while asserting that "animals' minds 
differ from our own not m~rely in degree but in kind" (can things differ 
both in degree and in kind ?), nonetheless concedes th~m a soul (which 
he 1dent1fi s wi h th~ir loyalty, affection, and indeed their sentience, 
but our "duties" to them are actually duties to God, and are therefore, 
arguably, "indirect". 
What is to count as a criterion of rationality 7 Tool-making or fire-
controlling capacity ? Human languag ? And if the$e constitute valid 
criteria, are they "clear-cut" ? 
I. Kant - "Duties to Animals"• D.G. Ritchie (op. cit.) (both in: T. 
Regan and P. Singer - eds. - "An,mal Rights and Human Obligations"; op. 
cit.; pp. 122-3 ana 183, respectively). H.J. McCloskey. too, P.schews 
talk of dutie$ "to" animals in favour of duties 11 in respect of" animals, 
e.g., the duty not to make th m suffer unnecessarily ("The Right to 
Lite"; op. cit.; p. 410); he also speaks of duties "about" animals . 
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"Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 61); see also her "Beast and 
Man" (op. cit.; ch. 10 passim). 
"A Critique of Kant" (in : T. Regan and P. Singer - eds. - "Animal Rights 
and Human Obligations"; op. cit.; pp. 124-6) 
S.I. Benn - ''Human Rights - for whom and for what?" (in: E. Kamenka and 
A. Erh-Soon Tay - eds. - "Human Rights"; op. cit.; pp. 65); see also his 
"Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests" {op. c i t.; pp. 
157.159). 
J. Glover - "Causing Death and Saviny Lives" (op. cit.; p. 50) 
S. I. Benn - "Human Rights: for whom and for what ?11 {op. cit ; p. 72) 
J. Rawls - "A Theory of Justice" {Oxford: Clarendon Pres!>. 1972; pp. 17. 
504-12). Like Rawls. J. Narveson believes that we can have duties of 
justice only to those who have a con~ept of justice; which would involve 
treating them as "moral persons" {"Morality and Utility"; op. cit.; p. 
87). See also 0.0. Raphael (op. cit .; pp. 175-7). who promulgates a 
similar view. 
"Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 50) 
The two quotations of Bentham which follow are from his "The Principles 
of Moral and Legislatio "• reprinted in a brief excerpt as "A Utilita-
rian View" (in: T. Regan and P. Singer - ~ds - "Animal Rights and Human 
Obligations"; op. cit., pp . 130, 129). 
J.S. Mill. too, b31i ves this· tC' be possible: "Granted that any 
practice causes more pain to anim~ls than it gives pleasure to man; is 
that practice moral or immoral ? And if, exactly in proportion as human 
beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not 
with one voice answer 'inmoral 1 , let the morality of the principle of 
utility be for ever condemned". ("A Defense of Bentham"; in: T. Regan 
and P. Singer - eds. - 11 Animal Rights and Human Obligations"; op. cit.; 
p. 132). 
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There are enough di ficulties as it is in determining the extent of a 
certain kind of benefit and in measuring harm, partly due to the problem 
of predicting consequences and taking into account future benefits and 
harms; therefore, utilitarian calculation is very much an attempt at 
balancing incommensurables. 
See, e.g., "Animal Liberation" and "Practical Ethics" (both op. cit.). 
"The Concept of Moral Standing" (op. cit). 
"Animals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; p. 92). 
"Practical Ethics" (op. cit.; chs. 4 and 5) 
"Causing Death and Saving Lives" (op. cit.; pp. 138/9. 140). The remark 
which follows is culled from pp. 158/9. 
Mentally or physically handicapped people are normally wors! off then 
normal people, but this does not mean that our relationship with them is 
one of inequality or th~~ their interests do not have equal weight with 
our own (ibid.; p. 148). 
"What Sort of People should there be?" (op. cit.; p. 155). 
T. Regan takes a ~trong stand against utilitarianism in, e.g., "Utilita-
rianism, Vegetariani sm, and Animal Rights", "Animal Rights, Human 
Wrongs", (both in:"All that Ow 11 therein"• op. cit .. ), "The Case for 
Animal Rights" (op. cit.) and again ; 11 he Case for Animal Rights" (1n: 
P. Singer - ed. - "In Defence of Animals"; op. cit.). 
Recall R. Nozick's dictum (cited above, ch. 2 n. 44) that what matters 
is not only a being's experiences and what Ci being is like but the 
~ctual activities connected with these aspects, to actually "live" one's 
life, in contact with r ality , and until one finds a satisfactory, 
comprehensive answer to what matters to human beings other than their 
experiences and determ1 nes that this answer does not a 1 so apoly to 
an1rrals, "one cannot reasonably claim that only the fe1t experiences of 
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animals limit what we muy do to them" ("Anarchy State, and Utopiaa; op. 
cit.; pp. 45-7; my un~erlining). 
J. Narveson ("Animal Rights 11 ; Canadia n Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977; 
pp. 172/3) r.•jects Singer's claim that carnivorous pleasures are trivial 
because they are unneces sary for human health, pointing out that 
listening to Beethoven is nnece~sary for human health but not trivial. 
This analogy obviously misses the mark: the point here would be whether 
listening to Beethoven would evoke pleasures greater than the 
disadvantages for those whom the music causes to 1 i e awake, to suffer 
headaches, or to be unable to study for ~n important exam. (Or suppose 
Beethoven were one of many composers forced to produce musical 
compositions in an intensive farm unit-type setting). - Some other 
pertinent considerations appear in: P.S. Wenz - "Act-Utilitarianism and 
Animal Liheration 11 (Personalist 60, 1979}; T. Regan- "Utilitarianism, 
Vegetarianism, and Animal R1ghts 11 (op. cit.). P. Singer defends 
vegetarianism on utilitarian grounds also in "Utilitarianism and 
Vtqetarianism 11 (Philo5ophy dnd Public Affairs 9, 1980), an l.i n ~wLr to 
Regan's paper, ibid. 
"Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights" ( ibid.). T. Rega:i 
also argues that the principle of equal consideration of interests does 
not provide a utilitarian basis at all. It tells us only th3t we must 
give equal consideratio~ to the interests of all sentient beings but not 
whr.t we must do once we have done this. It does not show that the 
consequences of equal consideration are better for ~11, or most, parties 
involved. If this criterion is va 1 id , it should still not prove fatal: 
the principle of equality could be combined with that of utility and 
extended accordingly (or "narrowed down" depending on how one looks at 
it). 
op. c~t.; p. 209; my underlining. 
T. Regan - "The Case for Animal Rights" (op. cit .; pp. 297-307}; J.M. 
Taurek - "Should the Numbers Count ?11 (Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, 
1976/7) . 
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"A:iimal Experimentation: First Thoughts"; see also: "Animal Rights, 
Human Wrongs (hoth in: "All that Dwell therein"; op. cit.), "The Case 
for Animal Rights" (in: P. Singer - ed. - "In Defence of Animals"; op. 
cit.). - An examrile: an amateur sc ienti s t might believe that injecting 
his rats with doses of morphine will make them happier animals. 
T. Regan - "Animal Experimentation: First Thoughts" (in: "All that Dwell 
therein"; op. cit.; p. 69). See C. McGinn on feelings and the basis of 
morality, in "Evo 'L1tion, Animals, and the Basis of Morality" {op. cit.; 
pp. 88. 91, 94) . 
A. Schweitzer - "The Ethic of Reverence for Life" (in: T. Regan and P. 
Singer - eds. - "Animal Rights and Human Obligations"; op. cit.; p. 
134). 
ibid.; p. 137. In fact, Schweitzer' s own profession required him to 
kill some organisms {e.g., bacilli, or use plants and herbs for 
medicinal purposes) in order to cure human beings and curb disease. 
"The Moral Status of Animals" (0 ford: Oxford University Press, 1977; 
Preface). The following quotation ar from pp. 30 , 90, 89. 
"On the !:lus is of Mora 1 i ty'' (New York: Bobbs-Merri 11 , 1965). ExcC!rpts 
from this work are reprint d as "A Critique of ant" (op. cit.). This 
citation appears in the lat er collection, p. 126, 
On "ahimsa", and Jain, V die~ and Buddhist thinking, see U. Taehtinen: 
"Ahimsa: Non-Violence in th Indian Trbdition" (op. cit.; chs. I, III, 
IV, V). A.K. Coomaraswamy discusses Vedic thought and Western 
tradition, and the connection b 'twe n the doc tri ne o reincdrnation or 
transmigration of souls of th Indian trad1 ion and the ancient Greek 
idea of "metempsychosi s" or "metasom tosis'', both of which have similar 
implications with re sp ct to animals, that to injure or kill then1 is to 
disrupt or impair th "chain oi E" ing " ("M taphys'cs"; op. cit.; pp. 6, 
77 ff., 83 n). L. Wittgenst rn's remark is in: "Philosophische 
Untersuchungen" (op. cit.; 287). 
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D. T. Suzuki 1 s elucidation of 11 trisna 11 app ars in the German translation 
of "Mysticism: Christian alid Buddhist'', "Der westliche und der oestliche 
Weg 11 (Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, 1974 . 
11 0n the Basis of Morality" (op. cit.; pp. 131, 166). 
ibid.; p. 145 . D.W. Hamlyn ("Schop nhauer11 ; in: 11 The Arguments of the 
Philosophers" series; ed. T. Honderich; Lor.::fon: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1980) and B. Magee ("The Philosophy of Schopenhauer"; Ox1 ord: Clarendon 
Preas, 1983) provide very us ful discussions of Schopenh uer's views. 
11 A Cr i t i q u e of Ka n t 11 ( op . c i t . • p . 12 5 ) • 
B. Mage (op. cit.; ch. 9); D.W. Hamlyn (op. cit.; p. 123). 
ibid.; p. 136 
P. Mercer - "Sympathy anrl Ethics 11 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972; p. 2) 
The following quotations are frorn pp. 2, 4/5, again 4, 11, 83 f., 114 
f. ' 129 f. 
Cf. L.J. Suzman who writes that d ficiency of sympathy in racial, 
c.ultural or religious conclicts 11 is said to arise from defective 
criteria and to constitute a moral defect 11 (op. cit.). I doubt whether 
Suzman's "question of similarity". ho~~ev r, constitutes a substantive 
moral criterion. The inconc ivab1lity of pregnancy to men ("What 1s it 
like to be pregnant ?11 ) does not render women's concerns difficult to be 
regarded as of equal rank, or rend r thP issue of abor tion a problem of 
lesser moral import. 
T. Nage 1 expresse th f s p ss imi sm in hi Pr f ac to "Mortal Qu s t1 ons '' 
(op. cit.; pp. xii/xiii). 
A.O. Woozley is th form r theorist ("Law and the Legi~lation of Morali-
ty"; in: A.L. Caplan & D. Gallahan - eds. - "Ethics in Hard Times"; op. 
c i t.), C. Arnold the htter ("Analyses of Rights"; 1n: E. Kamenka & A. 
Erh-Soon Tay - eds. - "Human Rights"i op. cit.; p. 85). A. G w1rth -
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justifiedly, I believe - argu~s against Arnold's 1 redundancy argument", 
pointing out that rights are logically prior to a~~ies "in the order of 
µurpo!ie" and that "the nature of a claim-riqht is to some extent 
independent of its relation to the correlative duties" (Introduction to 
"Human Rights", op. cit.; p. 14). And R. Wasserstrom points out that 
rights fulfil certain functions that neither duti ~s nor any other moral 
or legal concepts can fulf ·1l (op. cit.; p. 9:' ). 
Cf. D.W. Hamlyn (op. cit.; p. 145). 
Here, I roughly follow J. Feinberg 1 s suggestions in "The Righ~s of 
Animals and Unborn Generations", pp. 159/60, and "Human Duties ~nd 
Animal R19hts 11 , p. 196 (both in: "Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of 
Liberty"; op. cit.). 
E.g., J. Feinberg writes (ibid.; p. 202): "Human duties to respect 
animal lives .... are simply one part f the larger catalog of human 
duties of all kinds and must find their proper place in an order of 
priority". It does not follow, however, as Feinberg btlieves, that 
"animal claims" (e.g., to life) are "much weaker than human claims". 
By invoking an "order of priority" with respect to human duties one does 
not weaken the rights and claims of animals or decrc~se the moral weight 
of one 1 s nonrights against animals. - T.L.S. Sprigge's differentiation 
between the import of "right" and 11 duty 11 is in: "Metaphysics, 
Physicalism, and Animal Rights" (op. cit.; p. 103). 
R. Nozick • "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" {op. cit.; chs. 3 c-r1 5 
passim). T. Regan discusses the problem of identity in "The Case for 
Animal Rights" (op. c~t.; pp. 82-4). 
M. MacDonald - 11 Natural Rights 11 (in: A.l. Melden - ed. - ,.Human Rights"; 
op. cit.; p. 49; reprinted from: Proceedings 0c the Aristotelian 
Society, 1947/8). R. Nozick speak$ of "value-seeking and 11 valuing11 in 
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"P~ilosophical Explanations" (op. cit.; ch. 5 passim, esp. sects. II and 
IV). - But J. Rodman ("The Liberation of Nature"; Inquir.~ 20, 1977; p. 
117) writes: ''Nature lies' beyond good and evil', wh1cn 1s why the 
attempt to bring it within the framework of the moral/legal 
consciousness is ·.mately so perverse". Rodman would have to deal 
with the quest;ons ~hether humans are "natural existents", and where the 
scope "f morul and legal corsciousness must end. - G. Vlastos (l"p. 
cit.; p. 95) ground:t "tiuman rights" on "equal human worth which m~y be 
translated into, but ·educed to, equal wortn of hu~•n well-being and 
freedom". But ~ 1s it that remains beyond reduction (to hum'1n 
well-being and freedom) ? And if nonhuman species can enjoy well-being 
and freedom, why not extend equal worth to them and their capacities ? 
(Or 1s their 11worth" reducible, and there'lre a lesser worth ?) 
Recal 1 Bentham's dictum that "(t)he day may come, when thP. rest of the 
animal creation may acquire these rights ••. ",quoted above, p. 69. 
Cf. R.D. Ryder's account of its history in "The Struggle against 
Speciesism" (op. cit.). 
J. BennJtt (op. cit.; esp. ch. 4). 
Ibid,.; pp. 35/6. - See also D.A Dewsbury on "Animal Intelligence" (in: 
"Encyclopaedia of Psychology", vol 1, op. cit.). In the 
above-mentioned lecture at the University of the "itwatersrand, S.J. 
Gould expressed strong opposition to the claim that worth can be 
assigned to individuals and groups by measuring intelligence as a single 
quantity. 
To pursue C. McGinn's comparison"of the emergence of consciousness with 
the sudden switching on of a light ("The Characters of Mind"; op. cit.; 
pp. 12·4): once the 11pht is on, there m:sy be degrees in brightness -
cf., e.g., 11 di111T1ing devices". 
R.G. Frey - "What has Sentiency to do with the Possession of Rights ?" 
(in: r.:i. ~der & D. Paterson - eds. - "Animals' Rights: A Symposium"; 
op. cit.); J, Rodman (op. cit.; p. 91); P. Singer - "Animal L iberat1on" 
(op. cit.; p. 181). 
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tn what follows, I will not be directly concP.rned with the moral status 
of the dead or unborn generations. J. Feinberg ("The Rights of Animals 
and Unborn Generations"; op. cit.;) and J. Glover \ 11 Caus1ng Death and 
Saving Lives", and "What Sort of People should there be ?"; both op. 
cit.) provide useful discussions of these issues. My own reflective 
intuition is that speaking of the "rights" of persons who have died is 
only a way of registering their .,ast claims, and that speaking of the 
" 01ts" of future generations serves to illustrate our concern for our 
cultural ~eritage and our environment. 
T \>.'' 11 ddress the ~ssue of p .. imary perception in pl.ints in sect. 7 3. 
EarthHOnTl'i i"td bees, e.g., certa~nly have cognitive maps for their 
£·nv11"Cn1nt.:it And rerent scientific evidence has demonstrated memory-
and 1 Hrr. " • capacities "r sna 4 1s. J. Rodman thim~s - correctly, I 
bel1e•1e - hilt "the pl~ght of (animals) •••• arouses us not -:o much 
ber.ausf: we .. 1supprove of unr.ccesv ·y sufferi 1 or ~ (though, other 
thiny~. bei''9 f 1111, we tend to do so), but because we react indignantly 
to .•• external •••• condit~ons being impose~ on natural entities tha+ 
ha\'P >eir owr. interr.al structu1"es, needs, and potentialities .. (c:>. 
cit.; 1J • ·O; m.)· 1mder11ning). - Or adaptive behaviour, sensory d1scri-
miMl1<i!' - ····J le.1rring capac1t1c!s, see D.A. Dewsbury ("Comparativ~ 
Anir:1al f'!hav1c ·; op. cit.). 
Cf. '4. Midgley - ~n1mals and why they Matter" (op. cit.; pp. 82/3). 
(Recall G. Vlasto~ definition; c1ted above, ch. 5 n. 4). J. Glover's 
remarks c·:.icern1ng contr1c:tarian1sm are iri "What Sort of People should 
there be?" (or. c1r.; pp. 144 f.). 
J. Narveson - 'Mo ··. li':y and Utiiity" (op. cit.; pp. 86/7); L.J. Suzman 
(op. cit.; p. l4 C'1zmd11 1 : implication here is that animals ca"riot 
have rights becau~e :1 !Y are incapable of making moral choices. Yet 
many animals r.a~ r~er~111r ly (nonmorally) choose what is in their interest 
(s~e below, where ~he 1:~cussion revolves around moral agency). Rights 
might be invoked in ur<..e• to insure that an individual can exercise her 
.. 
capacity for moral choice or function as a moral agent, but this 
constitutes only one aspect of the multifaceted language of rights . 
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Rights fil "there to acknowledge the power of moral choice", but this 
power is not necessari1y the basis for their ascription: it is necessary 
only for certain rights, like the.. right to freedom of (moral, political, 
rational) choice. (~ike animals, we are not free to choose - and change 
- our nature. Moral choice is a power which is necessarily limited and 
which, while issuing in the inv~r.ation of rights, is not the only facet 
of our nature in virtue of which an appeal to rights is made.) 
A. Gewirth's and J. Wild's attempts t1 weight rights qi.;antitatively 
against one another approach utilitarian calculations in their Sisyphus-
like absurdity as well as in their m~ral reprehensibility. (A. Gewirth 
- "Reason and Morality"; op. cit.; sect. 3.4 passim; "Human Rights"; op. 
cit.; p. 150. J. Wild - ·'Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of 
Natural Law"; Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1957; pp. 46, 118, 
209/10, 219). 
T.L.S. Sprigge - "Non-Human Rights: an Idealist Perspective" (op. cit.; 
pp. 445/6). 
"New Scientist"; 30 June, 1977 
S.R.L. Clark draws our attention to facts and considerations about 
aninic:>ls' "ethical agency" in "The Nature of the Beast" Sep. cit.; p. 
107). I think that talk of "moral" and "ethical" (Gk: "ethos", 11 eth1kos 1' 
- characte ~; Lt. "ethicus" - standard of character set up by an.> race, 
nation (or species ?)) and "moral" (Lt. "mora11S", "mos", "moris" -
custom, pl. manners) have their counterparts in Aristotle'~ "natura 1" 
and "strict virtues" ("Nichomachean Ethics" VI. 13t Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). Consider ·the origin of the term ethology. See 
also S.F. Sapontzis - "Are Animals Moral Beings ?" (Atrerican Philosophi-
cal Quarterly 17, 1980), and "A Critique of Personhoo'1 11 (Ett.1cs 91; 
iqe1). 
SE:~ ... ~. Cr,omaraswamy's essay 11 A:<1mcanr.a: Self-Naughting" 1n his "Meta-
physics" (o.,. cit.; pp. 92, 100 n). The underlining in the followfog 
cit~tion is min~, for obvious r~asons. 
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R. Wasserstrom (or r.~t.; pp. 104, 109). 
J. Narveson has coined this phrase in "Animal Rights" (op. c1t.; p.164), 
in reaction to P. Singer's and T. Regan's views. See P. Sfoger - "All 
Animals are Equal" (op. cit.;) and "Killing Humans and Killing Animals" 
(Inquiry 22, 1979); T. Regan - "The Moral Bash Clf ~eget.ar1an1s111" (in: 
"All that Dwell therein"; op. cit.). 
"Interests and Rights" (op. cit.; chs. 111 & XI); 11 V1v1section, Morals 
and Medicine" (Journal of Medical Ethics 9, 1983). 
W. Paton (op. cit; p. 39). Paton believes that the argument from 
marginal cases does not hold because "there are no 'hopelessly' 
defective human beings" (p. 34), in that "there is a chance with all of 
them they they mi'y ceue to be so" (p. 39). Surely th1s applies only to 
lunatics, but not to imbeciles . The point, however, is not tha we are 
dealing with beings for whom a cure may be found in the future, but with 
beings who are mentally deficient now, below the normal human level and 
below that of many animals, and who deserve mo~al consideration now and 
because of t~ei r present c;tatus, not because of someth1 ng that may 
happen in the future. 
J. Kleinig - "Human Rights, Legal Rights, and Soehl Change" (in: E. 
Kamenka & A. Erh-Soon Tay - eds. - "Hur · n Rights"; op cit.; p. 142); A. 
Donegan (op. cit.; chs. 3 and 5); A. Gewirth "Rea::.on and Moral ty" (op. 
cit.; sect. 3.4); H.J. Mccloskey - "Rights" (op. it.; p. 124), "The 
Right to L1fe" (op. cit.; pp. 414/5), "Moral Rights and Animals" 
(lnqu1ry 22, 1979; p. 42 - the citation is from this paper); L J Suzman 
(op. cit.). Cojections to the notion of present potentiality are in 
A.I. Melden - "Rights and Personi 11 (op. cit.; p. 221). 
Contra J. Raz (np. cit.; op. 204/5) whose "reciprocity thesis" implies 
that only "meMbers of the same inoral co1T1T1u11ity 11 have rights, and which 
1s a contractar1an theory. if other beings share the capacities which 
characterize Raz's reciprocity agents, viz. to possess interests and to 
~ n~uy well-being, is ic unclear on what grounds he can deny them rights. 
, ,,nilarly 1 in Gewirth ("Reason and Morality"; op. cit.; passim), freedom 
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and well-being characterize agents, 1.e., claimants of rights - but 
these, tor, are shared by other animals: there must be something else 
that prizes his agents apart from other beings and once this is 
specified, the necessary connection between agency and claims, but not 
rights, becomes apparent. The reciprocity and agency requirements are 
discussed and rejected in S. F. Sapontzis • paper "Mora 1 Ccnmuni ty and 
Animal Rights" (American Philosophical Quarterly 22, 1985), on the basis 
that the weak and powe,.less cannot reciprocate and engage iri moral 
agency. Sapontzis holds that corrmon moral goals, such as protection 
from exploitation, wvuld be more readily attained if moral rights were 
extended to all powerless beings, in other words, to animals as well. 
T. Regan employes the term "moral patients" ( 11 The Case for Animal 
Rights"; op. cit.; pp. 151-6, 279/80), which I wish to avoid: owing to 
its pathological connotations it see:ns to be appropriate only in the 
case of lunatics and imbeciles. 
Professor G. van N. Viljoen, quoted by E. Brown in "The South African 
Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA)" (in: H.W. van der Merwe and R.A. 
Schrire - "Race and Ethnicity"; op. cit.; pp. 114/5). J. Narveson 
speaks of "sentimental interests" ("Animal Rights"; op. cit.), L. 
Pickering f'rancis and R. Norman of "str·ong emotional dtl cl.ments" ( 11 Some 
Animals are more Equal than Others"; Philosophy !'3, .L978; pp. 510/1). 
J. Kleinig (op. cit.; p. 42) writes that if "we do not wish to ascribe 
rights to animals it is •.•• because we do not consider their welfare 
interests important enough to Justify securing them by force". 
A.I. Melden - "Rights and Persons" (op. cit.; ch. VI passim). But 
"Tarzan" and "Mowgli" are not merely fictional characters: see, e.g., C. 
Maclean (op. cit.) and M.K. Temer11n (op. cit.). In his criticism of 
the "relations requirement" S. F. Sapontzis states that the existence of 
th! animal riQhts movement demonstrates that such relations not only 
obtain but are very strong ("Moral Co111nunity and Animal Rights", op. 
citd p. 256). 
. 
"The Right to Life" (op. cit.; p. 416). Recal 1 H.J. Adler's fear +hat 
the discovery that we might differ from animals only 1n degree and not 
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in k1nd would serve to destroy our moral bash for holding that all 
human beings have basic rights and an individual dignity (sect. 2.2. 
above): why should this signal a 11 destruct1on 11 of this moral ba51s and 
not an "extension" ? 
H.J. McCluskey - "Rights"; "The Right to Life"; "Moral Rights and 
Animals" (all op. cit.); R.G. Frey - "Interests and Rights" (op. cit.; 
chs. II, V, 'III and XI). M. Midgley disc"sses "interests" in "Animals 
and why they Matter" (op. cit.; pp. 54~); and J. Rachels treats 
•property" and •possession" in "Do Animals have a Right to Liberty ?" 
(op. cit.; pp. 207/8, 219/20). 
A.I. Melden - "Rights and Persons" (op. cit. i p. 186) - and H.J. 
Mccloskey - "The Right to Life" (op. cit.; p. 417) - embark on thh 
attack. 
It 1s possible to teach a dog to "shake hands", but it would be rather 
absurd to attempt to teach your pet snake this trick. If snakes have a 
"right to E.ducat1on" at all, they are certainly not educable tn th1s 
way. 
H.L.A. Hart, (op. cit.; both pass~ges are on p. 66); L.J. Suzman - op. 
cit. (pp. 15/6). Contra Suzman, 1t might even be argued that an animal 
who is being mistreated or who anticipates danger will struggle, kick, 
scratch or try to bite. and that this might be a form of claiming its 
rights. a 1 bei t 1 n the absence of a concept of rights or of the mora 1 
significance of the situation. (See T.L.S. Sprigge - "Nonhuman Rights: 
an Idealist Perspective"; op. cit.9 p. 442.) However. I do not intend 
to endorse this assumption: it seems to be merely an 1nteresting 
hypothesis. 
Does "taking rights seriously" commit u~ to ascribing (moral) rights to 
artifacts ard 1nan1mate objects which are often held to have "value in 
their own right 11 (cf. w. Paton - "Man and Mouse"; op. cit.; p. 36) ? I 
submit that attribution of moral rights to these objects would not ~nly 
be counterintuitive but would render the scope of moral responsibility 
infinite and ultimately entail an attenuation of rights to the point of 
uselessness. But artifacts, like paintings, buildings. etc •• col ld 
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consistently be held to have ''aesthetic rights", rather than moral 
rights. S\milarly, soil, rivers, whole ecosystems (in abstraction from 
the fauna and flora they contain) might be said to have "ecc; fcal 
rights". Though rocks are not conscious or "alive", it would be inde-
fensible to blow up the Matterhorn simply because it lacks life or 
feeling. Wnat we do to rocks 1s not of "moral concern" (contra P. 
Singer - "The Concept of Moral Stan~ing"; op. cit. - who locates the 
source of moral concern for mountains in their "extrinsic value", as 
means to the ends, e.g • . joy, or 1nspiration, of human beings), but of 
"ecological" and perhaps also of "aesthetic" concern. Ecological and 
aesthPtic rights might be said to converge in the legal realm, altima-
tely. 
Ch. 6 
l 
.. 
' 
E.g., by T. Regan - "An Examination and Defense of one Argument 
concerning Animal Rights" (in: "All that Dwell therein"; op. cit.; pp • 
117/8), and J. Raz (op. cit.; pp. 197/8), who distinguishes between 
"core rights" and "derivative rights". Neither Regan nor Raz, however, 
furnish an account of what these rights are, what particular basic and 
nonbaslc rights creatures nave, and what place they occupy in their 
11ves • 
B. Brophy - "In Pursuit of Fant.asy" (in: S. and R. Godlovitch & J. 
Harris - "Animal" Men, and Morals"i op. c1t.i p. 127). L. Nelson, in 
"Duties Lu Animals" (ibid.; p. ~ ~O), wr1tes that interests are the basis 
for rights, and that · he interes~ - of others are inferred from certain 
externa 1 or physical mani f~statfons, known to be associated with "such 
processes" in oneself. It is a "matter of consistency", according to 
Nelson, that "men have r.o more interests and rights than animals": 
"either we can (ascribe interdts and rights) by analogy or we cannot 
(ascribe them) at all." 
A. I. Mel den - "Introduction" to "H•Jman kights" (op. cit.) - and T. Regan 
- "An Examination and Defense of one Argument concerning Anima 1 Rights" 
(op. cit) - do this. 
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As 1s proposed by A.M. Maciver ("Ethics and the Beetle"i Analysis 8, 
1948i p. 70) and A. Gewirth. Gewirth writes that "(b)y a principle of 
proportionality other beings, such as children, foetuses, mentdlly 
def1c1t!nt persons, and animals can be shown to have moral rights 1n 
lesser degrees" ("Can Utilitarianism Justify any Moral Rights ?"; in: 
"Human Right!it"i op. cit.; p. 150). Cf. also sect. 3.4 pa.sim in Ms 
"Reason an'1 Morality" (op. cit.). If 1t were contributory to the 
well-being and compatib1- with the freedo~ of rational agents, abusing 
all these "other beings" would be justifiable, in Gewirth's view, an 
implication he fails to give due consideration. 
Rt:levant excerpts from these declarations have been reprinted in: A.I. 
Melden - ed. "Human Rights" ( • ). 
R. Goldwin - "Rights ver:iu• 10 Contest" (in: A.L. Caplan & D. 
Callahan - "Ethics in Hard Tirr.elt , " cit.; pp. 125/7). See also H.J. 
McClosk!!y in "The Right to Life" in particular (op. cit.) - Of course, 
to reduce all m~tives to a basic one, viz. that of self-preservat1on, i~ 
not very helpful in understanding bthdviour, and it 1s unlikely that 
such a reduction will facilitate an understanding of moral concern, 
rights-discourse, etc. 
;h~s h H.L.A. Hart's •most plausible ca~didate 11 : his thesis ir that 11 1f 
there are any rights at all, then there is at least one nat~ral right, 
the equal ri9ht of all men to be free" (op. cit.i p. 61). 
That it 1s not in an animal's interest to be co'lfined in cages and 
enclosures is beyond reasonable doubt. s~e above, ch. 3, esp. my 
remarks at the beginning of tne chapter lnd in sect. 3.2. On a tiger's 
liberty to eat human beings and "on violation of this right as -. matter 
of self-defence, see sect. 7.2. 
It was not mere coincidence that Orwe 11 cr,nferred the rel e of leaders of 
the revolution onto pigs in his novel "Animca1 Fann": retent find1ngs 
indicate a level of intelligence comparable with that nf clever dogs. -
On the rights to liberty, and to property, see J. Rachel) - "Do Animals 
have a Right to Liberty ?" (op. cit.) - wno bases his 4rgument on a 
discussion of J. Locke's concept of prop~rty. 
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The rights to freedom and to we11-being are rights to those features 
which characterize behaviour and, indeed, "successful agency•, and are 
therefore "fundamental", according to A. Gewirth ("Reason and Morality"; 
op. cit.; sect. 2.7.; see also h1s "Introduction" to "Human Rights"; op. 
cit.; p. 5). (Gewirth, I hasten to add, does not explicitly reduce the 
right to happiness to the right to well-being.) Cf. also R. Wasserstrom 
(op. cit.; p. 105), and G. Vlastos (op. cit.; p. 95). The "right to 
resistance of oppression" reff.rred to in the French declar1tt1on of 
rights (ther~ is something strangely paradox1cal about this right: 
"right" presupposes Justice and equa 1 i ty, a11J ""opress ion" imp l 1e1 the 
contrary) can be said to derive both from the right to liberty a~d from 
the right to well-being. 
Thh problem 1s mentioned, but not d1scusud or resolved, by S.R.l. 
Clark - "The Moral Status of Animals" (op. cit.; p. 14 n). 
M. Midgley - "Beast and Man" (op. cit.; pp. 215, 229/30, 249) - deals 
with sue~. ec:!ucation and the interest chimpanzees have or take in it. 
J. Rawls - "A Theory of Ju tice" (op. cit.; esp. ~ects. 31 77; the 
quotation is from p. 505). 
In mentioni ng these rights, I do not mean to imply that att1ve and 
pa:as1Ve euthanasia are not morally Justifiable. I think that txc:e11ent 
reasons can be fu n1shed in support of these practicas, though perhaps 
not necessarily or exc 1 us he ly those advocated by J. G 1 over and P. 
Singer 1il their thorough lC<;ounts, "Causing DHth and Saving lives" and 
"Practical Ethics", r.:tspecthely (both op. cit.) t;nfortunl\.ely, the 
iss~e of euthanasia it beyond the se~pe of my inquiry: I will have to 
resign mys•lf to discussing euthinas1a with reqard to animals only - see 
the following chapter. 
Cf. S.R.L. Clark - "The Moral Status of Animals" ~op. cit.; p. 73). 
S.I. Benn mentions the first two 1n "Rights" (op. cit.; p. 198); A.I. 
~ielden discusses the third in "Rights and Persons" {op. cit.; ch. VI, 
passim). 
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A.I. Melden mentions this right; ibid.; p. 184. 
S.I. Benn - "Ega11tar1an1sm and Equal Consideration of Interests" (op. 
cit.) - and R. Dworkin (op. cit.; pp. xiii, 273·8) -, respectively, 
claim this status for them. 
ibid.; p. 63. 
Ch. 7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
E.g., D.G. Ritchie (op. c1t.), and H.J. Mccloskey - "Moral Rights and 
Animals'' (op. cit). - For an opposing view, see B. Brophy - "The 
Darwinist'~ Dilemma" (op. cit.) - who writes that only as moral agents 
are we justified in, e.g., protecting birds from our cats. - Ritchie 
would counter that defending animals by appeal to rights would require 
that we secure their natural predators a fair trial before finding them 
"guilty" or "innocent". 
Following a paper on "Just Punishment", given in the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand in March 1985, L.J. 
Suzman suggested that although their agency may approximate rational 
agency in some instances and a high degree of interspecific 
understanding may be possible (e.g., between shepherd and sheep-dog), 
animals cannot be "punished" in the primary sense, i.e., as one might 
t1ke to tas~ a rational agent. 
J. Feinberg .. 11 Hu1nn Duties and Animal Rights" (op. cit.; p. 201) ... J. 
GrAeve has suggested to me in convetsati~n that even keeping carnivorous 
pets on a vegetarian diet might be rtgarded as cruel. (Now, what about 
the animals whose remains delight our pets ? But as long as there is no 
rea 1 pet food "industry• and our dogs and cats have to get by on 
"scraps", tt might be argued, there 1s no real contest. Nevertheless, 
we have struck on another argument against keeping animals as pets.) 
Recall my distinction between "moral agency" and "ethical agency• in 
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sect. 5.2 - T. Regan suggests that only moral agents can vio16• rights, 
and that animals cannot and do not violate the rights of c ·.er beings 
("Ttie Case for Animal Rights"; op. cit.; p. 285). Here, curiously, 
rights would flow not from the creature who has them but from the agent 
who can violate them, and this runs counter to Regan's view. 
Cf., e.g., J. Rachels - "Do An1m11s have a Right to liberty ? 11 (op. 
cit.; pp. 220/1). 
•The Right to life" (op. cit.; p. 414) 
This 1s the gist of R. Dworkin's "trump" theory (op. cit.; p. xi; and 
ch. 7 passim). 
O.G. Ritchie speaks of •puardiansh1p of their rights" (op. cit.; p, 
183). - J. Glove1, in "Causing Death and Sav1ng Lives" (op. cit. i pp. 
76 ff), speaks in terms of a "contest" between respect for autonomy and 
paternalism. The conmon assumption 1s that one cannot be 11 p1tern1l1s-
tic" in one's treatment of animals, for they do noi satisfy the •belief-
requirement": it 1s sufficient that animals are subjects of a 11fe and 
have interests, for characterizing human meddling with their lives and 
interests as "paternalistic". (See T. Regan •The Case for Animal 
Rights" i op. cit.; pp. 103-9.) 
•Animals and why they Matter·" (op. cit.; pp. 25/6) 
O.T. Suzuki - "Der westliche und der oestliche Weg• (op. cit.; p. 118). 
"Ani~•ls and why they Matter• (op. cit.; p. 21) 
J. Rachels - •can Ethics provide Answers 711 (A.L. Caplan & D. Callahan -
•Ethics in Hard Times"; op. cit.) - quotes from O. H1.111e 1 s essay on 
suicide: "The life of a man is of no gre•ter importance to the universe 
than that of an oyster" and suggests that Hume would no doubt have felt 
vindicated by •\•t)lutionary tt.eory which eroded confidence about any 
special place for humanity in the scheme of things. - Contra Hume (and 
Rachels) it could be drgued that human beings have families and friends 
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who worry about th~m, unlike oysters, and that ~uch a circle constitutes 
at least part of the "universe". And to respond to this that such 
relations, etc., make no difference to the course of the Jrld would be 
to make a claim wh1ch is itself purely consequentialist. 
Cf. L. Wittgenstein's "mixed remark" in "Culture and Value" (Oxford: 
8as11 Blackwell, 1980; p. 72): "It \t!Ould almost be strange if there did 
not exist animals with the mental life of plants. I.e., lacking mental 
life". And: "I do not transfer my 1dea (of pain) to stones, plants, 
etc. • • • Only of what behaves 1 ike a human being can one say thJt it 
has ,E!jJl!"· ("Ph11osoph1scht Untersuchungen"; op. cit. 283). 
K. Wilkes - "Phys1ca11sm" (op. cit.; p. 100). L. Wittgenstein's remark 
is in "Zettel" (op. cit.; 532). 
P. Tompkins & C. Bird - "The Secret Life of Plants" (New York: Harper 
Celophan Books, 1984; first published 1973; p. xi11). On memory in 
plants and communication between plants and human beings, see C. 
Backster - "Evidence of Primary Perception in Plant Life" (International 
Journal of Parapsychology, 1968). Backster's inquiry, which was 
conducted by means of li e-detectars, involved dropping living brine 
shrimp into boiling water in order to test plants' "reactions". Judging 
from this callous treatment of animals, it is unlikely that he will have 
drawn any moral consequences from the "evidence of primary perception in 
plant life". 
A.W. Galston & C.L. Slaynan - "The Not-so-secret Life of Plants" 
(American Scientist 67, 1979); K.A. Horowitz, D.C. Lewis, & E.L. 
Gasteiger - "Plant 'Primary Perception"' (Science 189, 1975). 
C. McG1nn - "The Character of Mind'' (op. cit.; pp. 31 ff). A similar 
argument constitutes o~e of his three objections to the idea of panpsy-
chism. Cf. also rp. 82/3, 85, where he says that from the evolutionary 
point of view, "knowledge would be pointless without action", and that 
light-sensitive behaviour of plants hardly counts as agency. 
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J. Glover asks whether the "direct wrongness" of taking life also 
applies to ants, mosquitoes, or in the case of weeding the garden, and 
takes the implied negative answer to render the ~octrine of the 
"sanctity of life" unacceptablr. ("Causing Death and Saving lives"; op. 
cit.; p. 42). - J. Rachels - "Can Ethics provide Answers ?11 (op. cit.; 
p. 22). - K. Goodpaster discusses tt.e · nterests of plants (op. cit.; p. 
319). 
c.r. Stone writes: "What 1s needPd 1s a (theory) that can fft r•1r 
growi!'tg body of knowledge of geophysics, biology anl'f the cosmos. In 
this vein, I do not think it tt~ remote that we may come to regard the 
Earth, •••• as or ~ organism, of which Mankind is a functional part the 
mfnd, perhaps." ("Should Trees have Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects" (Los Altos/CA:W1111am Kaufmann, Ir.c.; 1974; pp. 51/2). 
Some philosophers may disagree with Stune's claim that man fs the 11mind 11 
of the earth and point to the havoc we have wreaked, both 1n dealing 
with nature and with our 1ellnw hu~an beings. Cf. ch. 2 n. 21. - But 
the point of Stone's remark seems to be that any judgment, feel 1ng, ~r 
decision wh~ch concerns any form ot life, is morally significant. 
Although he doe~ not employ the t.~""" 11mor1l" as such, there 1s a 
striking s~1111.., ,· ty Detween th~ "radical new theory", the 11 111,Yth" he 
advocates, and the ethic of the future envisaged by J, Margolis, the 
discipline of 11moral ecology" ("Value and Conduct"; op. cit.; pp. 7, 
212). Both "foe s not merely on the 1nvned1ate use of the world for 
determinate human ends ••• but also on the long-term use of the world 
for determinablf! ends" (Margolis). 
Doubts about this are expressed by, e.g., J. Rodman (op. cit.; pp. 86/7, 
126 n. 36, 97, 103/4, and passim). C.D. Stone's remark 1s 1n "Should 
Trees have Standing ?11 (op. cit.i p. 10). 
R.G. Frey - "What has Sc:itiency to do with the P-:>ssess1on of Rights ?" 
(op. cit.;, "Interests and Rights" (op. cit.; esp. ch. 1, and 
Postscript). M. Midgley - "Animals and why th~y Matter" (op. cit.; pp. 
61/3, 66). 
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A. MacIntyre - "After Virtue" (London: Duckworth 1 1981 i p. 67 /S)i R. 
Dworkin (op. c1t.i pp. 103/4). H.J. Mccloskey r1ames two reasons why 
talk of rights cannot be abandoned 1n favour of other 1deas: first, 
because it is often logically primary and because som~thing is lost when 
we refer only to the good or the duty which h .. he basis of what an 
individual may do; second, becaLse the kinds of distinction drawn w~thin 
rights do not parall~l those drawn within duties, like "prima facie", 
"basic", "absolute" rights, etc. 
Cf. R. Wasserstom - op. cit. (pp. 101/2). 
R. Nozick - "Philosophical Explanations" (op. cit.i p. 459)i Nozick 
speaks in terms of "value-seeking" rather than "reason-seeking". 
A. Hacint.v ·e (op. cit-i p. 68); see also M.E. Zimmermann - "The Critique 
of Natl',·a 1 Rights and the Search for a Non-Anthropocentric Sas is for 
Moral Behaviour" (Jo~r11al of Value Inquiry, 19; 1985; p. 50), and T. 
Regan - "Exploring the 1dea of Animal Ri"hts" (in: R.D. Ryder & D. 
Paterson - "Animals' Rights: a Symposium"; op. c:t.). 
C. Pierce, in "Can Animals b, Llberated ?" (Philosophical Studies 36, 
1979; p. 74), contrasts liberation and the right to liberty: "Liberation 
requires us to resist and restructure a whole system of psychological 
pressures, whereas the right to liberty is givt·n to us within that 
system". I expect that similar arguments can be c.onstructed involving 
otner rights. - M.E. Zimmermann (op. cit.; pp. 48/9) mentions the 
transitiontl usefu 1 ness ' 1ghts. 
Thus, it might be argued 1riting and/or acting on behalf of animals 
especially in a country • c South Africa, is a kind of "displacement 
isctivity" which serves to channel one's ener~y away from, and to calm 
one's feelings of guilt over failure to concern oneself with, tht "real 
issues" of apartheid and the emancipation of women (both white and 
black). - Another criticism could come from black South Africans who 
might claim that concern w1th the rights and the "liberation" of animals 
actually involves a racist bias against them: they feel threatened, 
e.g., by conservation politics and policies and consider it .'et another 
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example of racial discrimination that animals, wild animdls, are 
assigned terrii:ory which is "rightfully" theirs, 1.e., the Africans. 
The implication here is that arguments contra speciesism smack strongly 
of racism. (But consider: given the subordinated role of women in black 
South African tradition and culture, would it be discriminatory against 
black men to advoc~te the rights of the fonner ? Or would this amount 
to a conte~t between two species of paternalism? If yes, which speci.••s 
is preferabl~, i.e., with respect to the individual black woman?) 
E. Fromn (op. cit.) t'urnif.h?s ~r ;11urr.inating account of Hitler's 
vegetarhnism (pp. 534, 537), of the rh;OfO'!~ train~ng routines he put 
his dogs through (p. 562), tnd also of his re·~·~,,.. ~o w~"' ·n (pp. 
543-8). 
C.D. Stone {op. cit.; p. 8) 
Cf. J. Rodman (op. tit.; p. 103). 
K. Marx - "On the Jewish Question" (in: R. Tucker - ed. - "The li\arx-
Engels Reader 11 ; New York: ·~.w. Norton; 1978). Marx is surely wrong, 
however, in linking individualism with egoism and in detecting only 
egoistic motivation in appeals to rights. To some extent, as I have 
argued, it may be true that the invocation of rights ;~ self-interested 
but the extension of rights to the hitherto underprivileged and to those 
who cannot themselves claim them surely disproves the argument from 
solely self-interested motivation. Duty-based theories seem to admit of 
such motivation to a much larger exte'lt. - T. Nagel' s doubts about 
rights are express 
wh•!re he complains 
"Equality" (in: "Mortal Questions"; pp. 115/6), 
~ 1ights limit the actions of others directly and 
.1.!l~ependently yet leave a great deal of life ungoverned by moral restric-
tions or requirements. According to Nagel, the "justification of broad 
•••• action to promote all aspects of the general welfare requires a 
much richer set of moral requirements" (which his "egal1tar1an1sm" 
purports to furnish; but th~re is no reason to believe that no rights-
thttO"Y can acconmodate rights in the sense of Nagel 's "equal moral 
claims". rights which concern not only restrictions on how an individual 
may be treated but, indeed, whatever may happP.n !o the individual) • 
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13 
14 
15 
175. 
D.M. Raup & S.M. Stanley - "Principles of Paleontology" (San Francisco: 
Freeman: 1971i p.255; my underlining). 
C. Pierce (op. cit.; p. 74). - J. Rodman's argument resembles the 
Piercean one; yet he contrast~ the "moral/legal stage of consciousness" 
with a kind of ecologicGl consciousness that transcends the narro~ 
legalistic/moralistic framework. Like Pierce, he argues that one "can 
only liberate oneself, just as Ont! can only ac.tualize one's own 
potentialities". But, unlhe Pierce, he se~s "liberation" as 
constituting part of that narrow framework (op. cit.; pp. 101-4). He 
seems to fail to appreciate that we are necessarily caught up in this 
legalistic/moralistic web and that not every attempt to expand it, e.g., 
by restructuring a given system, must be doomed to failure. 
In another sense of "liberation", the Budd~ist sense, it is required not 
only that one have a sense of self, etc., but that one transcend it in 
order to be liberated. It is unlikely that even highly intelligent 
chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys could accomplish this fe6t. (Most humans 
might not be capable of achieving this, for that matter.) But then 
again, we do not know, do we ? Consider the famous Zen anecdote: A 
monk asked Joshu, a Chinese Zen master: "Has a dog Buddha-nature or 
not?" 
Joshu answered "Wu". 
("Wu" means "Wu", plainly what a dog might have answered to the 
question. This parable 1s cited by D. T. Suzuki, in "Die grosse 
Befreiung"; Frankfurt/Main: Fischer,; 1975.) 
The etymological origin of "emancipation": (Lt.) "e" - out; "m1nus 11 -
hand; "capere" - to take. "Manus" and "capere" are combined in "manci-
pium" .. property. Hence, "emancipation", in Roman legal usage, meant 
"giving independence to ••• " (cf. A.M. Prichard; op. cit.;), and has 
since been expanded to n1ean also: liberation from the inhibitions 
imposed by convent i ona 1 mor1211 ty, etc. (See, e.g. , webs ter' s di ct i o-
na ry). - T. Regan ("Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights"; op. cit.; p. 
86) has called "animal rights" the "backbone of the humane mo11ement11 , 
and sympathy ("compassion'') its "heart", without actually inquiring into 
the possibility of their 1rtteract1on 1n moral "physiology". 
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